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ABSTRACT  
 
Cases involving sudden environmental events, such as British Petroleum’s (BP’s) accidental oil 
spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, clearly demonstrate the causal relation between poor 
corporate environmental performance and abrupt loss of shareholder value. Under such 
circumstances, a firm’s results can be readily priced using a conventional valuation model and 
hence, there is a clear nexus between environmental performance and business outcomes, as 
represented by the firm’s financial results as well as the event impact on shareholder value 
through equity prices. However, in less extreme cases there is no clear evidence of there being a 
relationship between these elements. Further, in relation to the literature on the nature of and 
motivations for corporate social and environmental reporting, scant attention has been directed 
towards research on the usefulness of environmental performance information to financial 
decision makers. Moreover, such studies as there have been have delivered mixed results in the 
absence of a conceptual framework that is able to distinguish the quality of such reporting from 
underlying performance and other representations of performance, such as reputation and SRI 
index membership. 
 
In order to address these previous shortcomings in this field, the proposed research focuses on 
environmental issues to investigate whether corporate environmental performance information 
can be considered as an aspect of a firm’s value, in terms of equity performance and to this end 
three empirical studies are carried out probing the relationships, respectively, between:  
 corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputation and equity performance, 
 socially responsible investment (SRI) index  membership and equity performance, and  
 CSR ratings and share selection in SRI versus general investment funds, 
whilst in each case controlling for other environmentally related factors, as well as financial 
performance. 
 
The findings of the first empirical study suggest that environmental reputation and physical 
performance measured as proxies of the corporate environmental performance have value 
relevance, being negatively significantly related to the stock valuation, whereas environmental 
disclosure (DJSI) is not value relevant to financial decision-makers, and hence, not incorporated 
10 
 
into share prices. However, the outcomes suggest that the GRI, an alternative measure of 
environmental disclosure, is value relevant even though it is not incorporated into share prices. 
The outcomes of the second empirical study indicate that companies being added to the DJSI or 
the FTSE4Good index in the March announcement results in a temporary decrease in a their 
share price, whilst companies added in (deleted from) the September announcement of the 
FTSE4Good index experience a significant but temporary increase (decrease) in stock return. 
However, membership of SRI indices does not have value relevance. Finally, the findings from 
the third empirical study suggest that CSR ratings have a weak influence on the ownership 
holdings decisions taken by SRI fund managers and further, they show that they, on aggregate, 
prefer to take into account multidimensional CSR measurements when making investment 
choices.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Context 
 
A series of cases have demonstrated the causal relation between poor corporate environmental 
performance and abrupt loss of shareholder value.  Memorable examples include the General 
Public Utilities’ nuclear accident at Three Mile Island in 1978, Union Carbide’s toxic release in 
Bhopal in 1984 and Exxon’s oil spill in Alaska in 1989, but British Petroleum’s (BP’s) 
accidental oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 provides a near-contemporary example.  Its 
share price fell from $57.16 on 19
th
 April, 2010, the day before the accident, to a low of $27.62 
on 24
th
 June, 2010, although with some subsequent recovery
1
. In addition, the loss of the 
company’s reputation in this area was marked by its removal from socially responsible 
investment (SRI) indices, such as the DJSI and FTSE4Good index, and shareholders faced future 
losses as a result of calls for tighter regulation by the US on deepwater oil drilling.  
 
While these cases involved sudden events with dramatic and easily understood consequences or 
risks, the common characteristic more important for the present purpose is that there were 
financial consequences in terms of regulatory breaches, clean-up and compensation costs etc. 
which thus economically internalised at least some element of the environmental harm (see, for 
example, Blacconiere and Patten, 1994).  Such financial representation of this harm in the firms’ 
results could also be readily priced using conventional valuation models.  Thus, in cases such as 
these, there is a clear nexus between environmental performance, business outcomes, as 
represented by the firm’s financial results and the impact on shareholder value through equity 
prices. 
 
The research challenge lies in less extreme cases, where the firm’s environmental impact is more 
subtle and/or manifested over a longer period.  In such cases, the question then is whether 
securities markets incorporate these factors when considering risk and return, i.e. as internal 
factors ultimately represented in the firm’s financial results, whether they incorporate them in 
                                                 
1
 Source being the Wall Street Journal, http://quotes.wsj.com/BP/historical-
prices?mod=WSJ_qtoverview_relatedinfo   
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some other way in their decision-making, perhaps as part of more general environmental, social 
and governance (ESG) concerns, or whether they are insensitive to them?  
 
Regarding this, environmental issues have been reflected in large body of academic literature 
examining the relationship between environmental performance and firm performance (see 
Appendix I for examples), but the empirical evidence is mixed and further, there is the confusion 
over the utilizing of the term “performance”. Accordingly, the term ‘firm performance’ in this 
context is categorised as a firm’s equity performance, as indicated by its share price movements, 
and its financial/economic performance, which is measured by the managers’ performance on 
business activities as presented in their  financial results. For example, a number of the 
aforementioned studies (e.g. Hammond and Slocum, 1996; Herremans et al., 1993) have 
conflated these two aspects of a company’s performance to represent a firm’s overall financial 
performance. The fundamental debate in this context is whether corporate environmental 
performance can be considered as an aspect of firm value in terms of its financial and/or equity 
performance. Accordingly, in this study equity performance and financial performance are 
defined separately as the constituent parts of overall firm performance, unless stated otherwise.  
 
The other aspect environmental performance is what form of accounting the market uses as the 
source of environmental performance information for its decision-making. Regarding this, from 
the perspective of conventional finance and accounting theory, financial statements and reports 
are primarily directed towards enabling investors to make decisions appropriate to their 
preferences, but here the questions are: if investors only care about risk/return, does such 
information convey enough about the impact of ESG factors?  Further, if they care about ESG 
concerns for their own sake, is adequate non-financial information available to help them form a 
view on this? With respect to this, little is known about how such information impacts on 
investors’ decision making and further, previous empirical studies have elicited mixed findings 
regarding the value relevance of ESG information (Black et al., 2000; Clarkson et al., 2004; 
Hassel et al., 2005; Hughs II, 2000). From the perspective of financial accounting theory, it is 
accepted that financial information provides valuable information to investors, but because the 
adaptation of ESG issues and related activities, which are mostly presented in non-financial 
14 
 
reporting, are related to business cases and are usually on a voluntary basis, it is hard to identify 
whether the non-financial information has value relevance. 
 
Coupled with these matters, is the issue of how to measure the existence or absence of such a 
relationship. However, this previous research has not explicitly identified the impact of the 
various aspects of environmental performance on financial outcomes. One key reason for this is 
the lack of standardised measurements for environmental performance owing to their non-
financial nature. Regarding this, corporate environmental performance does not just involve 
physical performance (e.g. pollution levels) and hence, several alternative measurements have 
been considered, such as: corporate environmental reputation (e.g. Belkaoui, 2004; McGuire et 
al., 1988 and 1990; Toms, 2002); company environmental disclosures (e.g. Belkaoui, 1976; 
Freedman and Patten, 2004; Murray et al., 2006); and the badge of SRI indices memberships (e.g. 
Cheung, 2011; Curran and Morran, 2007; Robinson et al., 2011). This variation gives rise to 
what exactly do these measures represent. That is, what, if anything, do markets react to, i.e. 
what form of environmental accounting, if any, do they use as their source of information?  That 
is, if it is actual environmental performance, then it can be said that this is a rational link either 
based on the conventional perspective or ethical/moral motives, but if it is reputation then it 
needs to be interpreted with care whether it is consistent with performance or not. If not, there is 
an argument that the market is being irrational and it needs to look at what reputation is for. 
Similarly, with the badge of SRI indices, if linked with performance, then this may be a quick 
way of conveying a great deal of information and further, giving a good signal of corporate 
sustainability leadership and thus enhancing a firm’s reputation (Cho et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 
2011). Conversely, if performance and badge are not related then it might be also argued that the 
market is being irrational. Regarding these matters, much less attention has been directed in the 
form of comprehensive research, with one exception being Cho et al. (2012), who argued that 
perceived corporate reputation is not always followed by actual corporate performance. Hence, 
one of the main aims in this thesis is to identify which measure(s) of environmental performance, 
if any, is/are relevant in contributing to a firm’s value and to elicit which measure(s), if any, 
investors rely upon in their investment decision-making.  
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1.2. Aims and Objectives 
 
The proposed research focuses on environmental issues and aims to investigate the fundamental 
point of whether corporate environmental performance information can be considered as an 
aspect of a firm’s value, in terms of equity performance. Further, there is the aim of discovering 
the extent to which, if at all, various measures of a company’s environmental performance 
individually and collectively impact upon firm value. From the perspective of traditional 
accounting, there is still ongoing debate as whether it can enhance firm value or not, because it is 
still carried out on a voluntary basis and as a result, there is neither universal recognition nor a 
universal definition (e.g. Gary et al, 1995). For example, it cannot be concluded that strong 
environmental performance leads to strong firm value, because it has not been clearly elicited 
whether environmental performance is associated with other universal financial measures, such 
as earnings and dividends and hence, feed through to firms’ stock prices. In this respect, the 
information from various sources essential for making investment decisions and hence, another 
goal is to elicit whether investors take into account information regarding a firm’s environmental 
performance in their investment decision-making. By fulfilling these aims, this thesis contributes 
to the field by providing new insights into the perceptions regarding environmental performance 
information by outside investors as well as delivering useful guidelines for managers and policy 
makers in relation to how to manage their environmental reporting.  
 
More specifically, this thesis is driven by the need to address the following research questions: 
 
 Question 1: What effect do various measures of environmental performance have on 
investor decisions? 
 
 Question 2:  Which measure is of greatest relevance in this process? 
 
 Question 3: Are there differences between SRI-styled and other funds in terms of the 
environmental performance of companies represented in their portfolios? 
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In order to address these questions, the following objectives are pursued. 
 
1) To identify emerging themes and gaps in the extant theoretical and empirical studies; 
2) To develop a conceptual framework which takes into account an investor’s preference in 
relation to environmental performance when making investment decisions; 
3) To conduct empirical research to test the conceptual framework and propositions using an 
appropriate research design. More specifically, the empirical research comprises three studies 
investigating the relationships respectively between:  
i. corporate social responsibility (CSR) reputation and equity performance, 
ii. socially responsible investment (SRI) index  membership and equity performance,  
iii. CSR ratings and share selection in SRI versus non-SRI funds,  
whilst in each case controlling for other environmentally related factors; 
4) To assess whether the findings provide support for the conceptual framework. 
 
1.3. An overview of the thesis 
 
The study consists eight chapters, including the introduction. Having presented the aim of the 
study with main research questions here, chapter 2 provides discussion on the definitions of CSR 
and a review of the extant studies on the relationship between corporate environmental 
performance and equity performance. In addition, the theories underpinning the empirical 
approaches in prior relevant studies are reviewed and the results of these are highlighted so as to 
indicate what relation between environmental performance and firm performance might be 
expected in this research. Drawing on the findings of the CSR literature, focusing on the 
corporate environmental performance, in chapter 3 a conceptual framework is devised regarding 
investors’ decisions in relation to environmental performance. Finally, in this chapter the 
propositions for the subsequent development of hypotheses to be tested in the empirical studies 
are put forward and the proxies used for environmental performance in each of the subsequent 
empirical studies are described in detail. 
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For the three empirical studies (chapters 4, 5, and 6) a variety of datasets and econometric 
techniques are used to assess the relation between equity performance and corporate 
environmental performance: 
 Chapter 4 explores corporate environmental reputation, environmental disclosure and 
pollution performance impacts on firms’ equity performance through the development of 
a model for testing the relationship between share returns and environmental performance, 
which is an extension of the earnings-returns model used by Belkaoui (2004). In addition, 
the valuation model developed in Ohlson (1995) who showed how firm value is related 
accounting data and other information is employed to investigate whether or not 
environmental performance, as other information, is value relevant. 
 
 In chapter 5 there is an event-study for testing the value relevance of non-financial 
information. The aim here is to determine whether or not DJSI World and FTSE4Good 
Global Index membership conveys information that is relevant to the investment 
community. More specifically, the event investigated is the announcement of addition to 
or deletion from the DJSI World from 2000 to 2007 or the FTSE4Good Global Index 
from 2002 to 2007. Further, whether membership of such indices can enhance firm value 
is probed by using Ohlson’s (1995) model.  
 
 Chapter 6 explores whether the level of CSR ratings positively influences the equity 
holdings decision by SRI funds more than for non-SRI ones, using Lipper’s data on 
portfolio holdings for the years 2006 and 2007.  
 
Chapter 7 provides discussion on the main findings from the hypotheses tested in the empirical 
studies. The final chapter, chapter 8, contains a synthesis of the findings, which involves drawing 
on the review of the literature, the key elements of the conceptual framework as well as 
important empirical outcomes.  Further, future research avenues in this area are proposed and the 
major implications for academics, policy makers and managers outlined. 
 
Overall, in this chapter, the importance of the case for improved accuracy in the measurement of 
environmental performance has been put forward. That is, it is posited that if a range of measures 
18 
 
is tested to assess their impact on equity performance, this could provide useful insights for 
managers and policy makers, because they would have greater knowledge on how investment 
decisions are influenced by CSR/environmental reporting. The next chapter provides a 
comprehensive literature review of extant scholarly research into the relationship between 
corporate environmental performance and equity performance. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  
Research interest in social responsibility matters in business started to grow in the 1970s, when a 
number of empirical studies were carried out to investigate whether these have an impact on firm 
profitability (Carroll, 1999). It could be that it was Milton Friedman (1970) who galvanised this 
debate by claiming there was a link between CSR and firm performance and which led to a 
proliferation of papers in a variety of management and business journals supporting or refuting 
this position. However, despite all this scholarship no hard and fast conclusions have been 
arrived at. In general, what is evident is that there are no comprehensively agreed uniform 
measurements of CSR (Ilinitch et al., 1998; Margolis and Walsh, 2003) and further, no 
robustness of consistent positive findings between the two, although they seemed to indicate  that 
CSR has a positive influence on firm performance (Orlitzky et al., 2003). In fact, it cannot be 
emphasized enough that the results of any analysis setting out to evaluate the impact on firm 
profitability of compliance with CSR depend crucially on how well chosen are the CSR 
measures used to capture its various facets.  
 
In this chapter, there is an overview of all of the extant research that is relevant for informing 
three empirical studies: the first uses various proxies as measures of CSR to examine the 
association between it and equity performance; the second is an a event study on the 
announcement of SRI index membership status; and the third uses a portfolio ownership 
holdings dataset to investigate whether the decisions made by SRI and non-SRI fund managers 
differ, because of former’s dependence on CSR.    
 
The aims of this chapter are: 
 To chart a comprehensive landscape of the relevant literature; 
 To present a cohesive overview of the extant studies and their results; 
 To discuss the reasons why any relationship should be expected based on the theoretical 
approach in extant previous studies; 
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 To develop a research agenda for this thesis by identifying existing gaps in this field. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. After considering the definition of corporate social 
responsibility (section 2.2), the following section (section 2.3) contains analysis of the existing 
literature regarding the relationship between CSR and firm value. Subsequently, the literature 
concerning how CSR might influence the investment decision making in relation to empirical 
research and the possible theoretical approaches are discussed in section 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. 
Section 2.6 identifies the remaining issues in literature, which are pursued in the theoretical 
development and research design discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
 
2.2. Definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
 
Shareholder values (returns), in terms of profits and dividends, used to be considered as the key 
drivers of all corporate activities. In this respect, perhaps best known is Milton Friedman’s (1970) 
CSR definition, published in a 1970 New York Time Magazine article, stating that the 
responsibility of firms is “to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which 
generally will be to make as much as money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of 
the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.” In other words, 
under this perspective the only legitimate function of business is to maximise profits, which 
implicitly maximises shareholder value in financial terms, whilst complying with legal and 
ethical norms. It has caused researchers in the area of the CSR to respond by seeking to prove 
that this view is too narrow regarding the relationship between business and society.  
 
Owing to CSR being multifaceted (Cochran, 2007), it has evolved in a number of different ways, 
depending on the researchers’ orientation towards the business environment and their attitudes 
towards environmental factors, such as: economic, legal, and ethical considerations. For example, 
Shocker and Sethi (1973) considered that a “social contract” is a core element of CSR in order 
for a company to survive and grow. That is, a firm has to operate according to guidelines that are 
set by society and these authors defined CSR as “consideration by the corporation of the interests 
of groups other than those with direct economic ties to the firm” (1973, p98), thereby specifically 
referring to groups that are able to press companies to change their behaviour. Later, Sethi (1975) 
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redefined it as “bringing corporate behavior up to a level where it is congruent with the 
prevailing norms, values and expectations of performance” (1975, p62). Moreover, he contended 
that it is “prescriptive in nature”, in that companies usually conform to prevailing social norms 
even before the new social expectations are legally required and as such, can be linked to 
organizational legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Further, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) 
characterized CSR as “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the 
firm and that which is required by law” (p.117), where this refers to going beyond legal 
requirements by adopting activities, such as: progressive human resource management 
programmes, developing non-animal testing procedures, recycling, abating pollution and 
supporting local business. From this perspective, obeying the law is not a sufficient condition to 
be considered a socially responsible company.  
 
In order to address comprehensively the obligations of business to society, Carroll (1979) 
identified four hierarchical categories ranging upwards through: economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary responsibility. Economic responsibility refers to companies producing goods and 
services that society wants and selling them at a profit and these activities should be congruent 
with the prevailing legal requirements, i.e. these are the legal responsibilities. Ethical 
responsibilities are societal expectations that go beyond the legal requirements companies have 
to comply with. Regarding the last, discretionary responsibility is probably the most difficult to 
conceptualize amongst them and may be analogous with the concept of voluntary participation, 
coined by McWilliams and Siegel (2001) when considering CSR. In general, based on a study on 
the development of CSR definitions during the 1950s to 1990s period, Carroll (1999) found that 
its definitions expanded during 1960s and proliferated as well as becoming more specific in the 
1970s.  However, in the 1980s and 1990s, more refined conceptualisations emerged that were 
focused on the measurements of CSR and empirical research regarding whether it has a 
relationship with firm performance.  
 
Overall, the scope of CSR remains conceptually quite unbounded, with there being no single 
commonly accepted definition and no general agreement on its main components. Further in 
relation to this, some contemporary authors on CSR have noticeably broadened this out to 
include the fields of: business, economics, law, the environment, different stakeholders, 
23 
 
voluntary participation, and society as a whole (e.g. Dahlsrud, 2008; Raynard and Forstater, 
2002). In fact, with regards to their definition of CSR, the Commission of the European 
Communities has included all of the above dimensions, that is, CSR is defined as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” (2001, p.6) and this perspective 
has been widely adopted and implemented by other interested researchers (Dahlsrud, 2008). 
Given its popularity in prior scholarship, this is the definition of CSR adopted in this thesis and 
within this broader definition it is accepted that CSR is a tool beyond the creating of economic 
value, which includes social and environmental aspects of the interaction between companies 
and their stakeholders. Moreover, it is voluntary, going beyond legal requirements as well as 
being multi-dimensional. That is, under this lens companies should take the interests of multiple 
stakeholders (e.g. NGO, government, investors), the environment and society at large into 
account as well as being economic sustainable when choosing to go beyond what is legally 
expected.  
 
2.3 CSR and firm value  
 
In this section, so as to provide more insight and understanding of the influence CSR on the 
investment decision, the previous studies on this issue are reviewed, including those in other 
literature reviews. Although there is a significant body of empirical analysis on the influence of 
CSR on financial performance (Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Orlitzky et al., 2003), most studies 
have not set out to identify this performance in terms of a financial measure as well as equity 
performance. Regarding this, recall that firm performance has been defined as financial 
performance using financial results of business outcomes and equity performance determined by 
share price movements (i.e. stock returns). The concern of this research lies in the impact of CSR 
on equity performance, which unlike the financial results that can be easily internalised, is 
subject to a number of subjective considerations on the part of the investors. Having said this, an 
outline analysis of previous studies regarding the association between CSR that have focused on 
the corporate environmental performance and firm performance in terms of financial 
performance and equity performance is presented in Appendix I.  This section contains 
discussion on the definition of value relevance and studies regarding CSR that have focussed on 
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corporate environmental performance information and its relation with the market values of 
firms. 
 
The concept of CSR has been, as shown above, complicated and further, has been broadened to 
include not only the environment (which is focused upon in this thesis), but also: the protection 
of human rights, the provision of community support, the maintenance of product safety 
standards, the improvement of employee welfare and the protection of minority interests, 
amongst other matters. From the European Community’s point of view, it is essentially about 
companies presenting their CSR practices to their stakeholders voluntarily within their business 
operations. However, how to measure CSR has not been standardised and further, whether or not 
it is value relevant to investors has yet to be conclusively ascertained. Moreover, because how 
companies interpret CSR varies substantially across businesses, it is hard to elicit whether the 
non-financial CSR information has value relevance. If such information is able to predict or 
drive at least some portion of financial information, then this will indicate that it is value relevant 
to investors.  In other words, if it is internalized in terms of financial information, such as a 
firm’s: assets, liabilities, or earnings, investors can be seen to assess the value of CSR 
information. Most of the existing studies have investigated whether CSR impacts on stakeholder 
values by concentrating on the CSR influence on an improvement in the firm’s operating 
(financial) performance and whether, in turn, this can have an impact on share price, with little 
attention being paid to whether non-financial CSR information is value relevant, i.e. influences 
share price.    
 
In the context of value relevance, Francis and Schipper (1999) proposed four possible 
interpretations of the construction of value relevance as follows (p. 325-326):  
 Interpretation 1: financial statement information leads stock prices by capturing intrinsic 
share values towards which stock prices drift. Then value relevance would be measured 
as the profits generated from implementing accounting-based trading rules.  
 Interpretation 2: financial information is value relevant if it contains the variables used in 
a valuation model or assists in predicting those variables. Thus, the value relevance of 
earnings for a discounted dividend valuation model, or a discounted cash flow valuation 
model, or a discounted residual income model, might be measured by the ability of 
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earnings to predict: future dividends, future cash flows, future earnings, or future book 
values.  
Interpretations 3 and 4 are based on value relevance as indicated by the statistical association 
between financial information and prices and returns. 
 Interpretation 3: the statistical association measures whether investors actually use the 
information about changing prices and in this case value relevance would be measured by 
the ability of financial statements information to change the total mix of information in 
the market place. This interpretation implies that value relevance is measured in terms of 
“news”, whereby value relevant information changes stock prices because it causes 
investors to revise their expectations.  
 Interpretation 4: value relevance is measured by the ability of financial statement 
information to capture or summarize information, regardless of source, that affects share 
values. This interpretation does not require that financial statements are the earliest 
source of information. It is consistent with the value relevance of financial reports 
stemming from either the content of the financial statements themselves or a settling-up 
role, in which the audited financial statements discipline other, more timely information 
disclosures, such as management earning forecasts.   
 
Further, as pointed out by Barth et al. (2001), such information might be considered as value 
relevant information, if investors can summarize or aggregate information available from other 
sources when valuing a firm, even though it may not be “new” to the market. A number of 
studies have probed into identifying the value relevance of CSR information (Black, et al., 2000; 
Clarkson et al., 2004; Hassel, et al., 2005; Hughes II, 2000). For example, Hughes II (2000) 
found that non-financial pollution measures, such as superfund sites and the emissions rate are 
negatively related to firm value for high polluting utility industries, but not for their counterparts. 
It also emerged that this non-financial information is negatively and significantly related to a 
high polluting firm’s share prices, but not for the rest. Their findings were the same as those 
from research by Jaggi and Freedman (1992), which was based on market-based valuation.  
Clarkson et al. (2004) examined the pulp and paper industry using environmental capital 
expenditures as the other information variable and they elicited that low polluting firms that have 
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low environmental impact and low levels of prosecution enjoy incremental benefits associated 
with environmental investments.  
 
More recently, Hassel et al. (2005) have claimed that the environmental performance ratings are 
informative for listed Swedish companies, being negatively related to the market value of firms.  
Even though three of these previous studies (Clarkson et al., 2004; Hassel et al., 2005; Hughs II, 
2000) found that environmental performance is value relevant and negatively associated with a 
firm’s market value, their investigations were only conducted on polluting industries in one 
domestic market. Another relevance variable, firm reputation, was employed in a work by Black 
et al. (2000), in which they stated that non-financial information, as measured by the Fortune 
reputation score, is incrementally value relevant to the firm even after controlling for the 
financial halo effect (i.e. the reputation is highly positively correlated to a firms’ financial 
performance).  
 
2.4 CSR and investment decision - empirical analysis  
 
This section considers CSR, focusing on environmental performance, and stock market 
performance in terms of: the evidence at the firm-level regarding the relationship between CSR 
and equity performance; the evidence at the firm-level relating to the assessment of market 
reaction to the membership of SRI indices; and the evidence at the fund-level concerning the 
different performance between SRI funds and non-SRI ones. 
 
CSR and its relationship to equity performance 
Several scholars have elicited that there is a positive market reaction to disclosures of high 
environmental performance by corporations. For instance, Belkaoui (1976), Ingram (1978), and 
Jaggi and Freedman (1982) examined market reaction to CSR disclosure by comparing pollution 
disclosures with non-pollution disclosures and found both that the information is useful to 
investors and that the market reacts positively to such disclosures. Although Jaggi and Freedman 
(1982) did not use annual report announcement month as an event day, which was employed in 
Belkaoui’s (1976) study, their findings were consistent with the latter’s results, thus indicating 
that investors react positively to the disclosure of pollution abatement information from polluting 
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firms. However, in another study by Freedman and Jaggi’s (1986) their results indicated that the 
investors’ reaction was not affected by the depth of company disclosures and this could be 
interpreted to mean that they just want to know whether a firm has disclosed information on 
pollution or not, rather than in how much detail. Another point is that Freedman and Jaggi’s 
(1986) disclosure score was weighted by pollution information and this may be an insufficient 
indicator of environmental performance.  
 
Similarly,  Murray et al. (2006) found that annual company returns and social and environmental 
disclosure, measured by the number of pages, did not have any direct relationship with each 
other after testing such disclosures for the UK’s top 100 companies over nine years. One possible 
limitation from using this measure is that a firm may provide many pages, regardless of its 
written content and quality in their reporting, so as to look good in the eyes of the investor. In 
relation to this, Unerman (2000) suggested that measuring the number of sentences might be 
more accurate than measuring the number of pages, because the former may be more reliable 
owing to there being less risk of measurement error than for the latter as page content is not 
always in text form. However, when adopting such a numerical approach there is always a trade 
off between the quantity and quality of the disclosed data. 
 
Moreover, a number of studies using independent environmental information, such as CEP, the 
first public information available on environmental performance, founded in 1969, have been 
carried out (Shane and Spicer, 1983; Spicer, 1978a and 1978b; Stevens, 1984), but an overview 
shows that they having been very much focused on highly polluting industries (the paper, power, 
steel, and oil industries). For example, Spicer (1978a), with a sample of pulp and paper firms, 
found the pollution control information from 1968 to 1973 was not associated with market risk. 
However, when controlling for accounting measures, he showed that the market risks are 
significantly associated with pollution control records. Further, in another study (1978b), the 
same author found that companies with better pollution control records tend to have higher 
profitability, larger asset size, lower total risk, lower system risk, and a higher P/E ratio, than 
ones with poor records. However, Chen and Metcalf (1980) rebutted Spicer’s (1978b) results, 
claiming that the relationship between pollution control records and financial performance exists 
only when firm size is controlled. Furthermore, Shane and Spicer (1983) set out to investigate 
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the information content of social disclosures by conducting an event study using the date of 
release of pollution expenditure information by CEP as the event to be investigated and found 
that negative abnormal returns were evident on the two days prior to the information release. 
Further, they elicited that companies with low pollution control performance rankings 
experienced significantly more negative returns than those with high rankings. Steve (1984) 
supported this position that the information released by CEP is useful to investors.  
 
Unlike CEP, the TRI, the first regulatory requirement instigated by the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), regarding the disclosure of a firm’s pollution data, is evidence of the growing 
social interest in companies’ environmental performance. In this context, Hamilton (1995) and 
Konar and Cohen (1997) looked at the market reaction to the release of TRI reports and found it 
to be negative. However, other studies that have employed CEP or TRI as a proxy for 
environmental performance showed evidence that a better pollution control record tends to result 
in higher financial performance.  
 
Using different measures, Mahapatra (1984) investigated the association of pollution control 
expenditures as a CSR activity with systematic risk and profitability, over the period 1967 to 
1978, for six polluting industries targeted by the Environmental Policy Act (1979) and found that 
companies’ pollution control expenditures did not lead to higher market returns, i.e. they did not 
reward the companies with greater profitability.  Jaggi and Freedman (1992) employed control of 
water pollutants as an example of pollution performance and elicited that between 1975 and 1980 
market performance was negatively associated with the former. This result is different to 
Spicer’s (1978b) empirical findings for the same industry, to obtain which he examined a 
different time period (1968-1973) and used different measurements (the CEP pollution index). 
The reason for this variation may be that investors are only interested in a company’s general 
environmental performance, rather than the details. However, both these studies can be criticized 
for their small sample sizes: 18 companies in the Spicer study and 13 in that of Jaggi and 
Freedman.  
 
Corporations with a good reputation can increase their market value and have advantages over 
their competitors, if the market values respond positively to reputation. However, this is not easy 
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to measure because it relies on the evaluators’ perceptions. In addition, it can be greatly 
influenced by the company’s: size, age, access to mass media, and name changing caused by 
mergers, amongst other reasons (Abbott and Monsen, 1979). Since Moskowitz (1972) developed 
the first reputation index, some researchers have employed it for testing for the relationship 
between CSR reputation and equity performance (Abbott and Monsen, 1979; Alexander and 
Buchholz, 1978; Cochran and Wood, 1984; Vance, 1975). However, the studies that did so 
elicited inconsistent results between a firm’s equity performance and the level of reputation. For 
example, after Moskowitz (1972) found the positive results, Vance (1975) refuted these, arguing 
that companies with a higher rank of reputation experience lower stock market performance. 
However, when Alexander and Buchholz (1978) re-examined Vance (1975) and Moskowitz’s 
(1972) work and corrected their deficiencies (e.g. short period times and no use of adjusted risk), 
for 1970 to 1974 and 1971 to 1973, their results indicated there was no relationship between 
them. Additionally, Abbott and Monsen (1979) questioned Vance’s testing period and outcome, 
because of the stock market collapse in 1974 and the fact that he reported regression coefficients 
rather than correlation coefficients. Consequently, scholars called for new more reliable 
measures of CSR that substantially reduced the levels of subjectivity involved (Cochran and 
Wood, 1984).  
 
As corporate reputation has been surveyed by Fortune magazine annually since 1982, researchers 
have easily been able to obtain consistent and comparable data over an extended period 
(McGuire et al., 1988). Regarding this, Szwajkowski and Figlewicz (1999) pointed out that it is 
hardly surprising that researchers quickly adapted to the Fortune reputation rankings as measures 
of CSR, when one considers the previous measures available and in fact, they have triggered 
substantial research into the impact of CSR reputation on a company’s equity performance 
(Belkaoui, 2004; Herremans et al., 1993). Herremans et al. (1993) showed that abnormal returns 
with better and poor companies’ CSR reputation in higher polluted industries do significantly 
differ from one another, whereas these results do not hold for lower polluted industries. From a 
different angle, using the same measure of CSR, Belkaoui (2004) reported that the information of 
earnings in determining stock returns is monotonically and significantly related to CSR 
reputation, as provided by Fortune. Such a finding is consistent with the evidence reported by 
Hussainey and Salama (2010), who found that firms with higher levels of reputation scores 
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provided by Management Today, exhibit higher levels of share price anticipation of earnings 
than those with lower ones. 
 
SRI index Membership 
SRI indices have been receiving increasing attention within investment communities.  Regarding 
these, following the Domini 400 social index, launched in 1990 by KLD and the first SRI index 
(Fowler and Hope, 2007), several indices have emerged for listing companies according to 
environmentally and socially responsible investing criteria, such as the DJSI in 1999, 
FTSE4Good index in 2001, and the Calvert social index in 2000. However, the history of such 
indices as proxy measures for CSR is relatively shorter than that for the others described above.  
 
The performance of SRI indices has been studied by some researchers, such as: the Domini 400 
social index by Statman (2000) and Sauer (1997), the DJSI by Lopez et al. (2007), and the 
FTSE4Good by Collison et al. (2008). Further, Schroder (2007) analyzed comprehensively the 
performance of 29 SRI indices with conventional benchmark indices. The research into the 
Domini 400 index revealed that there was no difference in performance with a benchmark index 
(e.g. S&P 500). Lopez et al. (2007) compared a sample of DJSI verses non-DJSI European firms 
for the period from 1998 to 2004, inclusive and found that there were significant differences in 
performance between firms belonging to the DJSI and those not. Moreover, it emerged that the 
firms on the DJSI are negatively associated with accounting-based performance and the authors 
suggested from these results that being included in an SRI index may involve costs or 
reallocation of resources that affects a firm’s performance. Collison et al. (2008) compared 
financial performance between the FTSE4Good index series and their benchmarks (e.g. FTSE 
All Share index) over a nine-year period from 1996 to 2005 and found that the FTSE4Good 
indices outperformed the benchmarks, concluding that most of the superior performance for the 
indices was because of risk reduction. Finally, Schroder (2007) reported that most SRI indices 
did not exhibit risk-adjusted returns significantly different from the benchmarks, but many of 
them have a higher β-coefficient.  
 
Furthermore, market reaction to SRI index announcement of inclusions and exclusions has been 
investigated by several scholars, such as: the DJSI by Cheung (2011) and Robinson et al. (2011), 
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the DJSSI (Dow Jones Sustainability Stoxx Index) by Consolandi et al. (2009), the FTSE4Good 
by Curran and Moran (2007), and the Calvert social index by Doh et al. (2010).  Cheung (2011) 
and Robinson et al. (2011) studied the impact on US or North America firms of being included in 
or excluded from the DJSI World index over the period from 2002 to 2008 and from 2003 to 
2007, respectively.  They elicited similar results that there is no significant impact on stock 
return on the announcement day. However, on the day of exchange, i.e. the day that the index 
came into effect, Cheung found evidence that firms being included to (excluded from) the DJSI 
experienced a temporary, but significant, increase (decrease) in stock return.  In contrast, 
Robinson et al. (2011) showed that inclusion stocks experienced a sustained increase in stock 
return following the index change. Further, both studies provided evidence that there is a 
temporary decrease in stock return when firms are removed from the DJSI. Consolandi et al. 
(2008) studied whether inclusion in, or deletion from, the DJSSI, an index for European 
corporations, results in a market reaction and found that there is no significant impact on the day 
of announcement or the date of index revision. However, the results did show that companies 
experience a significant and positive excess return of 0.03% after it is announced that they have 
been added to the DJSSI.  
 
Curran and Moran (2007) examined whether being added to or deleted from the FTSE4Good 
UK50 index resulted in a significant impact on share price changes from 2001 to 2002. They 
found that inclusions on this index lead to positive share price change and exclusions lead to the 
converse, but the results were not statistically significant. Finally, Doh et al. (2010) examined 
market reaction to the inclusion in or deletion from the Calvert social index and found that the 
abnormal returns for additions are not statistically different from zero, but the abnormal returns 
on a day after announcement for deletions are negative and significant at the 5% level. They 
considered this difference to be an imbalance in information availability between companies that 
were about to be added and those that were about to be deleted. That is, firms being added to the 
index would be likely to publish this news for stakeholders, whereas firms being deleted from 
index would tend to suppress or not publicize this news. In general, these studies have provided 
inconclusive evidence after testing a restricted market or for a short time period. In this context, 
Fowler and Hope (2007) have pointed to the limited research into the impact of SRI indices, 
even though there has been an increase in interest in such indices from companies and investors.   
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In sum, the existing studies that have examined the association between the proxies of CSR and 
equity performance have been dominated by the question of whether the CSR can be integrated 
into the objective function of the profit maximizing firm. However, the answer to this has yet to 
be inconclusively established, in particular, because it would appear that the existence of 
preferences beyond those of the classical perspectives may be involved and as yet, no clear 
evidence on what these are has been determined.  The following subsections address these 
matters in detail.   
 
The performance of socially responsible investing 
Since more and more investors are integrating social and environmental criteria into their 
investment decisions, much literature has been generated to document the performance of 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) funds (Kreander et al., 2005). Regarding this, by 
comparing historical returns of SRI funds and non-SRI funds, the empirical link between socially 
responsible practices and financial performance has been investigated. Previous research has 
shown that SRI funds, on average, perform similarly to non-SRI ones (for more details see 
Appendix II). For instance, by testing the excess returns, calculated by using Jensen’s alpha, 
Hamilton et al. (1993) investigated the performance of 32 SRI funds and 320 randomly selected 
non-SRI funds from 1981 to 1990. They found that the mean monthly excess return for 17 SRI 
funds established before 1985 was higher (-0.063%) than those of the corresponding 170 non-
SRI funds (-0.140%).  Further, they showed that the mean monthly excess return for the 15 SRI 
funds established after 1985 was lower (-0.277%) than those of the corresponding 150 non-SRI 
funds (0.480%). However, the differences in the performance of SRI funds and non-SRI ones 
were not statistically significant.  
 
Statman (2000) investigated the performance of 31 SRI and 62 non-SRI funds, matched by 
similar fund size, in the US, for the period from 1990 to 1998. He showed that the mean annual 
excess return, calculated by Jensen’s alpha, of SRI funds was higher (-5.02%) than those of the 
non-SRI type (-7.45%), but the difference in performance between the two was not statistically 
significant. Consistent with previous studies, Bauer et al. (2007) reported that the difference in 
mean excess return was not significant between 8 Canadian SRI funds and 267 of their 
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conventional peers, for the period from 1994 to 2002. This evidence probably needs to be 
interpreted cautiously, because the treatment did not involve matching SRI funds and the non-
SRI in pairs so as to control for the effect of specific characteristics, which may be endemic in 
SRI fund portfolios (Mallin et al., 1995) such as: fund size, start date, or geographical investment 
area. That is, the findings of this study are possibly misleading because the authors failed to 
ensure that similar entities were being compared.  
 
Similarly, Mallin et al. (1995) compared the performance of 29 UK SRI funds to those of 29 
non-SRI funds, for the period from 1986 to 1993. The performance of funds was measured by 
the risk-adjusted Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen’s alpha. It was found that the Jensen’s alphas of 
SRI funds, which ranged from -0.28% to 1.21%, were not significantly different from those of 
non-SRI funds, which were spread between -0.41% and 1.56%, whilst the performance of the 
SRI funds slightly outperformed those of non-SRI ones. Further, they reported that the 
performances of SRI funds and non-SRI ones seem to underperform the market benchmark: the 
Financial Times All Share Actuaries Index.  Using a similar matched pair approach on the basis 
of fund age, size, and investment universe, with the same performance measures, Kreander et al. 
(2005) carried out an extensive study of the European fund market over the period 1995 to 
2001and found similar results to those of Mallin et al. (1995).  
 
Further, the results of these authors (Kreander et al., 2005; Mallin et al., 1995) affirmed that both 
funds underperformed the benchmarks, i.e. the Financial Times All share index and the Financial 
Times World index.  Gregory et al. (1997) also found that the SRI funds, on average, did not 
perform significantly differently to the non-SRI ones, when they controlled for: the type of funds, 
ages, the area of investment, and size.  A recent paper by Benson et al. (2006) comprehensively 
analysed the portfolio allocation across industries and the results confirmed the findings of 
previous studies, in which the performance of SRI funds was found to be not significantly 
different from the performance of non-SRI ones. Further, the portfolio analysis showed that 
those of SRI were different to those of their conventional counterparts. However, Brammer et al. 
(2006) criticized these previous studies for confusing fund manager performance with firm 
performance regarding CSR, further pointing out that it is probably that SRI fund managers are 
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poor stock pickers or that the transaction cost of SRI funds may be higher than conventional 
funds, rather than socially responsible companies yielding lower stock performance.  
 
In general, it emerges that the performance of SRI funds is weakly better than non-SRI ones, but 
the difference is not significantly different from zero. Next, the question arises as to whether the 
portfolio holdings for SRI funds are different from those for non-SRI funds.  However, few 
empirical studies have attempted to find the difference between the two funds’ portfolios at a 
given level of CSR performance. The evidence regarding this has not been clearly elicited, yet 
and it only shows that institutional investors, on aggregate, prefer to invest in companies with 
higher levels of CSR. Further, their investment decision regarding CSR information has been 
found to be more reliant on the quantitative rather than the narrative information. Regarding this, 
Teoh and Shiu (1990) surveyed Australian institutions about their attitudes towards SRI and 
found that institutions used CSR information for investment decisions, if it was presented in 
relation to quantified, specific issues, rather than as SRI information disclosed in a company’s 
annual report. Similarly, Coffey and Fryxell (1991) examined the relationship between 
institutional ownership and the aspects of CSR, using Fortune 500 firms over a single period and 
found an inconsistent relationship: a positive relationship with the number of women on the 
board of directors; a negative relationship with the Sullivan principle; and no relationship with 
charitable contributions. Nevertheless, it remains unclear from the results of these two earlier 
studies as to whether there is a definite relationship between ownership holdings and the level of 
CSR. 
 
 
2.5 CSR and Investment decisions – Theoretical approaches 
 
Scholars have adopted various theoretical stances when investigating whether CSR has an 
influence on firm performance and in this section, these, as aforementioned in the previous 
section and others shown Appendix I and II, are discussed. The most popular of these theories 
are the stakeholder theory and/or legitimacy theory as they indicate that CSR is expected to 
increase firm performance. Moreover, these theories overlap, because a company needs to be 
considered as part of a broad social system, upon which it has an impact (Deegan, 2002). As 
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such, most studies would appear to indicate that there is a positive relationship, albeit somewhat 
weak, between CSR and firm performance. Regarding this, Pava and Krausz (1996) observed 
that among 21 empirical papers they reviewed that were published between 1972 and 1992, 12 
verified that a positive relationship exists. A more extensive study conducted by Orlitzkey et al. 
(2003) also reported the existence of a positive association between CSR and firm performance, 
which involved a meta-analysis of the 52 studies from 1976 to 1997.  
 
Stakeholder theory, originally known as stockholder theory, has focused on the fiduciary 
responsibility of managers to shareholders (Hasnas, 1998). Friedman’s (1970) comment 
regarding the social responsibility of business is probably the best phrase from this perspective 
and further, Jensen (2002) developed this point by arguing that managerial fiduciary 
responsibility enhanced by the fact that maximisation of the interest of different stakeholders is 
much more complex than the simple profit maximizing behaviour. Hence, to overcome this 
conflict, he postulated a new concept enlightened value maximization that “utilizes of the long-
run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders” 
(p.235).  Further, from the modern stakeholder theory perspective, a number of studies have 
asserted that companies should meet the demands of a broader range of stakeholders, not just 
shareholders (e.g. Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Wood and Jones, 1995), which includes groups 
and/or individuals who can have an impact on the achievement of an organization’s objectives, 
or who are affected by it (Freeman and Reed, 1983).  Broadly speaking, the stakeholder can 
cover many people or organizations (e.g. consumers, investors, and employees, and community) 
and even society as a whole. According to one of aspect of this lens, proponents of normative (or 
ethical) stakeholder theory assert that organizations have a social responsibility to uphold the 
interest of all stakeholders (Hasnas, 1998). From this perspective, their expectations in relation to 
CSR may be different depending on which group they belong to and further, the often conflicting 
demands from these groups, regarding CSR, are prime levers of influence on corporate 
behaviour (Wood and Jones, 1995). For example, the consumer is a key stakeholder for any 
company and attraction and their loyalty is fundamental to any business.  With growing 
awareness of environmental concerns, they may expect a company to produce green products 
and risk free products as well as having good environmental performance in its operations. In 
particular, this trend towards purchasing green products has been growing with increasing 
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climate change concerns. However, the question is whether they really care or are willing to pay 
a premium for the CSR products. Regarding this, one survey conducted by the Boston 
Consulting Group (BCG) found that more consumers purchased green products in 2008 than in 
2007 and they also found that people were willing to pay a premium.  
 
Further, Pivato et al. (2008) found that socially responsible companies are associated with a 
higher level of trust in them and their products, which leads to increased sales and customer 
loyalty. With regard to employee demands, these are often related to human resource 
management, such as: workplace safety, amenities, and financial security, and a catalyst for their 
enforcement is the unionization of the workforce as this can encourage firms to adopt CSR 
policies (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). These authors pointed out the positive relationship 
between management and workers and further, as an outcome of employing CSR, this would 
result in firms being rewarded with increased employee loyalty and attractiveness to potential 
employees (Truban and Greening, 1997) as well as greater productivity (Mittal et al., 2008). In 
addition, a community group may want a company to have more proactive environmental 
practices and to support local services. Fair trade, building an education centre in South Africa or 
supporting HIV/AIDS education programmes, are good examples of such community-based 
activities. Consequently, it is expected that socially responsible companies will be rewarded 
through the increase in their market values and socially reprehensive companies will not.  
 
Finally, from the perspective of society as a whole, the relationship between an organization and 
society, which often relies on the notion that societal expectations lead to the forming of a social 
contract between the two,  has been discussed within legitimacy theory by several scholars (e.g. 
Deegan, 2002; Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Gay et al., 1995). Under this discourse, it is argued 
that organizations need to ensure that their operating activities are within the bounds and norms 
of the society in which they operate.  If they breach this contract, their business will be 
threatened by society’s enforcement it, by such means as: reduction in the demand for products 
by consumers, fines or by the imposition of new regulations. So as to mitigate such risks, 
companies have to demonstrate their understanding of society’s views by providing information 
that is commensurate with this goal (Deegan, 2002), referred to as organizational legitimacy 
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(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). Dowling and Pfeffer suggested that an organization may legitimate 
its activities for treating legitimacy as follows (1975, p.127):  
 the organization can adapt its output, goals, and method of operation to conform to 
prevailing definitions of legitimacy; 
 The organization can attempt, through communication, to alter the definition of social 
legitimacy so that it conforms to the organization’s present practices, output, and values; 
 The organization can attempt, again through communication, to become identified with 
the: symbols, values, or institutions that have a strong base of social legitimacy.  
 
Disclosures and annual reports can be used as a means of communication by companies. From a 
legitimacy theory perspective, a number of studies have probed companies’ social and 
environmental disclosures practices (Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Patten, 1992) and found positive 
results in support of this theory. As a result, proponents of these theories have tended to believe 
that companies could increase equity performance with higher CSR, because under this 
perspective investors who have their demands satisfied, in terms of their receiving sufficient 
information, are considered likely to reciprocate by giving credit to companies through greater 
involvement with them.  
 
Those arguing that there is a negative relationship between CSR and firm performance, whereby 
a higher level of CSR will lower the firm’s financial performance (Aupperle et al., 1985), are 
thus of the opinion that these two components have a trade-off relationship. This line of thinking 
may be analogous with Friedman’s (1970) statement and the traditional stakeholder theory (i.e. 
profit maximization). Further, Preston and O’Bannon (1997) proposed the possibility of this 
negative effect, because of a private managerial goal, referred to as the managerial opportunism 
hypothesis, the reasoning behind which being: “when financial performance is strong, managers 
may attempt to “cash in” by reducing social expenditures in order to take advantage of the 
opportunity to increase their short-term proven gains” (1997, p423-424).   
 
A third perspective is that the relationship between CSR and firm performance is neutral. 
Adopting this stance, Waddock and Graves (1997) and Ullmann (1985) explained that because 
there are so many variables in the relation between the two these could be coincidental, i.e. trade 
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off against one another. Further, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) argued that firms that supply the 
demanded for CSR will not get any benefit, because of the cost of providing the CSR in the first 
place. Moreover, from the efficient capital market perspective, one should not be able to get 
profit, because the share price fully incorporates publicly available CSR information. That is, 
following this logic there will be no difference in performance between socially responsible and 
irresponsible companies. The next section provides a succinct research agenda that seeks to 
address these gaps in the literature. 
 
2.6. Developing the research agenda   
 
This section builds a research agenda from the themes that are absent from the literature on CSR, 
focusing on corporate environmental performance. The literatures reviewed in this chapter have 
done much to cast light on the role, importance, and impacts of corporate environmental 
performance on investment decisions. The research agenda in this thesis is aimed at addressing 
those issues that will lead to significant enhancement of the extant appreciation of the role and 
importance of CSR in investors’ decision making.  
 
The lack of consistent results is probably because of the existence of no standardized measure of 
CSR.  As pointed out by Ilinitch et al. (1998), with growing attention being paid to corporate 
environmental performance, the measure used is becoming increasingly important. Furthermore, 
environmental/CSR reporting is produced on a voluntary basis and the disclosures have 
commonly depended on companies’ business practice, which has led to the reliability of 
environmental performance measures being strongly criticised by some scholars (e.g. Clarkson et 
al., 2011; Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Patten, 2002; Rockness, 1985). In this context, investors and 
other stakeholders may have difficulty gathering accurate information when making decisions. 
Further, regarding inconsistent outcomes, Wood and Jones (1995) pointed to the possibility of 
benefiter(s) from CSR being misidentified when conducting empirical studies, as well as the 
need to broaden the definition of stakeholders.  As a consequence, it remains unclear whether the 
indicators that have been utilized in the earlier studies are an appropriate way to measure CSR, 
because there is no consensus on what it actually is. 
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It can be also argued that a single CSR proxy measure presents some obvious limitations with 
regard to the interpretation and reliability in the previous empirical research. For example, single 
CSR proxy measures are frequently used in CSR literature to assess either a social, 
environmental or economic characteristic of a company and subsequently endeavour to link this 
with a firm’s equity and financial performance. A major concern with this body of research is 
that it assumes that a single proxy, such as environmental disclosure, can assess a company’s 
broader commitment to socially responsible activities and further, provide sufficient information 
for investors’ decision making. This approach clearly fails to recognise the multi-faceted social, 
environmental or economic aspects of CSR on investors’ decision- making behaviour.   
 
In addition, the limitation associated with prior SRI studies is that the majority have sought to 
analyze SRI portfolio performance by employing mutual fund data, finding that there is no 
significantly different performance between SRI and non-SRI funds on stock returns (e.g. Bauer 
et al., 2007; Statman, 2000). However, this focus on these funds has been criticized by Brammer 
et al. (2006), who pointed out that these outcomes are reliant on the fund managers’ performance 
rather that of the company itself. In addition, these studies have rarely differentiated the 
influence of CSR on decision making between SRI and non-SRI fund managers. That is, they 
have simply investigated whether fund managers prefer to invest in companies with high CSR 
performance (e.g. Coffey and Fryxell, 1991; Waddock and Graves, 1997), rather than whether 
there is a distinct difference in the decision making behaviour between the two different types of 
fund manager. Consequently, it is debatable whether this earlier research has accurately assessed 
the true impact of CSR on institutional investors’ decision-making.   
 
Finally, the lack of conceptualization/theory is another hindrance to objective and comprehensive 
CSR research. Regarding these, few have referenced those available to explain the inconsistent 
outcomes and further, they have often been conducted with implicit assumptions lacking clear 
justification. In relation to this, Ullman’s (1985) comment "empirical data in search of an 
adequate theory” probably captures well the difficulty that scholars have faced once they have 
produced any results, irrespective of the relationship identified. Further on this score, as pointed 
out by Ullman (1985) and Aupperla et al. (1985), previous studies on CSR have been hindered 
by: little reference to underlying theory, inappropriate definition of key terms, short time periods 
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and small samples. The same holds in relation to CSR and stock market performance twenty five 
years later. It may be that the apparent lack of acceptance surrounding prior CSR research based 
on the underlying assumption grounded in theory appears to be due to the difficulty of 
combining financial and non-financial factors into an investment strategy. Even though a recent 
study conducted by Brammer et al. (2006) explicitly and comprehensively probed the 
relationship between CSR and the stock market through the demand side, they failed to provide 
clearly a conceptual link describing the relationship. Taken together, the general conclusion to be 
drawn from the existing studies is that investors in the equity market seem to be aware of a 
firm’s environmental performance. However, it cannot be concluded that strong environmental 
performance leads to strong equity performance, because they have not clearly elicited whether 
the environmental performance information is associated with other financial indicators, such as 
earnings and dividends and hence, feed through to stock prices. In other words, it remains 
unclear whether investors consider corporate environmental performance as a key factor when 
making their investment decisions and in order to examine whether there is a strong systematic 
relationship between the two, what empirical data is sufficiently robust to be able come to a 
definitive conclusion on the matter needs to be elicited.  
 
2.7. Chapter summary 
 
This literature reviewed in this chapter has shed light on the debate relating to the influence of 
CSR by focusing on the effect of corporate environmental performance on investors’ decisions, 
both empirically and theoretically. The evidence from the existing studies has shown that this 
needs further comprehensive enquiry as the results have been inconsistent.  To this end, drawing 
on the research issues identified in this chapter, in chapter 3, the conceptual framework and 
research design to reinforce the foundations for this thesis are presented and justified. 
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Chapter 3. Conceptual framework and research design 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Based on the research issues identified in the previous chapter, this chapter has the following 
aims: 
 
 To outline and develop a conceptual framework of investor preference based on 
conventional  economic theory; 
 To formulate research questions and related propositions for empirical testing; 
 To develop the analytical framework for the empirical research.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, following the introduction section 3.2 considers the 
motivations for investors in the decision making process, given the existence of non-financial 
concerns, especially regarding corporate environmental performance. Regarding this, nowadays 
utility measures in relation to ethical and social dimensions have been incorporated into the more 
traditional wealth maximisation utility-based models. In general, CSR, as discussed in chapter 2, 
is accepted here as relating to complex issues, such as: environmental protection, human 
resource management, healthy and safety at work and relations with the local community. 
Further among these aspects, growing public concern over issues, such as, natural resource 
depletion and global warming, amongst others, has led to a substantial increase in multiple 
stakeholder (e.g. government, shareholders, investors, NGO) awareness of corporate 
environmental performance, which is reflected in international agreements/regulations (e.g. the 
Kyoto Protocol, emissions trading schemes) (Ilinitch et al., 1998).  However, despite enhanced 
interest in companies’ environmental activities, the earlier studies, as also shown in chapter 2, 
have failed to provide robust evidence regarding the influence of environmental performance on 
stock market performance and further, which corporate environmental information should be 
relied on when making investment decisions, in particular, because there is no standardized 
measure of such performance. Regarding this, there is an overview of the various measures of 
environmental performance used in previous studies, with the aim of deciding which information 
should be tested for value relevance in this research. Following this, in section 3.3 the selected 
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measures of environmental performance for the conceptual model are presented and justified. 
Section 3.4 presents the research design and the overall methodology employed in the thesis and 
section 3.5 is the chapter summary.  
   
3.2 Development of the conceptual framework 
 
3.2.1 Conventional economic theory   
  
In conventional economic theory, two dimensional assessments (i.e. expected return and risk) 
have been forged on the back of the theoretical utility models of investor behaviour within a 
Markowitz (1952) portfolio optimisation framework and the assumptions underpinning the 
capital assets pricing model (CAPM). This framework simply assumes that investors are only 
concerned with the dollar return and a firm’s risk profile and hence, all investments are assessed 
with regard to risk and expected return in an attempt to maximise their utility. Within this 
perspective, the investor’s utility function can be expressed as follows:                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                      ),( RRi EfU            
where Ui is the total utility of an investor i and ER and σR are the expected return and risk (i.e. the 
standard deviation of the possible divergence of actual investment outcomes from expected 
outcomes) in terms of R which is rate of return on an investor’s investment (Sharp, 1964, p.428). 
In sum, the metric of risk and return that is typically measured with regard to monetary measures 
of risk and return, whilst other non-financial forms of risk (e.g. environmental risk) and social 
return are ignored.  
 
Uncertainty in economic activities makes it impossible for investors to know the value of a 
firm’s stock in future, but they do need to have some expectation of its terminal value, which 
they can obtain from the current price of a firm’s shares. Regarding this, the valuation requires 
an estimate of the present value of all expected future cash flows from owning the security, 
which includes the dividends and/or earnings (Gordon, 1959; Miller and Modigliant, 1961). In 
other words, it involves looking into an uncertain future and making an educated guess about the 
many factors determining future cash flows. Accordingly, because of the uncertainty in future 
earnings and the fact that the discount rates have to reflect the riskiness of the cash flows in the 
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valuation, investors who want to maximise the return at a given level of risk will diversify their 
investment. 
 
Regarding the aspects of CSR operating through the conventional risk and return parameters of 
investment decision-making, they may spread their investments over a number of assets in order 
to reduce the risk. That is, the company’s socially undesirable activities, which may be liable to 
legislative action, will increase firm risk (i.e. market risk and accounting risk) and have a 
negative impact on the firm’s valuation. On the other hand, Richardson et al. (1999) have 
claimed that higher CSR companies can reduce risk and resolve uncertainty about cash flow. 
They posited three aspects of CSR that may be indentified in capital markets: market process 
effects (i.e. reducing uncertainties about a firm’s profitability) by the provision of extensive 
information, including CSR; expected cash flow effects due to CSR projects (i.e. pollution 
abatement investment), due to the impact of CSR on product markets (i.e. green products), or 
due to anticipated regulatory costs; and discount rate effects due to the interaction between CSR 
and investor preference (i.e. investors are willing to trade-off return and risk) (Richardson et al., 
1999, p.20-21). Further, Bowman (1973, p.33-34) stated that a corporation being associated with 
CSR may affect the price of its stock and thus investors return. As such, if the corporate 
environmental performance has been internalized by regulation or capital market, it is then 
expected to affect a firm’s earnings prospects and stock market value (e.g. Amir and Lev, 1995; 
Anderson and Frankle, 1980; Belkaoui, 2004; Cormier and Magnan, 1997; Hussainey et al., 2010; 
Ingram, 1978; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996). These results, in turn, make it more attractive to 
outside investors. That is, higher levels of CSR are subject to lower uncertainty regarding future 
cash flows, more predictable earnings, and lower risk for investors. 
 
In fact, the recent few empirical studies that have focused on the impact of CSR on risk have 
shown that the higher a firm’s CSR the lower its systematic risk (Salama et al., 2011) or  firm 
risk (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). In particular, Orlitzky and Benjamin, (2001) claimed that 
this was the case after conducting a meta-analysis and further, showed that high CSR appears to 
be most highly negatively correlated with total market risk rather than accounting risk (e.g. 
standard deviation of long-term ROA). Even if findings were to show that CSR is negatively 
related a firm’s market risk, its correlation with financial return may not show, as claimed with 
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asset pricing models. Indeed, the evidence in the previous studies reported a different story, 
which is that there is an inconsistent relationship between the two (e.g. Brammer et al., 2006). 
Regarding this, some scholars have claimed that the conventional perspective on investor 
behaviour is too narrow to provide a full explanation of market behaviour, in particular, because 
investors do not always behave in a homogeneous way (e.g. DeBondt and Thaler, 1994; Thaler, 
1999; Statman, 2005).     
 
3.2.2 Additional preferences: ethical preference 
 
Regarding the conventional perspective, investors are assumed to be rational in the sense that 
their investment decisions are driven by seeking to maximise return for any given level of risk. 
In other words, this perspective does not admit that other motivations can have an effect on 
investment decision making (Statman, 2005). However, this cannot provide a complete 
explanation for certain financial market phenomena and, one major area of enquiry that has 
challenged these classical norms is that of behavioural finance (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler, 1994; 
Thaler, 1999; Shiller, 2003). This area of study is founded on the assumption that real investors 
are not completely rational in the above sense in their market behaviour at all times, and the 
degree to which they behave irrationally can change over time. Moreover, they can be influenced 
by general market sentiment and wider prevailing economic factors. Under this lens, some 
scholars (e.g. De Bondt and Thaler, 1994; Thaler, 1999) have claimed that investor decision 
making behaviour is not homogeneous and evidence has shown that different investor segments 
have different preferences (Clark-Murphy and Soutar, 2005) as well as that investors use a 
variety of criteria when making investment decisions, rather than just a single one (Nagy and 
Obenberger, 1994). For example, Nagy and Obenberger (1994) found that other variables, such 
as the feelings for a firm’s products and services, are important factors affecting investment 
decision-making as well as the classical wealth maximisation criteria.  
 
Regarding this perspective, individual investors who want to invest in a socially responsible way 
can generally make investment in two ways: directly, by purchasing securities issued by a 
company known to be socially responsible or by investing in corporations for the purpose of 
shareholder engagement activities; and indirectly, by purchasing units in socially responsible 
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mutual funds, which are commonly managed by institutional (or professional) investors (Haigh 
and Hazelton, 2004). However, it may be difficult to distinguish the preferences and motivations 
for making ethical investment decisions (e.g. human rights, the environment, Fair Trade, or self-
interest in material well-being) and therefore, it is hard to ascertain whether and how far they 
trade off their financial benefits against their ethical criteria. Notwithstanding the fact that some 
studies (e.g. Lewis, 2001; Lewis and Webley, 1994; Mackenzie and Lewis, 1999) have attempted 
to elicit what motivates individual investors to trade-off their financial returns for ethical 
considerations, their results have been inconclusive. Even with changing social norms, which has 
led to growing acknowledgement of CSR issues among investors, the bottom line is that 
naturally they expect remuneration from their investments, whether they are ethical or not and as 
a consequence many have mixed portfolios of ethical and non-ethical holdings (Lewis, 2001).  
 
In another study it was found that investors are often willing to trade off their returns, if they 
have surplus funds to invest, but if they do not, they expect a reasonable return from their 
investments (Mackenzie and Lewis, 1999). Nevertheless, the results of all of these studies have 
indicated that investors’ motivations are mixed and complicated and include, such as matters as: 
wanting to be good; self-interest; religion and contributing to society.  Other researchers have 
elicited that investors who have moral or ethical preferences focus on non-financial information 
when making their investment decisions (Hudson, 2005), such as how companies have carried 
out their business to achieve their profits, rather than how much they have earned (Cowton, 
1999).  
 
Even though most individual investors may prefer to invest in special investment vehicles 
(Cowton, 2004), as witnessed by the rapid growth of SRI mutual funds/unit trusts since the 
1980s (Gray et al., 1988), relatively few studies have been focused on the motivations/preference 
of institutional investors managed SRI funds when making investment decisions. For instance, it 
may be the case that most managers, as advisors of SRI funds have to consider both the clients’ 
personal preference as well as meeting fiduciary obligations (e.g. Cowton, 1999b and 2004; 
Jansson and Biel, 2011; Harte et al., 1991; Rockness and Williams, 1988). Regarding this, 
Cowton (1999b and 2004) showed how a UK-based SRI fund found that tension between these 
two was hard to resolve. With respect to investment decisions and CSR, Derwall et al. (2011) 
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have contended that socially responsible investors may apply both value-driven and profit-
seeking orientations in their investment decisions. In general, while this approach has been able 
to explain certain financial phenomena not explicable by such social norms alone, it still remains 
difficult to assess the degree of investor behaviour taking place at any one time and further, 
whether CSR information is value relevant or not to the decision-making process.  
                             
To incorporate ethical investment into the theoretical economic utility function, Beal et al. (2005) 
suggested three potential motivations drawn from the financial theory and ethical investment 
literature: for superior financial returns, for non-wealth returns  from the investment, and for the 
contribution to social change. The last two may be depended on the degree of ethicalness of 
investors’ investments. Further, by adopting the measure of people’s well-being (e.g. happy, 
frustrated/annoyed, etc.) devised by Kahneman et al. (2004), these authors constructed a model 
of ethical investor behaviour, defining the utility of an investor’s “pleasure” over the course of an 
investment as “the sum of the product of the investment period and the net affective experience 
associated with the ownership of the ethical investment” (Beal et al, 2005., p.75). Therefore, 
from this perspective the total utility of an investor over the investment period can be represented 
by summing the flow of pleasure and the conventional utility model, thus including an ethical 
investment element in the model, as follows:   
 
           ij
j
ijRRi hEfU   ),(     
 where Ui  is the total utility of an investor i. ER and σR are the expected return and the risk of     
return (Sharpe, 1964, p. 428). hij is the amount of time an individual investor i invests in a 
particular investment j and μij is the net affective experience of investment j in relation to the 
ownership of the ethical investment. The feature of an investor’s pleasure in the expanded model 
will vary depending on their intensity of preference for ethical investment. For instance, if an 
investor does not take account ethical criteria (i.e. μij =0) in the investment decision making, their 
total utility can be obtained in the same manner as for the function of return and risk derived 
from the conventional valuation model (e.g. CAPM).  In other words, in this case the investor’s 
utility will be driven by the set of his/her efficient portfolios associated with risky and risk free 
assets (see Sharpe, 1964).  At the other extreme, if an investor is not at all concerned about their 
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economic wealth and only places importance on ethical criteria, then their investment decisions 
will be unaffected by expected return and risk (e.g. NGO activists). Beal et al. (2005, p.74) also 
mentioned this scenario and pointed out that the person in question would have complete control 
over income and budgetary constraints. However, in reality an investor is likely to be motivated 
by a mix of ethical and financial considerations. If an investor includes ethical preference in their 
investment decision, then his/her utility will be increased from undertaking ethical investment, as 
shown in figure 1 (Beal et al. 2005, p 73). That is, when an investor includes their ethical 
preference in the investment decision process, his/her utility curve shifts upwards from U (W0) to 
U (W0*).  
 
 
Figure 1. Investor's utility function  
    
Source: Beal et al., (2005, p73)     
           
 
Regarding this perspective, Derwall et al. (2011) treated investors as profit-seekers who believe 
that companies with higher levels of CSR produce higher return and proposed the error-in-
expectation hypothesis, which contends that high CSR companies can be expected to receive 
higher stock returns, because the market is slow to recognize the positive impact of such 
activities on companies’ expected future cash flows.   This idea could be justified by identified 
issues in chapter 2, with a number of studies investigating the relation between CSR and firm 
performance having reported that there is a positive, albeit often weak, association between them 
(see Appendix I for more details). Little work has been carried out under this particular 
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hypothesis, but Derwall et al., (2005) and Kempf and Osthoff (2007) implicitly applied this idea 
by utilizing the best-in-class screening approach and found that investors can enjoy a higher firm 
performance by incorporating this into their investment decision.   
 
Once investors want to take into account environmental considerations as an aspect of SRI, they 
have to make decisions based on “information” from various sources (Cowton, 2004; Harte et al., 
1991). In relation to this, CSR information can be obtained from companies’ reporting (e.g. 
Deegan and Rankin, 1997) and/or from other sources (e.g. the media) (e.g. Chatterji and Levine, 
2006). The next subsection discusses the role of information in investment decision-making and 
considers the alternative sources and types of information.   
 
3.2.3 Role of environmental performance information  
 
In conventional finance and accounting theory, financial statements and reports are primarily 
directed towards enabling investors to make decisions appropriate to their preferences. For 
example, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) framework (2007) stated that the 
objective of financial statements is “to provide information about the financial position, financial 
performance and cash flows of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making 
economic decisions” (paragraph 9, 2007). That is, the information generated by providers should 
help investors in rational decision making and it should be of a high standard so as to give 
effective support to their choice process (Deegan and Unerman, 2006, p.376-380). In other 
words, investors should be able to understand the information that is communicated by firms and 
further, be able to predict the future financial performance through the information provided.   
 
Regarding this perspective, Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) stated that “communication” is an 
important means to reduce potential risk as well as proving that the organization understands 
society’s norms and expectations.  Companies have increasingly made the effort to provide 
information as part of their communications strategies, so as to ensure that stakeholders’ 
different norms are accommodated for as best as is possible (Epstein and Freedman, 1994; 
Deegan, 2002). Moreover, from this perspective Gray et al. (1996, p.46) stated that information 
“is a major element that can be employed by the organization to manage (or manipulate) the 
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stakeholder in order to gain their support and approval, or to distract their opposition and 
disapproval.”  In other words, information may be a crucial factor both for the provider (e.g. a 
firm’s manager) and for the decision makers (e.g. investors). However, according to Deegan 
(2002), even though the organization attempts to communicate through providing extensive 
information, it is not easy to identify whether its information is valued by stakeholders, that is, is 
it useful to investors in their decision-making?  In other words, if investors only care about 
risk/return, does such information convey enough about the impact of CSR factors?  Further, if 
they care about CSR for its own sake, is adequate non-financial information available to help 
them form a view on this?    
 
The environmental performance information provided by companies  
CSR information can be presented as financial, social and environmental reporting by companies 
and supplemented by a range of additional data, in such a way as to be publicly accessible to 
both investors and other market players. Moreover, they should provide relevant information, 
especially that which is useful for making the investment decision (Sprouse, 1963) and further 
such information is, regarding the efficient capital market perspective, expected to be fully 
reflected immediately in the share price and not manipulated in any way (Fama, 1970). 
Regarding this, Deegan and Unerman (2006, p 379) pointed out that information efficiency is 
important for the capital market in accounting, because share prices are deemed to be based on 
expectations about future earnings. That is, if a share price changes when information is released 
then it may imply that the information was of use to investors and could lead them to develop 
new expectations about the future earnings of a company. In other words, a change of price 
reflecting new information to investors about an event is an important signal for reallocation of 
their level of ownership in the capital market, which has a subsequent effect on the profitability 
of a company.   
   
In this respect, if the information is presented in quantitative (i.e. financial) terms, the link to 
financial performance can be easily estimated (Teoh and Shiu, 1990) and if not, it should be 
explained clearly whether it is able to be internalized into financial performance. In this context, 
it was found that narrative (or non-financial) information often fails to communicate sufficiently 
precisely about a firm’s risk and return relationship (Milne and Chan, 1999).  Nevertheless, as 
51 
 
mentioned earlier, with the growth of interest in corporate environmental performance, alongside 
pressure from the public and increased statutory regulations, corporations are increasingly trying 
to disclose as much information as possible, with regards to their environmental performance 
(Epstein and Freedman, 1994).  
 
According to Epstein and Freedman (1994), the majority of investors think companies should 
disclose corporate environmental information in their reporting and hence, these authors inferred 
from their finding that such information is useful to investors. These results would appear to 
support the view that investors will give credit to companies who provide more extensive 
voluntary environmental disclosures than those who do not (e.g. Belkaoui, 1970; Hasseldine et 
al., 2005). Nevertheless, how to measure a firm’s environmental performance and which aspects 
of such performance exert the greatest/least influence on financial decision makers, are still open 
to debate. The main difficulties in this measurement are: that it requires the assessment of non-
financial performance, which is mostly un-unified and/or narrative in format, uncertainty as to 
what to measure and how and the methods to be used for the aggregation of multiple types of 
metrics (Illinitch et al., 1998). In addition, Abbott and Monsen (1979) stated that the basic 
difficulties in measuring CSR are: the unavailability of detailed information on corporate social 
activities in quantitative terms; and the difficulty of measuring the full impact of known 
corporate activities on society.  
 
Further to this, Deegan and Unerman (2006, p352-356) also highlighted the problems faced 
when trying to include social and environmental performance in financial accounting 
information, owing to: lack of financial equivalence, the materiality decisions associated with 
social and environmental costs, and the absence of accurate tools for measuring intangibles. 
Regarding this point, one study by Teoh and Shiu (1990) showed that investors would be 
influenced by CSR information, if it was presented in clear quantified financial terms. Thus, 
because of the complexity and lack of financial equivalence for non-financial performance, 
investors may need to be able corroborate knowledge by seeking external information prior to 
making an investment decision.  
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Regarding this context of the difficulty of assessing the information, i.e. whether it is value 
relevant or not, Healy and Palepu (2001) suggested that the information provided by 
intermediaries can help investors in their investment decision making and further it can lessen 
information asymmetry between firms and outsider investors.   More specifically, alternative 
measures of environmental performance generated by formal organizations that regularly collect 
and distribute information about companies (Deephouse and Heugens, 2009), can take the form 
of: quantity/quality of information (e.g. ratings); third party representational measures (e.g. 
badges of CSR performance) or summary estimation (e.g. reputation). Table 1 presents the 
possible measures of corporate environmental performance, which can be utilized by investors 
when making investment decisions. 
 
Table 1. List of proxies of corporate environmental performance  
 Reporting by 
Subject Company Intermediary 
Environmental performance  GRI  Ratings, Indices, Reputation 
Reporting quality (of company)  Assurance   Ratings 
 
 
The environmental performance information provided by information intermediaries 
Chatterji and Levine (2006) asserted that CSR measures, including the environmental 
performance by information intermediaries, may help investors by supporting reliability, validity, 
and comparability of firms’ environmental/CSR performance. This is because they can rely on 
the firm’s environmental performance being measured regularly in the same format and being 
easily comparable across firms or sectors and over time. In addition, because the information 
intermediaries may access private data that is not publicly available or have their own 
methodological tools for the measuring of the environmental performance,  investors who wish 
to use such information in decision making can save the time and cost of collecting it from 
disparate sources (Illinitch et al., 1998).    The alternative environmental performance measures: 
 quality/quantity of information,  
 third-party representational measures, and  
 CSR/environment reputation 
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are discussed below and are covered in greater detail when they are utilized in the empirical 
study in chapters 4 to 6.  Note that these measures by information intermediaries have not been 
discussed separately in the CSR literature as a measure of environmental performance, but rather 
have been broadly categorized as CSR/environmental ratings. Thus, in the relevant literature 
discussed below these three identified discrete areas often overlap. 
 
Quality/quantity of information as a measure of environmental performance  
With regards to the quality/quantity of environmental performance information, investors can 
look at the ratings of a company’s CSR performance, such as the: Accountability Rating, the 
Corporate Responsibility (CR) Index, or Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics 
(KLD) rating, which are regularly measured and evaluated by organizations (or rating agencies) 
in terms of how responsibly companies manage their impact on the: society, environments, and 
the economies in which they operate. The CSR/environmental ratings give simple ordered 
information to investors regarding the companies’ past environmental/CSR performance and 
their future outlook (Chatterji et al., 2009), which facilitates the decision-making process 
(Ilinitch et al., 1998). Research has shown that the information from CSR ratings companies 
most likely does support investors in their decision making (Derwall et al., 2005; Kempf and 
Osthoff, 2007) and that they can minimize the information asymmetry by providing them with 
reliable information  (Chatteri and Levine, 2006; Derwall et al., 2005; Scalet and Kelly, 2010).  
Looking at it from a different angle, effective CSR ratings may assist managers to make better 
strategic decisions regarding CSR and consequently, their efforts may be rewarded with higher 
firm performance  (Chatteri and Levine, 2006; Scalet and Kelly, 2010).      
 
Of the very few studies that have investigated how well the CSR ratings represent corporate 
environmental performance, it has been observed that some (e.g. KLD ratings) provide a fairly 
good summary of past environmental performance and current management decisions that may 
affect future outcomes (Chatteri et al., 2009). Further, it has been suggested that ratings (e.g. 
KLD ratings) provide a transparent, reliable, and valid measure of environmental performance 
(Rahman and Post, 2012). The few empirical studies that have investigated the influence of CSR 
ratings on stock market performance seem to support the assertion that higher CSR ratings are 
preferred by investors and the likelihood that these ratings are a reliable measure of corporate 
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environmental performance (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007; Mahoney and Robert, 2007; Waddock 
and Graves, 1994).  
 
The third party representational measure as environmental performance  
As another alternative measure, investors may rely on the membership of SRI indices as 
measured by a third representational party, such as the FTS4Good indices of the Financial Times 
and the London Stock Exchange, the DJSI of the Dow Jones indexes and the Sustainability Asset 
Management (SAM) Group, or the Domini Social Index (DSI) of the KLD. Regarding these, to 
be included companies have to meet certain criteria, including: environment, social and financial 
performance measures and hence their membership has been taken as demonstrating 
commitment towards sustainability leadership (Robinson et al., 2011). Thus, through these 
indices, providing standardized measures and creating benchmarks to track performance in 
public, socially responsible investors can conduct SRI easier than before (White, 2005). The 
empirical evidence would seem to suggest that companies included in the indices experience 
higher returns than those excluded (e.g. Consolandi et al., 2009; Curran and Moran, 2007; Doh et 
al., 2010). In short, this third representational measure of SRI indices provides valuable 
information that supports investment decisions. 
 
CSR/environmental reputation as a measure of environmental performance  
Scholars have found defining and measuring corporate reputation, deemed an intangible asset, 
problematic, largely because they have only considered it within their single subject area and the 
fact that the measurement scales chosen have been unidimensional, which has made it hard to 
compare one reputation with another (see Chun, 2005 for more details). Moreover, identifying a 
suitable measure of reputation has been made more complex because of the move away from a 
single stakeholder view (e.g. investors or employees) to multiple one where reputation can be 
defined as “a collective representation of a firm’s past actions and results that describes the 
firm’s ability to deliver valued outcomes to multiple stakeholders” (Gradberg and Fombrun, 
2002, p304).  Under these circumstances, investors can gauge a firm’s CSR/environmental 
performance either by trusting information provided by firms or through more unbiased 
measures taken from outside agencies (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Karpik and Belkaoui, 1989). 
Empirically, two well-known reputation ratings have been employed in relevant studies, these 
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being: Fortune’s America’s (or World’s) Most Admired Companies (AMAC or WMAC) and 
Britain’s Most Admired Companies by Management Today, which assess companies according 
to multiple criteria, including: social and community responsibility, financial performance and 
innovation. They will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter. There is evidence that has 
linked reputation positively with corporate environmental performance (Brammer and Pavelin, 
2004; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998b).  In particular, Konar and Cohen 
(2001) showed that environmental reputation is positively related to a firm’s intangible assets. 
Further, empirical evidence has suggested that investors strongly take account of 
environmental/CSR reputation when making decisions (e.g. Belkaoui, 2004; Herremans et al., 
1993; Hussainey and Salama, 2010). 
 
In sum, even though environmental performance information from intermediaries supports 
outside investors for investment making decisions, they still might want to know about actual 
performance and until recently there is no clear evidence which measures of this are more value 
generating. That is, it is still to be elicited whether investors pay more attention to actual physical 
performance than representative measures or whether they weight these equally during decision 
making.  
 
Deviation from investors’ expectations 
The evidence from the above studies has provided strong confirmation that investors believe that 
information related to corporate environmental performance is value relevant and that they use 
such information in valuing firms. However, other researchers have come up with contrasting 
results which have shown that these representational information measures do not represent a 
firms’ future cash flow, and thus should not be relied on to give an accurate current valuation. 
For instance, studies carried out by Inglis et al. (2006) and Rose and Thomsen (2004) showed 
that reputation does not influence a company’s future performance. Moreover, Dierkes and Antal 
(1985) contended that even though representational measures can provide useful information 
regarding the current challenges that a business faces, the investor needs to have knowledge on 
how the company will perform in the future. Further, Ilinitch et al. (1998) and Chatteiji and 
Levine (2006) asserted that investors attempting to use the data provided by information 
intermediaries should fully understand and cautiously interpret them by examining whether they 
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are measured accurately and do in fact represent investors’ concerns. In sum, these results imply 
that it is likely that these representative measures are not powerful enough to capture 
comprehensively corporate environmental performance information.  
 
From a different perspective, other scholars have elicited that investors’ non-financial motivation 
can lead to their decision-making being diverted away from the expectations of conventional 
theory, in that investors have other concerns than just simple maximisation of their economic 
utility (e.g. Belkaoui, 1976 and 2004; Bollen, 2007; Pasewark and Riley, 2010; Stevens, 1984). 
For instance, Bollen (2007) probed investors’ behaviours focusing on the cash inflow and 
outflow from SRI and non-SRI mutual funds and reported that those investing in a socially 
responsible manner are less sensitive to the poor performance of SRI funds than those who do 
not. A more recent study conducted by Pasewark and Riley (2010) revealed that investment 
decision-making depends on an investor’s personal values. That is, in their empirical 
investigation, they found that investors who were concerned about the societal implications of 
their investment chose non-tobacco companies to invest in even though the latter experienced a 1% 
higher rate of return. From this, it would appear that socially responsible investors are willing to 
trade-off their maximized wealth for their ethical preferences. 
 
On balance, the above discussion would appear to indicate that corporate environmental 
performance is value relevant in investment decision-making, but one caveat to this is the limited 
number of studies that have investigated this relationship. Moreover, there is substantial evidence 
that investors will take this performance into account so as to maximize their utility, but the 
strength of the relation between these two aspects of performance is still contested. However, 
whereas measuring the financial aspects of environmental performance can be easily 
accomplished through the financial information contained in statements, non-financial 
performance, which this researcher believes constitutes an important part of this phenomenon, 
has yet to be measured robustly and hence there remains information asymmetry between the 
two parties of outsider investors and companies. Thus, investors often have to rely on the 
information provided from intermediaries so as to reduce the uncertainty in their decision 
making. In addition, the extant studies have not comprehensively investigated the relationship 
between corporate pollution levels, representative measures of environmental performance (e.g. 
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ratings or reputation), and/or quality of reporting as measures of corporate environmental 
performance. In particular, whether investors differentiate between these measures when they are 
making their investment decisions has yet to be specifically investigated. If it were found that 
these measures are taken into account during investment decision-making, this would 
demonstrate that there is a positive relationship between corporate environmental performance 
and equity performance, whereby a better reputation brought on by the former leads to higher 
returns on investment. Finally, the above cited previous empirical studies have not clearly 
elicited which of these measurements investors rely upon most when assessing environmental 
performance. 
  
On the other hand, investors may convey on these measurements equal weight when making 
investment decisions. In respect of this, the earlier studies have not thoroughly determined 
whether these measurements are highly positively correlated or not with each other and if they 
are, this would indicate that they have no particular preference with regards to each of them. If 
not, then the power of each measurement needs to be carefully interpreted in relation to 
investment decision making, because  focusing on the measure/s that impact most positively on a 
company’s performance would prove beneficial. A third possibility is that it may be found that 
investors do not trust the reliability of firms reporting on their environmental performance and 
prefer a more objective external assessment. Regarding this, a number of previous studies have 
revealed that there is no association between actual corporate environmental performance and the 
content of a company’s report disclosures (Ingram and Frazier, 1980; Rockness, 1985; Wiseman, 
1982), which lends support to the questionable reliability of these disclosures. However, rather 
than these results indicating a lack of quality and trustworthiness in relation to the information 
disclosed, they could just point to a lack of interest in environmental information to the external 
investor. Furthermore, a firm’s environmental performance could be misrepresented in other 
contexts, such as in the media. For example, if corporate managers realise that higher corporate 
environmental reputation is related to higher profit, then they may pay more attention to building 
a good corporate reputation in the press, at the cost of other aspects of environmental 
performance, such as the control of levels of pollution. In such circumstances, a manager’s 
behaviour could be reflecting his/her wish to improve economic performance by any means, 
rather than indicating any environmental concerns. 
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In reality, it is hard to disguise actual underlying performance regarding environmental issues, 
because of the increasing number of international agreements on pollution abatement, such as the 
mechanisms (i.e. emissions trading, joint implementation, and clean development) under the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, it has not been clearly established whether environmental 
performance is relevant, in terms of value to a corporation, or whether it has a positive or 
negative impact on corporate equity performance. Moreover, regarding the measurements 
included for this thesis (i.e. corporate physical performance, environmental reputation and 
environmental disclosures) it has not been previously established whether or not they affect 
corporate environmental performance in equal measure. If this were elicited, company managers 
could then use the results to orient their business strategy in accordance with the most fruitful 
performance measure/s, thereby attracting increased investment. Drawing the above discussion 
together, figure 2 provides a diagram of the conceptual framework to be applied in this research 
endeavour. This framework includes recognition that aspects of environmental performance may 
be internalized in financial performance through law/regulation (e.g. environmental taxes) or 
through trading transactions (e.g. where customers’ buying decisions are sensitive to 
environmental performance) and that other aspects of environmental performance may be 
relevant to investors even though they do not have such a direct financial impact.  The primary 
research aim here is to determine which forms of information on environmental performance are 
used by investors for whom such performance is relevant to their decisions. 
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework 
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3.3 Implications  
  
Investors may have different reasons for taking into account corporate environmental 
performance when making investment decisions. For instance, this may be driven by a financial 
motivation (i.e. profit maximisation), where it is perceived that the higher the level of corporate 
environmental performance, the higher are the expected returns and the lower the potential risk 
in the future, which will result in higher cash flows, consistent with conventional theory. 
However, under this perspective it is assumed that investors are homogeneous and thus, the 
presence of non-financial motivations in relation to corporate environmental performance are 
overlooked when the intention is to understand financial market phenomena, as  a number of 
scholars have pointed out (e.g. DeBondt and Thaler, 1994; Nagy and Obenberger, 1994; Thaler, 
1999). Consequently, because certain financial phenomena are not explicable by norms alone, an 
alternative theory that can capture heterogeneous investor behaviours taking place at any one 
time is needed. Therefore, to this end, behavioural theory, which challenges the classical norms, 
is adopted for this thesis as it can take into account the role of potentially sub-optimal 
information sources and non-financial information.   
 
In addition, in the conceptual framework it is posited that investors can maximize their utility 
function by taking account of corporate environmental performance when making investment 
decisions. That is, it is assumed that the environmental performance information is directly 
related to a firm’s share price. However, in order to understand the environmental performance 
in terms of non-financial information it is absolutely crucial to elicit which information can help 
investors to assess environmental performance related to financial risk and returns, which has yet 
to be established. Regarding this, investors may need to draw information on environmental 
performance not only from intermediaries, such as reputation, rating or badges of CSR 
performance, but also from information provided by the companies themselves, such as 
CSR/annual reporting or physical performance. The empirical evidence on this has shown that 
investors seek other information, including environmental information, from sources other than 
CSR/annual reporting (Deegan and Rankin, 1997; Harte et al., 1991). 
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In the context of the usefulness of information, including environmental information, this is a 
key element of the investment decision-making process, as its effective dissemination lessens the 
uncertainty between companies and investors, thereby resulting in increased efficiency in the 
allocation of resources for the latter, than were it otherwise (Williams, 1987).  However, 
different investors adopt different approaches to processing such information so as to generate 
value. In particular, it is suggested here that the investment decision is dependent on an 
investor’s perception regarding CSR/environmental performance.  Nevertheless, to date, it is 
unclear which aspects of the latter investors rely upon most, if any, when making the decision 
whether to invest or not in a particular company.   
 
In this thesis, investors are considered as information users who require environmental 
information from a variety of sources, including representational forms, physical performance 
and/or the quality of a firm’s reporting, when making their investment decisions.  Moreover, the 
level of usefulness of this information is positively dependent on the degree to which it is 
employed in the decision making process, which varies across investors. This gives rise to the 
first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Investor’s decisions are influenced by information on environmental performance. 
 
 Institutional investors generally can be categorised into two investment styles these days: non-
SRI and SRI. The former type is the mainstream investment industry, which has been hesitant to 
be concerned with corporate environmental performance and only aims at maximizing 
investment return in their investment decisions. By contrast, institutional investors in the latter 
integrate social, environmental, and ethical considerations into investment decisions and have 
become the leaders in the SRI investment market (Louche, 2009; Sparkers and Cowton, 2004). 
That is, these investors engage in socially responsible investment, which the Social Investment 
Forum (SIF) has explained “involves evaluating companies on CSR issues, analyzing corporate 
social and environmental risks, and engaging corporations to improve their CSR policies and 
practice” (Social Investment Forum, 2006, p.2).  In other words, this form of investing reflects 
CSR activities that matter to those investors who have an interest besides simply maximizing 
their wealth. In this respect, a number of studies have posited that, increasingly, SRI has become 
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interrelated with firms’ CSR practices (Cowton, 1999a; Sparkes and Cowton, 2004), whereby 
SRI investors can play a major role in encouraging companies to engage in CSR. Further, SRI 
investors often work cooperatively to steer management teams onto a course that is believed to 
improve financial performance over time as well as enhancing the well-being of all the 
company’s stakeholders (i.e. customers, employees, investors) and protecting the natural 
environment (Schueth, 2003). Regarding the evidence of firms’ efforts, many have adopted 
various CSR initiatives to improve the relationship between them and their stakeholders 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2009). This is supported by empirical evidence that the SRI investors prefer 
to invest in companies with a higher level of CSR (e.g. Neubaum and Zahra, 2006; Mahoney and 
Roberts, 2007).  The above discussion leads to the second proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: An institutional investor’s investment style affects to what extent environmental 
performance is taken into account. 
 
 
3. 4 Research design       
  
In this section the methodologies used for the research in this thesis based on the outcomes of the 
literature review, chapter 2, and the conceptual framework presented in chapter 3 are explained. 
Note that this section does not cover the details of the methods employed, samples used in the 
individual empirical studies, mode of data collection and why each data type/source has been 
used, as these will be provided as appropriate in each empirical chapter. Here, the intention is to 
provide a broad overview of the identified environmental performance measures, as utilized in 
each empirical chapter, and what the aims of the research are.  
 
A large body of literature has investigated the relationship between environmental and equity 
performance, but the empirical evidence to date is inconsistent. As pointed out by a number of 
scholars (e.g. Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Ullman, 1985), the conflicting results in the prior 
research are probably mainly attributable to differences in methodology and in the choice of 
environmental performance indicators. For this thesis, where stock returns are used as the equity 
performance measure, three analytical procedures are employed to test the propositions in three 
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empirical studies: value relevance, drawing on the Ohlson model, a multiple regression and an 
event study, all being undertaken using secondary data. 
  
Regarding the first two analytical methods, these assess at the general level how well a 
company’s performance information is reflected in investors’ investment decisions. Linked with 
this, a further goal is to elicit the extent to which the valuation of a firm depends on the 
information that is available and whether any change in it affects current and/or future prices. As 
a test of information content, event studies are carried out over a long time to see how quickly 
and correctly the market reacts to a particular piece of news. Previous studies on CSR have 
employed this methodology to investigate market reaction to the issuing of new information. 
That is, it is considered an effective way for determining whether the market genuinely cares 
about information on a company’s CSR. More specifically, through this using this approach in 
this research it is possible to establish whether certain corporate environmental performance 
measures are taken into account when equity investment decisions are made as well as whether 
there is a significant difference between SRI and non-SRI investment decision making.   
 
3.4.1 Assessing environmental performance   
  
It has been discussed earlier in this chapter that with the modified utility model investors can 
optimise their utility by incorporating other objectives than just earnings and risk choices. That is, 
if they take into account corporate environmental performance as an additional consideration in 
their investment decision-making, their total utility can simply be expressed as:  
 
                                                           
j
ijijRRi EPhEfU ),(    
where Ui is the total utility of an investor i and ER and σR are the expected return and the risk of     
return. hij is the amount time an individual i invests in a particular investment j. EPij is the 
corporate environmental performance of investment j.  In other words, an investor’s investment 
decision-making can be derived from a firm’s performance, measured by expected return and 
risk, and its environmental performance. If the corporate environmental performance has been 
internalised by regulations or the capital market, investors can take this into account when 
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making their investment choices, because they can be exhibited in a tangible form, such as: 
financial, rank, risk or written report. That is, they may believe that higher environmental 
performance can lead to better expected earnings and/or lower risk, resulting in higher present 
value of a firm (Narver, 1971). However, because the definition and measurements for 
environmental performance have not been clearly identified, as yet (Ilinitch et al., 1998), it is 
difficult to assess the impact of corporate environmental performance on investment decision-
making.  
  
As has already been discussed, when a corporation releases its environmental performance 
information the physical performance information can be internalised by the capital market and 
indicated in its performance. However, because of the characteristics of non-financial 
performance, all of its environmental performance information may not be internalised and 
recognised and thus, investors may need to consider the company’s overall environmental 
representative measurements as a proxy for environmental performance. Next, which proxy is 
used for corporate environmental performance is explained and justified for each study as well as 
there being an overview of the analytical approaches employed in each case.  
 
Study 1  
The first study tests the first proposition that environmental performance information is of 
relevance to investors’ decision making. To do this, two methodological approaches are 
employed, multivariable regression and the Ohlson valuation model, using secondary data taken 
from Fortune’s WMAC. More specifically, initially, OLS regressions for panel data between 
1999 and 2007 are applied by extending Belkaoui’s (2004) study to elicit whether the corporate 
environmental performance measure has explanatory power for stock return and hence, is 
systematically related to the earnings. Next, following Hassel et al. (2005), using the same data 
set an analogue of the Ohlson model is enlisted to explore whether environmental performance 
has value relevance. In this study, three proxies are utilized as measures of environmental 
performance: 
 
 Environmental disclosure: measured by membership of the DJSI and assigned 1 if 
companies are listed and 0 otherwise, over the sample period. Further, to improve the 
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level of robustness, GRI Guidelines usage is used as another variable relating to 
disclosure from 2000 to 2007. 
 
 Pollution (i.e. physical) performance: measured by Green House Gases (GHG) intensity, 
defined as a firm’s total sales/revenues divided by GHG emissions.    
 
 Environmental reputation:  measured using Fortune’s WMAC scores on this aspect.  
 
The two aims of this study are:   
 
 To elicit which type of information regarding environmental performance is more 
trustworthy to investors when making decisions and further, whether this is positively or 
negatively related to stock market performance;   
 
 To explore which type of information has value relevance. 
 
Study 2 
As discussed in chapter 1, the badge of belonging to an SRI index may be a quick way of 
conveying positive information regarding corporate sustainability leadership, thus enhancing a 
firm’s reputation as well its value (Cho et al., 2012; Robinson et al., 2011). Hence, to test the 
second proposition, SRI indices: the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index are used. It also involves 
two analytical approaches, event study and value relevance, based on secondary data taken from 
the two indices. More specifically, the constituents of SRI indices were extracted from the DJSI 
World website from 2000 to 2007 and FTSE4Good Global index website from 2002 to 2007. 
The event study is conducted by following Brown and Warner’s (1980) statistical significance 
testing method and further, for the value relevance study the model used in Hassel et al. (2005) is 
employed. Understandably, the measure for environmental performance in this study is 
membership of one of these SRI indices. 
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The three main aims of this part of the empirical research are as follows: 
 
 Using an event study to examine whether the announcement of membership of SRI 
indices has an impact on the market; 
 
 To test how the announcement of inclusion in or exclusion from indices affects  
companies’ abnormal returns; 
 
 To test whether the badge of such indices has value relevance. 
 
Study 3 
This relates to the last proposition, for which four CSR ratings with different characteristics (i.e. 
global or regional, multi-dimensional or single dimensional CSR measure), are utilised: 
Fortune’s WMAC reputation score, the Environmental Index, the Corporate Responsibility Index 
and the Accountability Rating.  The analysis involves cross-sectional regression of the equity 
holdings on the CSR ratings. The companies’ ownership holdings are provided by the Lipper 
Analytic Services, a Reuters Company, for the sample period 2006 and 2007.   
 
This study has two aims as follows: 
 
 To test whether the level of CSR positively influences the equity holdings decision by 
SRI funds more than in the case of non-SRI ones; 
 
 To probe whether the characteristics of the CSR ratings measures, namely, environment 
reputation or multi-attributed reputation have a different impact on investment decision 
making for SRI fund managers and non-SRI fund managers. 
 
Figure 3 shows the overview of conceptual framework including analytical framework, which 
have been discussed above and then other key issues and hypotheses that are discussed in detail 
in the relevant empirical chapters.   
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Figure 3. Overview of conceptual framework including analytical frameworks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 1:  
The investor’s 
decisions are 
influenced by 
information on 
environmental 
performance. 
 
 
Proposition 2: 
An institutional 
investor’s investment 
style affects to what 
extent environmental 
performance is taken 
into account. 
 
 
 
 
Q3: Are there 
differences between 
SRI-styled and other 
funds in terms of the 
environmental 
performance of 
companies 
represented in their 
portfolios? 
 
Q1: What effect do 
various measures of 
environmental 
performance have 
on investor 
decisions? 
 
Q2: Which measure 
is of greatest 
relevance in this 
process? 
Environmental 
reputation 
 
Environmental 
disclosures (proxied 
by index 
membership or GRI) 
 
Physical 
performance 
H 1: the informativeness of 
accounting earnings as an 
explanatory variable for returns is 
systematically related to a firm’s 
environmental reputation, its 
environmental disclosures, and/or 
its physical performance 
H2: there is a positive association 
between company market value and 
corporate environmental reputation, 
environmental disclosures and/or 
physical performance.  
 
H3: representational non-financial 
information (i.e. corporate 
environmental reputation, 
environmental disclosures, or/and 
physical performance) is relevant to 
firm value. 
 
SRI index 
membership  
H 4a (4b): announcements of firms 
being included in (deleted from) an 
SRI index are associated with their 
experiencing significant and 
positive (negative) share price 
changes.  
 
H5:  membership of an SRI index is 
relevant information in that it has 
an impact on the market value of 
firms. 
 
 
CSR ratings 
H 6: the ownership holdings 
decisions by SRI funds are more 
affected by the level of CSR than 
those of non-SRI funds. 
 
Cross-sectional 
regression 
analysis 
Value relevance:  
Ohlson model 
Event study 
Value relevance: 
Ohlson model 
OLS regression 
Propositions Research 
questions 
Alternative 
EP measures 
Hypotheses Analytical 
methods 
68 
 
3.5 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter it has been posited that investors do not have homogenous preference 
when making decisions and hence, it is necessary to draw on behaviour theory in 
order to understand this process.  That is, non-financial motivations impact variously 
on investors in that some have an ethical aspect in their utility maximization strategy. 
However, because of the lack of a standardized measure of environmental 
performance, which is usually seen to represent non-financial performance, investors 
often have to rely on the third party representational measures. Regarding this, it has 
been put forward that investors’ perceived importance regarding the measuring of the 
environmental performance will determine the value of the information provided (i.e. 
usefulness information). The propositions outlined in this chapter are developed into 
hypotheses for testing in the empirical chapters and the specific methodologies 
applied in each case are introduced and explained as appropriate.     
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Chapter4. CSR Reputation and Equity performance 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter the aim is to acquire a comprehensive understanding of the impacts of 
corporate environmental reputation on equity performance, by developing a research 
model to test the relationship between share returns and environmental reputation as 
well as establishing whether or not the latter can be relevant to firm value. Although 
there are some studies that have investigated the relationship between environmental 
disclosures or environmental performance and equity performance, to date, the link 
between environmental reputation and equity performance has not been 
comprehensively investigated. Most environmental reputation studies have 
concentrated on its association with financial performance and have also been heavily 
focused on a specific market. Therefore, in this study Fortune’s WMAC reputation 
scores over a nine-year period from 1999 to 2007 are used to elicit whether they are 
value relevant and have an impact on equity performance at the global level.   
 
In addition, the environmental disclosures and pollution (or physical) performance are 
employed, in turn, as CSR performance measures also to test whether they are 
positively associated with equity performance and thus, relevant to firm value. A 
further aim in this chapter is evaluate whether all three CSR performance measures 
(i.e. environmental reputation, environmental disclosure, and physical performance) 
taken together have value relevance. However, the critical decision of choosing the 
measurements for environmental performance is problematic, because there is no 
widely agreed method for doing so. As explained in detail below, the approach 
adopted in this research is to draw upon a set of measures that have been used in 
previous empirical studies to measure corporate environmental performance, which 
include: membership of the DJSI for environmental disclosures and eco-efficiency, in 
the form greenhouse gas emissions, for physical performance. 
 
Section 4.2, contains explanation of and justification for the research design as well as 
hypothesis development. Moreover, the method of data collection and the empirical 
models are also presented in this section. In section 4.3 the results from the empirical 
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analysis are reported for both market and accounting based measures of performance. 
Section 4.4 contains discussion on the findings and section 4.5 is the chapter summary.  
 
4.2 Research Design  
 
4.2.1 Environmental reputation as a CSR measure  
 
Even though it has been criticized for long time owing to the high degree of 
subjectivity in the assessment criteria, corporate reputation is, undoubtedly, a 
significant and relevant corporate asset (Belkaoui, 2004). Unerman claimed that the 
building of good corporate reputation can be a worthiness asset to corporation noting 
that; 
 
“A corporation’s reputation among its economically powerful stakeholders is a 
valuable asset which needs to be protected and developed, and a key aspect of this 
reputation is stakeholders’ perceptions of the corporation’s CSR – or, more precisely, 
perceptions of how well the corporation’s CSR policies, practices and outcomes meet 
stakeholders’ social and environmental values and expectations.” (2008, p.362)  
 
Nevertheless, environmental reputation in CSR has yet to be comprehensively 
investigated, partially because there is no general agreement on how this can be 
measured and also because until fairly recently there has been limited public data 
available. In this regard, the few early studies carried out used simple techniques that 
lacked robustness to examine the market reaction to CSR reputation and in any case 
produced inconsistent results (Moskowitz, 1972; Vance, 1975; Cochran and Wood, 
1984). Since Fortune started publishing the first annual surveys of “America’s Most 
Admired Corporation (AMAC)” and the “World’s Most Admired Companies 
(WMAC)” in 1983 and 1997, respectively, a standard measure of reputation has been 
available to public.  Subsequently, a similar reputation measure, Britain’s Most 
Admired Companies (MAC) by Management Today, became available for use in 
empirical research. In this research, it is drawn upon along with that of Fortune’s 
WMAC for the empirical analysis, being more extensive than AMAC and each is 
discussed next.  
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Britain’s Most Admired Companies, which was first published in 1994 by 
Management Today, is commonly used in empirical analysis of UK firms. The 
method that they use is very similar to than employed by Fortune’s reputation index, 
being rated on a scale of 0 (poor) to 10 (excellent) for nine performance criteria: 
quality of management, financial soundness, ability to attract, develop and retain top 
talent, quality of product/services, value as a long term investment, capacity to 
innovate, quality of marking, community and environmental responsibility and use of 
corporate assets. A few studies have involved taking its “community and 
environmental responsibility” score to investigate: the relationship between 
environmental reputation and its disclosure (Hasseldine et al., 2005; Toms, 2002), the 
usefulness of reputation information to investors (Hussainey and Salama, 2010), and 
the impact of reputation on firm performance (Elsayed and Paton, 2005).  The 
findings from the first two supported the existence of there being a positive 
relationship between environmental reputation and its disclosure. Moreover, the most 
recent study, Hussainey and Salama (2010), showed that the environmental reputation 
contains value-relevant information and increases the stock market’s ability to 
anticipate future earnings change.  
Fortune’s reputation ratings are the most popularly used in CSR empirical research 
and since its AMAC ratings index became available to the public, a number of 
academics have taken the attribute “responsibility to the community and environment” 
as a CSR reputation measure, finding a positive relationship between environmental 
reputation and corporate financial performance (e.g. Belkaoui, 2004; Herremans et al., 
1993; McGuire et al., 1988).  However, the Fortune scores have been questioned 
because a significant body of research has found that these ratings are strongly 
correlated with financial performance and thus it has been argued that these financial 
effects should be removed before using the data (Brown and Perry, 1994 and 1995; 
Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Sodeman, 1995). Nevertheless, in spite of there being this 
downside, Brown and Perry (1995) and Wood (1995) also accepted that its 
“responsibility to the community and environment” is a useful measure of CSR 
performance. Moreover and perhaps more importantly, Fryxell and Wang (1994) 
elicited that the environmental reputation score is the only component in the ratings 
that does not seem to be affected by the financial effects.  
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In sum, the results of the studies above have shown that there is a positive relationship 
between environmental reputation and corporate financial performance. However, 
these research endeavours were mainly focused on restricted markets at a national or 
regional level (i.e. US or UK) and as such they were too narrow to elucidate the 
general level influence of environmental reputation. In order to fill this knowledge 
gap, for this research, Fortune’s WMAC “responsibility to the community and 
environment” is used as a measure of CSR reputation, thereby examining the matter 
in the whole world context.  
 
Fortune the World’s Most Admired Companies Scores (WMAC) 
Since 1997, the Hay Group, as a partner of Fortune, has conducted surveys of top 
executives, directors, and industry analysts, in the form of questionnaires being sent to 
the participants in October each year, with the deadline for responses being mid-
December at the latest. The respondents are only asked to rate companies from within 
their own industry, thus implying that they have direct access to industry specific 
disclosures. They are asked to rank each of the selected companies within 57 different 
industry groups, 26 international industries and 31 US oriented industries, on nine 
factors: ability to attract and retain talented people; quality of management; social 
responsibility to the community and the environment; innovativeness; quality of 
products or services; wise use of corporate assets; financial soundness; long-term 
investment value; and effectiveness in doing business globally.
2
 Each of these criteria 
has to be rated on a scale of 0 (poor) to 10 (excellent) and subsequently, the 
company’s overall ranking is determined by a simple averaging of the attribute scores. 
Fortune releases the results annually on its website at the end of February and in the 
March edition of its magazine. Consistent with previous studies  (e.g. McGuire et al., 
1988; Belkaoui, 2004), social responsibility to the community and the environment is 
used as a measure of a firm’s environmental reputation and table 2 presents a 
summary of the scores from 1999 to 2007, before any adjusting for such matters as: 
mergers, take-overs or bankruptcy.  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Because of similar methodologies, America’s Most Admired Companies (AMAC) is not discussed in 
detail. Moreover, the attributes of AMAC are same as those of WMAC, except for the addition of an 
extra one for the latter: the effectiveness of doing business globally.   
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Table 2. Summary of environmental reputation scores from 1999 to 2007  
Year N Mean Min Max Standard deviation 
1999 271 5.7931 3.09 8.43 1.0891 
2000 331 5.8388 2.82 8.59 1.0015 
2001 380 5.9050 2.16 8.25 0.8878 
2002 318 5.6474 3.21 7.9 0.8774 
2003 345 5.4754 1.64 8.63 1.0693 
2004 346 5.7929 2.42 8.4 1.0040 
2005 357 5.8632 2.6 8.5 0.9936 
2006 351 5.8935 3.52 8.25 0.9757 
2007 347 5.7150 3.16 8.63 1.0417 
Average 338 5.7694 2.74 8.40 0.9933 
 
Although the number of firms that have been listed in the environmental reputation 
index has varied during the focal period of between 1999 and 2007, the mean score is 
around 5.7 with a standard deviation 1.0; that is, the spread of scores is very narrow 
and most rated companies have come within the range of 4.7-6.7.  
 
4.2.2 Development hypothesis 
 
In what follows, explanations are made for the impact of corporate environmental 
performance on investment decision-making, based on the conceptual framework 
presented in the previous chapter, under the market-based (i.e. stock return) and 
accounting-based (i.e. firm value) perspectives. Moreover, the sample of companies used 
are identified and justified as well as the proxies for environmental performance, 
including: environmental disclosure, environmental reputation, and physical performance.  
 
Market-based measurement 
Most of the existing work that elicited results positively relating environmental 
reputation to a firm’s performance has focused on its financial rather than equity 
performance (i.e. change in share price), with only a small number determining its 
link with the latter (Belkaoui, 2004; Hussainey and Salama, 2010)  Those studies that 
have considered equity performance have established the link between this and CSR 
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disclosures (e.g. Ingram, 1978; Murray et al., 2006) or CSR performance (e.g. 
Mahapatra, 1984) , rather than reputation.   
 
A number of researchers have carried out empirical investigations to test the 
assumption that information regarding environmental performance is reflected in 
share price changes, because the relevant stakeholders use this information when 
making investment decisions (e.g. Ingram, 1978; Murray et al., 2006). In this regard, 
to examine the movement in share prices, the return to investors is commonly used, 
because it can be simply calculated as a percentage of share price change.  Using this 
approach, a few studies have been conducted to establish whether it is a firm’s 
corporate environmental disclosures or environmental performance that contains 
information that has an influence on investment decision-making, but they showed 
inconsistent results (see, for example, Belkaoui, 1972; Ingram, 1978; Mahapatra, 1984; 
Murray et al., 2006).   
 
Further, research related to corporate environmental reputation was conducted by 
Belkaoui (2004) and Hussainey and Salama (2010), but even though they used a 
similar methodology their findings showed slightly different results. More specifically, 
Belkaoui (2004) examined whether the level of knowledge of earnings in the 
determination of stock returns is dependent on the quality of environmental reputation 
by employing Fortune’s AMAC data based on the US market and concluded that 
environmental reputation is significantly and positively related to returns. Hussainey 
and Salama (2010), using Management Today ratings information for UK companies,  
investigated whether environmental reputation could act as a predictor of future 
annual earnings and they found that such information is useful, whereas regarding its 
impact on current earnings this emerged as being insignificant, but notably negative in 
relation to returns. It is too early to confirm whether corporate environmental 
reputation is value relevant information or not to stakeholders for investment 
decision-making, because their studies (i.e. Belkaoui, 2004; Hussainey and Salama, 
2010) only focused on a specific market, such as US and UK.  However, despite this 
limitation the methods they used are valid for testing the association between the 
corporate environmental performance and equity performance to assess whether 
environmental information to stakeholders affects the level of accounting earnings 
and hence, that of returns. 
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Earning’s explanatory power for returns 
Since Ball and Brown (1968) published their findings that the accounting earnings are 
useful information for stakeholders’ investment decision-making, investigation into 
the association between them and returns has been undertaken (Easton and Harris, 
1991). In a study by Easton and Harris, how accounting earnings are an appropriate 
variable for explaining returns has been comprehensively discussed by using the book 
valuation and earnings valuation model.
3
 Under the premise that if market price and 
book value are considered as a “stock” of wealth then changes to these measures of 
wealth can be considered as “flow”, which these authors expressed as follows: 
 
               
 
Where a change in price (∆Pit) is the difference in price per share of firm i between 
two points in time (t-1 to t), change in book value (∆BVit) is the difference in the book 
value per share of firm i between the same two points in time, and uit is the difference 
between ∆Pit and ∆BVit. Moreover, under the clean surplus relation that was put 
forward by Ohlson (1995), the change in book value per share equals earnings per 
share minus the dividend per share over the time period in question, i.e.       
        and when rearranged these two formats and divided through by beginning of 
period price can be expressed as follows: 
 
        
     
 
   
     
     
 
That is, this equation shows that the earnings per share divided by the starting price 
related to expected returns.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The book valuation model is only discussed in this study because the earning valuation model 
involves using a similar approach to reach the same return-earnings relation. Further, the concern in 
this research is with the level of accounting earnings rather than changes in earnings (for more details 
see Easton and Harris, 1991, p.22-23). 
77 
 
Driven by the above discussion, two hypotheses that arise for testing in this research 
are: 
 
H1: The informativeness of accounting earnings as an explanatory variable for returns 
is systematically related to a firm’s environmental reputation, its environmental 
disclosures, and/or its physical performance. 
 
H2: there is a positive association between company market value and                             
corporate environmental reputation, environmental disclosures and/or physical 
performance. 
 
Accounting-based measurements 
Even though financial information, such as earnings and cash flow, has been shown to 
be value relevant to the market, non-financial information was not a central concern in 
this respect until Ohlson (1995) presented a valuation model, using: book value, 
earnings, and other information. The model can be expressed as follows based on 
standard assumptions that underlie the dividend discount model, the clean surplus 
relation, and an assumed stochastic process for abnormal earnings: 
 
                 
 
where Pt is stock price at time t, BVt is end of book value of equity, Et is abnormal 
earnings for period t, and vt is other non-accounting value relevant information.   
 
The visible difference between the market-based and accounting-based models is that 
the latter incorporates “other information”, which is information about future 
abnormal earnings that is not contained in current earnings. The author stated that vt 
summarizes value relevant events that have yet to have an impact on the financial 
statements and a factor which is related future earnings independently of current and 
past earnings. However, researchers have faced difficulty in defining “other 
information”. Thus, some have employed the valuation model, having set the other 
information variables aside (Bernard, 1995; Clubb, 1996), whereas others defined 
them by using various non-financial information events, such as: air pollution, 
reputation, or analysts’ forecasts of next year’s earnings (Amir and Lev, 1996; Black 
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et al., 2000; Clarkson et al., 2004; Dechow et al., 1999; Hassel et al., 2005; Hughes II, 
2000).        
 
From the previous empirical investigations (for more detail see Appendix I), it can be 
inferred that environmental performance is value relevant to financial information, but 
it is not necessarily the case that it is positively associated with a firm’s market 
valuation, because the market based valuation studies have shown an inconsistent 
relationship between environmental performance and market returns. Furthermore, as 
yet, there are not even clear widely accepted measurements of environmental 
performance. Compared to market-based valuation, little research has investigated the 
value relevance of non-financial information variables, because, as pointed out above, 
there is no clear definition of what they entail. Dechow et al. (1999) comprehensively 
conceptually summarized the valuation model with and without the other information 
variable, which they defined as the analysts’ forecasts of the next period’s abnormal 
earnings, and their findings weakly supported the Ohlson model. However, they 
pointed out that the model is still useful for empirical research, because it provides a 
unifying framework of a large number of previous valuation models by using three 
variables (i.e. book value, earnings, and short-term forecasts of earnings). Moreover, 
as such it is a robust basic framework on which subsequent research can build, and the 
studying of the relationship between future abnormal earnings and current information 
variables is heuristically appealing. Hence, in this study the model is adapted by using 
environmental performance, corporate environmental reputation and disclosure, which 
have not been fully investigated previously, as the non-financial information variables. 
The issue of interest here is to assess whether corporations can increase their value 
with this non-financial information, which gives rise to the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: representational non-financial information (i.e. corporate environmental 
reputation, environmental disclosures, or/and physical performance) is relevant to 
firm value.  
 
The hypotheses development discussed above is summarized diagrammatically in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Summary of hypotheses developments 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.3 Sample and Data Collection 
 
The three variables that were used in this research to measure corporate 
environmental performance are: reputation, disclosure, and physical performance. 
Regarding the longitudinal data collection on reputation, because the firms in the 
WMAC index change from year to year, only those that were listed for the entire time 
period of 1999 to 2007 were included, which resulted in a total of 1,197 firm-year 
observations.  
 
As a measure of corporate environmental disclosures, membership of DJSI World was 
used rather than content analysis, which has mostly been employed in previous studies 
(e.g. Freedman and Jaggi, 1982 and 1986; Murray et al., 2006) and the reason for 
doing so was because disclosing environmental performance is still voluntarily 
reported by companies and is not normally verified by an independent third party.  
Shane and Spicer (1983) argued that a major problem in previous studies was the 
voluntary CSR disclosures. They suggested that without mandated disclosures and 
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reporting standards for firms, difficulties relating to inconsistency and non-
comparability of information disclosed made empirical analysis problematic.  
Moreover, content analysis has other drawbacks, such as it being extremely time 
consuming and consequently most of the research using this method is only short term 
as well as being highly subjective, because of the self-constructed recording by the 
researcher themselves, rather than by any objective procedure, such as a ranking or 
rating method (for more detail see Appendix I). Ever since DJSI World was launched 
in 1999, its committee has reviewed three criteria annually, i.e. economic, 
environment, and the social dimensions, to decide whether a firm can qualify to join. 
More specifically in relation to this research, the index committee reviews the firm’s 
environmental reporting according to industry specific criteria, such as: the climate 
change strategy or biodiversity.
4
  Although the assessment is subjective, it can be 
considered consistent and comparable across firms because the committee is applying 
the same criteria to each firm. In fact, to be a member of an index firms need to 
maintain and disclose information that reflects the prescribed criteria in their 
sustainable practices. Regarding the scoring for this aspect, a dummy variable was 
created and it was defined 1 if a company belonged to DJSI World and 0 otherwise.  
 
As the alternative measurement of the disclosure variable, the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) data from 2000 to 2007 was employed. GRI was established in 1997 
by the CERES (Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economics) in partnership 
with the UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme), with the aim of 
developing a globally acceptable standardized format for reporting on the: economic, 
environmental, and the social performance of organizations. Since the first 
sustainability reporting guidelines were released in 2000 (known as the G1), the 
frameworks have been comprehensively revised and the second (G2 guidelines) and 
the third versions of the guidelines (G3 guidelines) were issued in 2002 and 2006, 
respectively. Many organizations have accepted the guidelines in their sustainability 
reporting. This variable is defined as a dummy variable, which was given a value of 1 
if a company applied any of the guidelines in its CSR/environmental reporting and 0 
otherwise, with the data being obtained from the GRI website and 
Corporateregister.com, a global directory of CSR resources. 
                                                 
4
 For more detailed information see http://www.sustainability-index.com/07_htmle/assessment/csa.html 
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The third explanatory variable, ghg-intensity, was used as a measure of corporate 
environmental performance, being defined as a firm’s total sales and revenues divided 
by its greenhouse gases emissions. Corporate total sales and revenues, which are 
accounting items in the corporate income statements representing a firm’s business 
activities over a period of time, were collected from DataStream for local currency 
and then the averaged monthly exchange rate over period t, collected from 
DataStream, was applied converted into the US dollar.  Based on a review of websites 
of CorporateRegister.com and the corporate websites for firms included in the 
reputation index from 1999 to 2007, each company’s greenhouse gases emission 
levels were collected from its environmental reporting, but because of the difficulty of 
separating the geographic segment sales, only corporate total greenhouse gases 
emission figures were used.  The term “environmental performance” is probably the 
most ambiguously defined CSR performance measure being identified by a range of 
different indicators in the previous studies, including: the CEP index (e.g. Ingram and 
Frazier, 1980; Shane and Spicer, 1983; Spicer 1978a and 1978b; Stevens, 1984), 
emissions data taken from the TRI (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hamilton, 1995; 
Patten, 2002) and various alternative performance ratings (e.g. Belkaoui and Karpik, 
1989; Rosso and Fouts, 1997; Ruf et al., 2001). It is this lack of consensus on which 
measure(s) to use that explains the inconclusive results on environmental performance 
and corporate business performance. Further, a few studies have involved employing 
corporate underlying performance without controlling for variation in the size of 
organizations and hence, by using the ratio of total firm revenue to greenhouse gas 
emissions as the environmental performance variable a distinction between firm size 
can be incorporated into the analysis. 
 
Accounting and stock return data were also taken from DataStream, with earnings per 
share being employed (Worldscope item 05202). In sum, the most significant 
constraints on sample size were the availability of the corporate environmental 
performance data from 1999 to 2007 and also that on a firm’s financial performance, 
which resulted in 338 firm-year observations that satisfied all conditions; however, 
the sample size varied for each model. 
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Measurements employed for the other variables  
In addition to the corporate environmental performance above, four selected financial 
performance variables, as used by Belkaoui (2004), were also examined in the models: 
leverage, growth opportunity, systematic risk, earnings variability, and in each case, an 
expectation regarding its relationship to stock return is stated based on Belkaoui’s study. 
 
Leverage was measured as the ratio of total debt divided by total assets, which has 
been used in previous research to determine how much of the company's assets have 
been financed by debt, thereby representing the level of riskiness of a firm (Waddock 
and Graves, 1997).  That is, the lower the company’s ratio of debt to assets, then the 
more it is financed through equity rather than debt.  
 
Growth opportunity was measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity, which was used because it can assess the future profitability of a firm, and a 
high ratio can indicate high expectations by investors of a firm’s future profitability. 
 
Risk was measured by market model beta, which is known as the systematic or 
unavoidable risk of the security, because it is that portion of the variance of the 
security’s return that cannot be diversified away by increasing the number of 
securities in the portfolio. The estimations of a security’s systematic risk i,t for each 
year were obtained by running a time series regression over the sixty months prior to 
the test period, using the market model, which is commonly used in this context. 
Standard and Poor’s Global 1200 index was utilized to measure the monthly market 
factor. In general, the higher the observed variation, the higher the risk involved in 
holding the equity.  
 
Accounting risk measures are considered as a firm’s earning variability and these 
were measured by finding the standard deviation of earnings for the thirty-six quarters 
of the years 1999 through to 2007, inclusive.  Beaver et al. (1970) claimed that 
accounting-based measures of risk should be considered as an assessment of the risk 
parameters for a future decision in the same manner as market-based measures of risk.  
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4.2.4 Empirical models    
 
The empirical analysis was conducted by two different performance measure 
approaches: market-based and accounting-based measurements. Regarding the former, 
this was aimed at assessing the degree to which earnings are informed by the chosen 
environmental performance variables and hence, how much the latter determines the 
level of returns. Belkaoui (2004) took US companies to investigate whether earnings 
are significantly and positively related to the level of environmental reputation and it 
is his procedure that was adopted for this work. However, in order to examine 
whether these relationships are stable enough to apply globally, the AMAC 
environmental reputation scores were replaced with the WMAC environmental 
reputation scores. As a preliminary step, correlation analysis was conducted between 
earnings and returns and the earnings coefficients from the regression of stock returns 
on earnings for three identified ranges of company environmental reputation across 
the sample were computed, these being: 3.95 to 5.63, 5.64 to 6.49, and 6.50 to 8.44 
for the DJSI. In addition, to conduct procedure above for the other environmental 
performance variables, the environmental disclosures were divided by two groups: 
companies listed in the DISJ and those not listed. Further, the physical environmental 
performance was categorized into three groups: 0.0002 to 0.0050, 0.0051 to 0.0184, 
and 0.0185-0.2717. The same procedures were repeated to make groups for the case 
of the GRI and a similar range of groups was obtained.  
 
For the regression based approach, the corporate environmental performance variables 
were examined separately and together. Furthermore, also in accordance with 
Belkaoui (2004), additional variables considered as the determinants of earnings were 
included and are discussed in detail later in this subsection. The process of testing 
involved longitudinal data analysis of the earnings coefficient conditional on the level 
of environmental performance, as defined above. Each explanatory variable was 
deflated by the closing share price at the end of fiscal year t-1, except for Fortune’s 
environmental reputation, because the collinearity test (i.e. variance inflation factor 
(VIF)) showed that it was highly correlated with   E i,t /Pi,t-1 .   The cross-sectional time 
series models, with an environmental performance interaction term, were formulated 
as follows:  
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where Ri,t is the stock returns of firm i for the annual period from nine months prior to  
the fiscal year-end through to three months after the fiscal year-end, as suggested by 
Ingram (1978), where Ei,t is earnings-per-share of firm i at the end of fiscal period t,     
Pi,t-1 is the price-per-share at the end of fiscal period t-1, fscoreit is Fortune’s WMAC 
environmental reputation score for  firm i for the year t, DJSIi.t is membership of the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) for the period t, ghg-intensityi,t  is the ratio of 
total sales revenues($M) dividend by greenhouse gases emission (tone) for firm i for 
the period t, debti,t is the firm’s ratio of total debt to total assets, growthi,t is measured 
as market value of equity divided by book value, riski,t is a firm’s systematic risk, 
measured by the market model and VARi, is the standard deviation of earnings for the 
thirty-six quarters from 1999 to 2007.   
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The first two hypotheses were tested using market-based performance valuations, 
whilst the last one involved accounting-based performance valuation. Under the 
assumption that the corporate environmental performance measures provide investors 
with value relevant information, the empirical model followed Hassel et al. (2005) 
which is the empirical analogue of Ohlson’s (1995) valuation model, which asserted 
that the firm value is related to accounting data and other information.  The 
foundation model is as follows
5
: 
 
                                      
 
Where MVit is the market value of firm i for the period t, dit is the dividend of firm i 
for the period t, MVit + dit is the cum-dividend adjusted market value, BVit-1 is the 
closing book value of firm i at t-1, Eit is the current period’s earning of firm i for the 
period t, and vt indicates the other non-accounting information.  
 
Then, the equation is divided by the beginning book value of each firm for regression 
of the cum-dividend market value on net income without the other information 
variables. 
 
        
      
   
 
      
      
   
      
           
 
where all the other variables are as before.  To control for size difference, the model is 
deflated by the beginning of book value of a firm. The constant term, β1, which 
corresponds to the coefficient to book value, is expected to be positive and β2, which 
is coefficient of earnings, is also expected to be positive. The non-financial 
                                                 
5
 This model can be expressed by substituting the definition of abnormal earnings (i.e.        
            ,where AEit is abnormal earnings of firm i for period t, Eit is earnings of firm i for 
period t, Rf is one plus the risk-free rate, and BVit is the book value of firm i for the beginning of period 
t) from Ohlson’s model (i.e.                       ), where all variables are defined as before. 
vit is non-financial information. The model can be expressed as follows: 
                                     
Then, after substituting the right-hand side of the clean surplus relation (i.e. BVit=BVit-1+Eit-dit) into the 
above expression, it can be arranged as follows: 
                                         
This expression can be transformed into a regression equation, containing an intercept term and an 
error term for calculation as follows:  
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information variable is not deflated, because it is assumed to be independent of BVit-1 
and Eit, following Hassel et al. (2005) 
 
The other value relevance information, the regression models, which are presented as 
“per share” of variable are as follows:   
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where all the variables are as before. The variable, BVPSit-1 is the book value per share 
for firm i at the beginning of fiscal period t-1. Pit is the price per share of firm i at the 
end of fiscal year t after three months, epsit is earning per share of firm i at the end of 
fiscal year t, ENVi, is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm i was 
operating in an industry with significant environmental impact and zero otherwise.  
Note that the proxies for the corporate environmental performance measure are not 
deflated, because they are assumed to be independent of company size, following 
Hassel et al. (2005). 
 
4.3. Empirical analysis and results 
 
4.3.1 Market based measurement 
 
 Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Panel A of table 3 presents the two groups of descriptive statistics for the measures of 
environmental disclosure (i.e. DJSI or GRI) for the variables used in the empirical 
tests, which are provided both before and after each was subjected to earnings being 
deflated by using the beginning of share price. When checked to see whether there 
were any outlying observations which could have influenced the results of the 
analysis, the residuals of each regression model were often large and graphs (i.e. 
added-variable plot and leverage verse residual squared plot) also support their 
existence. Hence, it was decided to drop the outliers so as to apply the same analytical 
methodology in each model as used in Belkaoui’s (2004) study. To see which 
observations are outliers and have large residuals in the regression analysis, some 
regression diagnostics were employed, including: added-variable plot (Stata commend: 
avplot), leverage verse residual squared plot (lvr2plot), normal probability plot 
(pnorm), normal quintile plot (qnorm). Visual inspection of the scatter plots was 
employed to identify outliers, with any that appeared being dropped, which sometimes 
involved omitting just one observation and at other times more than one. 
Subsequently, the regression and plots were rerun to look at how the outcome 
changed. This was continued until the results of graphical inspection showed that the 
observations were relatively spread and the line was smoother. 
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After this treatment was completed, in the case of the membership of the DJSI, the 
sample 310 firm-year observations for which all variables were available was reduced 
to 269 observations. The effect of post deflation earnings is most apparent in relation 
to growth opportunity and earnings variability, with the mean of the former changing 
from 4.3646 to 0.2284 and that for the latter from 2.0402 to 0.1362, whilst the 
medians changed from 3.1 to 0.1916 and from 1.4208 to 0.0764, respectively. 
Moreover, the standard deviations for these variables are all narrower under this 
condition. It should be noted that after this deflation treatment, when the correlations 
between the variables and the outcomes were calculated, that for corporate 
environmental reputation emerged as being too highly correlated to be a valid result.
6
  
 
Panel B of table 3 shows a Pearson (Spearman) correlation matrix after all the 
explanatory variables are interacted with epsit/Pit-1, except for corporate environmental 
reputation. The earnings are strongly correlated with other explanatory variables at the 
1% level, with the exception being environmental reputation. Moreover, correlation 
between earnings and environmental disclosures, defined as membership of the DJSI, 
is significant (0.518) at the 1% level, suggesting that there is strong association 
between earnings and environmental disclosures.  Further, a company with higher 
eco-efficiency ratio has higher earnings than a company with a lower one, as 
determined by the correlation between epsit/Pit-1 and physical performance (0.267).
7
 
The relationship between corporate environmental reputation and disclosure is 
negative and insignificant, which is inconsistent with findings by Hasseldine et al. 
(2005) and Cho et al. (2012). Interestingly, the ratio of the eco-efficient is negatively 
and significantly correlated (-0.199) with environmental reputation
8
 at the 1% level, 
suggesting that companies with a higher reputation have a poorer eco-efficient ratio. 
However, this should be treated with caution as there is no clear explanation why this 
                                                 
6
 When the test for multicollinearity was carried out, the variance inflation factor (VIF) test showed 
that the earnings deflated by share price (epsit/pit-1) and its reputation scores (fscore*epsit/pit-1) were 
22.73 and 19.57, respectively. Although the condition index, which is a measure of the degree of 
collinearity  among the regression variables displays a maximum number 27.64 which is less than 30, 
this is considered as indicative of moderate to strong multicollinearity. That is, the figure for VIF was 
considered to be too high, when compared with those for the other variables. Thus, reputation was used 
without deflating earnings.  
7
 The terms ‘corporate physical performance’ and ‘eco-efficiency’ are interchangeably used in this 
study and refer to the ratio of a company’s total sales divided by its greenhouse gases emissions.  
8
 To check the possible influence of deflating earnings, correlation analysis tests, both with and without 
this were carried out and compared. However, the same result of their being a negative and significant 
relationship between eco-efficient and environmental reputation (-0.1803) occurred in both cases.  
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is negative and the likelihood is that other unidentified factors are involved, rather 
than this being a valid result. Both leverage and the standard deviation of earnings per 
share show negative correlations (-0.119 and -0.129, respectively) with reputation at 
the 10 % level or better. 
 
Panel C of table 3 presents the descriptive statistics when the sample companies have 
membership of the DJSI and the industry impacts (ENVi). The latter category, the 
sample companies’ industry was extracted from DataStream and then each firm was 
allocated into one of twelve sectors, following Brammer and Millington (2005), these 
being: business services, chemicals, construction, consumer products, engineering, 
finance, high technology, publishing, resources, retail, transportation, utilities. Among 
these sectors, the chemicals, resource extraction, and utilities sectors were defined as 
having high environmental impact, because they all involve intensive interaction with 
nature, whilst the others were categorised conversely. To test whether two group’s 
means were significantly different, the parametric (ANOVA) and non-parametric 
(Mann Whitney’s rank sum) tests were used.  
 
Panel C of table 3 shows that there is no significant difference in the means  between 
those listed on the DJSI and those who are not, although those for nearly all the 
variables are higher for the former than the latter. This could well be because, 
although the criteria for membership are quite stringent, unlike those for the 
FTSE4Good in the UK, the DJSI committee do not exclude firms on ethical grounds. 
Regarding environmental impact, the figures suggest that low level firms are more 
profitable and have higher growth opportunities than their counterparts. In addition, 
the former have higher earnings variability and higher systems risk and leverage, 
which is consistent with the study of Beaver et al. (1970). Moreover, whilst low 
environmental impact firms have lower environmental reputation, they have a higher 
eco-efficiency ratio and more are listed in the DJSI than high impact ones. Whereas 
Panel B of table 3 shows a negative correlation between reputation and environmental 
(i.e. physical) performance, Panel C also presents their relationship as acting in an 
opposite direction. That is, companies operating with high environmental impacts 
have higher reputation and lower environmental performance than their counterparts. 
One possible reason why the low environmental firms have lower levels of reputation, 
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but their environmental and financial performance is better, is because the higher 
impact firms are already at a stable stage regarding these aspects.  
 
Although membership of the DJSI as a measure of the corporate environmental 
disclosures provides a subjective assessment and availability of environmental 
disclosures data for long time periods, it could still be the case that it has some 
limitations, such as unbalanced weighting of the three dimensions (i.e. economic 18%, 
environment 3%, and social 22% and the different weighting percentage of industry 
specific criteria in each dimension depending on the industry). Therefore, the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) for 2000 was used as an alternative measure for disclosure, 
when the first sustainability reporting guidelines were released, up until 2007 and the 
variable was denoted a 1 when companies had adopted this guideline and 0 otherwise. 
The final firm-year observations dropped from 291 to 255 after the elimination of 
outliers.  
 
The descriptive and correlation analysis show similar results in panel A and B, in 
table 3, except that GRI which is replaced as the measure of disclosures is positively 
significantly related to environmental reputation (0.154) at the 5% level, which is 
consistent with Toms (2002). Further, Panel C of table 3 shows that there is a 
significant difference in the means of environmental reputation between those 
adopting the GRI guidelines and those who do not, thus supporting the few extant 
studies in which it is claimed that companies providing extensive disclosure have 
higher CSR/environmental reputation (e.g. Hasseladine et al., 2005; Toms, 2002). 
However, those for market risk are not significantly different between two, 
contrasting with those of results when using membership of the DJSI as an 
environmental disclosure measure.  Further, the results in panel C in table 3 reveal 
that there is significant difference in the means of environmental disclosure between 
companies operating with high environmental impacts and those who are not. That is, 
high polluting companies tend to adopt GRI guidelines when preparing environmental 
disclosures more than their counterparts.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
 
Panel A: Descriptive analysis: DJSI or GRI 
Variable 
DJSI  GRI 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Median Min Max 
Return (Rit) 0.1183 0.2691 0.1047 -0.7446 1.5806 
 
0.1252 0.2641 0.1084 -0.7446 1.5806 
Earnings (epsit) 2.8069 6.3128 1.5900 -4.2420 64.8820 
 
2.78 6.4555 1.545 -4.242 64.882 
Environ. Reputation (fscoreit) 6.4168 0.9395 6.4300 3.95 8.44 
 
6.3901 0.9522 6.43 3.95 8.44 
Environ. Disclosure (djsiit or griit) 0.6431 0.4800 1 0 1 
 
0.4824 0.5007 0 0 1 
Physical Performance (ghg-intensityit) 0.0210 0.0339 0.0133 0.0002 0.2717 
 
0.0209 0.0348 0.0128 0.0002 0.2717 
Leverage (levit) 0.2569 0.1467 0.2432 0.0061 0.6826 
 
0.2638 0.1516 0.2495 0.0061 0.6826 
Risk  (riskit) 0.8944 0.5124 0.8281 -0.1037 2.2726 
 
0.9185 0.5469 0.8366 -0.1037 2.7169 
Growth opportunities (growthit) 4.3646 5.9770 3.1000 0.8300 80.6600 
 
4.2557 6.0932 2.99 0.72 80.66 
Earnings variability (VARi) 2.0402 2.5239 1.4208 0.2528 23.3852 
 
2.0451 2.5876 1.3807 0.2528 23.3852 
Earnings interacted with:           
Earnings (epsit/Pit-1)   0.0583 0.0411 0.0550 -0.1400 0.2257   0.0582 0.0381 0.0558 -0.1404 0.192 
Environ. Reputation (fscoreit) 6.4168 0.9395 6.4300 3.95 8.44 
 
6.3901 0.9522 6.43 3.95 8.44 
Environ. Disclosure (djsiit*epsit/Pit-1) or (griit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.0384 0.0404 0.0381 -0.1400 0.1920 
 
0.0336 0.0406 0 0 0.1667 
Physical Performance (ghg-intensityit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.0013 0.0031 0.0005 -0.002 0.0252 
 
0.0013 0.0031 0.0004 -0.0024 0.0252 
Leverage (levit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.0135 0.0134 0.0113 -0.045 0.0761 
 
0.0139 0.0141 0.0115 -0.0455 0.076 
Risk  (riskit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.0524 0.0529 0.0397 -0.1702 0.2274 
 
0.0556 0.0593 0.0401 -0.1702 0.3868 
Growth opportunities (growthit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.2284 0.2525 0.1916 -0.1796 3.0588 
 
0.2254 0.2563 0.1855 -0.1796 3.0588 
Earnings variability (VARi*epsit/Pit-1) 0.1362 0.2662 0.0764 -0.1962 2.6442 
 
0.1347 0.2672 0.077 -0.1423 2.6442 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Panel B: Correlation analysis: variables scaled by the beginning of the price other than environmental reputation 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
DJSI          
1.  Return (Rit) 1 0.4055*** -0.1490** 0.2819*** 0.1214** 0.3208*** 0.2653*** 0.2822*** 0.2728*** 
2. Earnings  
  (epsit/Pit-1)   0.355*** 1 -0.0729 0.4941*** 0.3527*** 0.5806*** 0.7256*** 0.5165*** 0.7415*** 
3.  Environ. Reputation 
  (fscoreit) -0.149** -0.0136 1 -0.0145 -0.1684*** -0.1463** -0.0281 0.1649*** -0.0624 
4.  Environ. Disclosures  
 (djsiit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.280*** 0.518*** -0.0116 1 0.2288*** 0.2759*** 0.4125*** 0.2311*** 0.3624*** 
5.  Physical performance 
  (ghg-intensityit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.0547 0.267*** -0.199*** 0.282*** 1 0.4572*** 0.2723*** 0.3458*** 0.2492*** 
6.  Leverage 
  (levit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.311*** 0.632*** -0.119* 0.377*** 0.376*** 1 0.4065*** 0.4239*** 0.3238*** 
7.  Risk  
 (riskit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.280*** 0.771*** -0.017 0.520*** 0.431*** 0.544*** 1 0.1816*** 0.6129*** 
8.  Growth  
 (growthit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.113* 0.288*** 0.0896 0.0923 0.0314 0.317*** 0.117* 1 0.4151*** 
9.  VAR 
 (VARi*epsit/Pit-1)  0.108* 0.438*** -0.129** 0.293*** 0.0637 0.218*** 0.444*** 0.0809 1 
GRI          
1.  Return (Rit) 1 0.4287*** -0.1283** 0.1963*** 0.1464** 0.3396*** 0.3023*** 0.2761*** 0.2720*** 
2.  Earnings  
  (epsit/Pit-1)   0.402*** 1 -0.0545 0.5166*** 0.3263*** 0.5690*** 0.5165*** 0.7216*** 0.7147*** 
3.  Environ. Reputation 
     (fscoreit) -0.135** 0.0103 1 0.1415** -0.1125* -0.1432** 0.2124*** -0.0215 -0.0294 
4.  Environ. Disclosure  
     (griit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.149** 0.531*** 0.154** 1 0.1941*** 0.1678*** 0.3162*** 0.3389*** 0.3603*** 
5.  Physical Performance  
 (ghg-intensityit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.0515 0.269*** -0.187*** 0.165*** 1 0.4002*** 0.3640*** 0.2243*** 0.2565*** 
6. Leverage  
  (levit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.374*** 0.662*** -0.129** 0.203*** 0.333*** 1 0.4121*** 0.4069*** 0.2805*** 
7.  Risk  
  (riskit * epsit/Pit-1) 0.308*** 0.740*** -0.0616 0.281*** 0.352*** 0.581*** 1 0.1615*** 0.4257*** 
8.  Growth  
 (growthit*epsit/Pit-1) 0.109* 0.262*** 0.109* 0.118* 0.0306 0.299*** 0.0748 1 0.5741*** 
9.  VAR (VARi*epsit/Pit-1) 0.0869 0.379*** -0.110* 0.161** 0.0604 0.174*** 0.342*** 0.0613 1 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Mean difference tests for independent samples by the membership of DJSI or GRI and industry impacts  
Variables 
DJSI  
 
GRI 
DJSI=0 
 N=96 
DJSI=1 
 N=173 
One-way 
ANOVA 
p-value 
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value 
ENV=0 
N=161 
ENV=1 
N=108 
One-way 
ANOVA 
p-value 
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value 
GRI=0 
N=132 
GRI=1 
N=123 
One-
way 
ANOVA 
p-value 
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value 
ENV=0 
N=161 
ENV=1  
N=94 
One-
way 
ANOVA 
p-value 
Mann 
Whitney 
p-value 
Annual-return (Rit) 0.081 0.139 0.086 0.075 0.132 0.097 0.295 0.295 0.096 0.156 0.071 0.017 0.138 0.103 0.302 0.324 
Earnings (epsit) 2.355 3.044 0.390 0.279 2.830 2.773 0.948 0.000  2.313 3.266 0.238 0.000 2.728 2.850 0.884 0.092 
Environ. Reputation  
(fscoreit) 6.395 6.429 0.782 0.605 6.125 6.852 0.000 0.000  6.259 6.531 0.022 0.023 6.092 6.9 0.000 0.000 
Environ. Disclosure  
(djsiit) or (griit)     0.677 0.593 0.158 0.157      0.404 0.617 0.001 0.001 
Physical Performance 
(ghg-intensityit) 0.018 0.023 0.326 0.736 0.030 0.008 0.000 0.000  0.175 0.246 0.105 0.194 0.028 0.008 0.000 0.000 
Leverage  
(levit) 0.283 0.242 0.029 0.068 0.306 0.184 0.000 0.000  0.296 0.230 0.001 0.001 0.315 0.176 0.000 0.000 
Risk  (riskit) 0.816 0.938 0.061 0.049 0.960 0.797 0.010 0.008  0.939 0.897 0.537 0.413 0.980 0.814 0.019 0.019 
Growth opportunities 
(growthit) 5.253 3.872 0.069 0.694 4.456 4.229 0.761 0.008  4.886 3.579 0.087 0.151 4.363 4.072 0.714 0.011 
Earnings variability (VARi) 1.711 2.223 0.111 0.971 2.207 1.792 0.188 0.027  2.154 1.928 0.487 0.596 2.145 1.875 0.423 0.000 
Note: Annual returns are measured for the 12 month period from nine months prior to the fiscal year-end through to three months after the fiscal year-end. Earnings are the accounting earnings per share. 
Environmental reputation (fscoreit) is measured by the Fortune Magazine score. Environmental disclosures (DJSI or GRI) are measured by membership of the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (djsiit) and as the 
statute of the Global Reporting Initiative (griit) guidelines, respectively. Environmental performance (ghg-intensityit) is measured by the ratio of total sales to total greenhouse gases emissions. Leverage (Levit) is 
measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Risk (riskit) is measured by the market model beta. Growth opportunity (growthit) is measured as the ratio of a firm’s market value to book value. Earnings 
variability (VARit) is measured as the standard deviation of earnings per share for the 36 quarters from1999 to 2007. Price (P) is the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal period. Environmental impact (ENV) 
equals 1 if the firm operated in an industry with high significant environmental impact and 0 otherwise. Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. The top of 
right half of the correlation matrix above the main diagonal provides the non-parametric spearman correlation estimations. A total of 269 (DJSI) and 255 (GRI) observations were used after dropping outliers from 
1999-2007 and 2000-2007 fiscal years, respectively. 
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4.3.2 Regression analysis 
 
Preliminary analysis of environmental performances and earnings 
Preliminary analysis has the function of determining whether earnings can be treated 
as an explanatory variable for returns in this study and table 4 presents this evidence. 
The variables, corporate environmental reputation and physical performance are 
divided into three groups, whereas membership of the DJSI or GRI, obviously, is 
binary in form. As the first part of the analysis, correlations between earnings and 
returns were examined for the entire sample size of 269 for the case of the DJSI and 
255 for the GRI, the number of observations being based on model 1.9.
9
 The last row 
of table 4, column 3, presents the results, where in can be seen that similar to a study 
by Belkaoui (2004), the correlation between earnings and returns is positive and 
significant related at the 5% level or better for all the variables in both cases. However, 
the relationship between earnings and returns is inconsistent, except for that regarding 
membership of the DJSI and also, this is significant at the 5% level or better.  
 
Turning to the different levels of the environmental reputation, the results in panel A 
show that earnings are more highly and significantly (0.6080) related to returns for the 
lowest category than for the other two levels. This is not consistent with the findings 
of Belkaoui (2004), which showed that the correlation between earnings and returns is 
strongly positively linked with the level of the corporate social responsibility 
reputation.  Similarly, the findings in panel B illustrate that the link between the two is 
highly associated at the lowest level of environmental reputation. One possible reason 
for these different outcomes could be because the AMAC has been compiled for 
substantially more time than the WMAC and therefore, investors and the public are 
more aware of the impact of reputation on financial performance. By contrast, 
because the WMAC covers a whole range of industrial cultures across the world and 
the data has only been collected since 1997, reputation has not been established as 
such an important economic matter as in the US. 
 
                                                 
9
 So as to compare each variable identified as a measure of the environmental performance under same 
circumstances, the common sample size imposed was that for model1.9. When the same procedure was 
conducted for each variable for the different models, the results showed the same patterns as above and 
all correlations between earnings and returns as well as earnings coefficients being significant at the 5% 
level or better. 
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In addition, whilst the results in panel A of table 4 show that the strength of relations 
between earnings and returns increases with membership of the DJSI, those in panel B 
report the link between the two decreases from maximum (0.4795) to minimum 
(0.1870) as using the GRI guidelines. The results are inconsistent with the findings 
from some studies, which claimed that expanded environmental disclosures are likely 
to be used by investors to better assess a firm’s earnings perspectives and reduce 
implied uncertainty (e.g. Cormier and Magnan, 2007; Healy et al., 1999). In other 
words, the findings in panel B seem to indicate that a firm with expanded disclosures 
tends to have lower earnings than those who have not. The possible explanation for 
the difference in the outcomes regarding the link between earnings and returns in 
panel A and B can be drawn from the level of media exposure (Aerts et al., 2008; 
Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier and Magnan, 2003). In particular, Cormier et al. (2011) 
noted the importance of how companies efficiently convey the CSR information. In 
this regard, membership of the DJSI, which is announced annually, may be a quick 
way of conveying a company’s expanded environmental disclosure to investors rather 
than the GRI guidelines. However, more environmental disclosure is not necessarily a 
reflection of better environmental performance (Delmas and Bless, 2010) and hence, 
the reasons for this clearly needs fleshing out further. 
 
With respect physical performance, the results from the panel A and B report same 
pattern of relationship between returns and earnings on the level of eco-efficiency 
ratios, that is, the earnings are highly related with the returns at a low level more than 
a high one, which is counterintuitive to what was expected. That is, the link between 
the two in the middle group is significantly higher (0.3690 in panel A and 0.4483 in B) 
than that of the other groups, and that of the lower group is significantly lower than 
that of middle group (0.3454 in panel A and 0.4370 in panel B). These outcomes lend 
support, Brammer and Millington’s recent study (2008) that there is likely to be a 
non-liner relationship between CSR and financial performance. In relation to the 
management strategy perspective, they stated that the improvement in CSR 
performance, which is associated with effective management of the stakeholder 
relationship, will enhance financial performance, but if the scope CSR is outstrips 
stakeholder demand, then improvement in CSR will be associated with diminished 
financial performance. Therefore, the evidence provided by panel A and B could the 
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existence of a possible non-linear relationship between CSR and financial 
performance.   
 
Adopting Belkaoui’s assumption that there is possible non-linearity within the data, in 
particular because of the results for the earnings and returns correlation analysis, the 
same groups were regressed on returns on earnings, individually being run for each of 
the three or two measures of environmental performances. These regressions do not 
impose a constant residual variance assumption across each measure of environmental 
performance (see Belkaoui (2004) p.128 for details). The earnings coefficient from 
these regressions is presented in column 4 of table 4 and except for environmental 
disclosure and physical performance in panel A there is a non-monotonic increase in 
these coefficients as each measure of environmental performance increases. However, 
the results pattern for reputation is similar to that of the correlation relationship 
between earnings and returns. That is, the earnings coefficient from 3.95-5.63 to 6.50-
8.44 decreases 4.2598 to 2.0527, which is more than 50 percent, but as for the 
correlation analysis, the middle category between 5.64 and 6.49 is even lower at 
1.1995.   Moreover, in general the evidence shows that the level of knowledge of 
earnings regarding the level of environmental performance is significantly related at 
least at the 5% level or better for all categories, but this requires further investigation. 
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Table 4. Relation between earnings and returns according to the level of environmental 
performance 
 
Panel A. DJSI from 1999-2007 
Level of environmental 
performance 
Number of firm period 
observations 
Correlation between earnings 
and returns Earnings coefficient 
Environmental reputation    
3.95-5.63 56 0.6080*** 4.2598*** 
5.64-6.49 89 0.2106** 1.1995** 
6.50-8.44 124 0.2963*** 2.0527*** 
3.95-8.44 269 0.3550*** 2.3224*** 
Environmental disclosures    
0 96 0.3316*** 1.8648*** 
1 173 0.3759*** 2.7672*** 
overall 269 0.3550*** 2.3224*** 
Physical performance    
0.0002-0.0050 88 0.3454*** 1.7757*** 
0.0051-0.0184 96 0.3690*** 2.5909*** 
0.0185-0.2717 85 0.3579** 3.1916*** 
0.0002-0.2717 269 0.3550*** 2.3224*** 
 
Panel B. GRI from 2000-2007 
Level of environmental 
performance 
Number of firm period 
observations 
Correlation between earnings 
and returns 
Earnings 
coefficient 
Environmental reputation    
3.95-5.57 57 0.5726*** 4.3657*** 
5.58-6.47 78 0.4181*** 2.7205*** 
6.48-8.44 120 0.2534*** 1.6883*** 
3.95-8.44 255 0.4020*** 2.7848*** 
Environmental disclosures    
0 132 0.4795*** 3.5289*** 
1 123 0.1870** 1.2803** 
overall 255 0.4020*** 2.7848*** 
Physical performance    
0.0002-0.0046 86 0.4370*** 2.5001*** 
0.0047 -0.0183 87 0.4483*** 3.4497*** 
0.0184-0.2717 82 0.3710*** 3.2603*** 
0.0002-0.2717 255 0.4020*** 2.7848*** 
Note: All correlations (Pearson) are between annual earnings per share and annual returns, and the earnings coefficients from the 
regression of annual return on earnings per share are significant at the 0.05 level or better (i.e. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01). 
Annual returns are measured for the twelve-month period extending from nine months prior to the fiscal year-end through to three 
months after the fiscal year-end, earnings per share is scaled by using the beginning of period stock price, and the corporate 
environmental reputation figures are Fortune Magazine’s WMAC scores. Membership of the DJSI and GRI is defined as 1 if 
companies are members of the index or have adopted the GRI guidelines and otherwise 0, and the GHG-intensity is measured by 
the ratio of a firm’s sales divided by its greenhouse gases emissions. The sample of annual earnings reports are drawn from the 
nine-year period corresponding to the 1999-2007 fiscal years in panel A and the eight-year period, from the 2000-2007 fiscal years 
in panel B.  
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The corporate environmental performance measures and other determinants of 
earnings’ explanatory power  
Depicted in table 4, the corporate environmental performance measures are one set of 
determinants of the information on earnings. Next, for a more comprehensive 
examination of these outcomes, tests of earnings conditional on the corporate 
environmental performance measures and accounting performance variables were 
conducted, the results of which are presented in table 5. For each of the models 1.1 to 
1.9, after regressing the variables any outliers were removed, which in some cases led 
to large drops in sample size when the model included the corporate physical 
performance measured as total sales divided by the emission of greenhouse gases, 
because of there being so much missing data. So as to be able to compare the results 
derived from the Belkaoui (2004) study, the dependent variable is the annual returns, 
which is measured for the twelve-month period extending from nine months prior to 
the fiscal year-end through to three months after the fiscal year-end, adjusted for 
dividends. This measure for the returns (i.e. annual or abnormal return) is often used 
in empirical tests, because its period (i.e. from 9 months prior to 3 months after the 
fiscal year-end) approximately corresponds to the period between earnings 
announcements (e.g. for example Belkaoui, 2004; Easton and Harris, 1991; Ingram, 
1978). Subsequent to the above analysis, and in the light of any possible unobserved 
relationship between the returns and the corporate environmental performance, it was 
decided that a further set of tests should be undertaken using monthly share price data 
spanning the period from nine months before the company’s financial year end to 
three months following it.
10
  The abnormal returns as a dependent variable are 
conducted by using model1.9 and subsequently reporting this as model1.9B in table 5. 
Moreover, after adding the environmental impact variable to the latter model this 
becomes model1.9C.  
 
                                                 
10
 As a further another test, panel data analysis was proceeded with.  Regarding this, Baltagi (2005) 
pointed out the advantages of using panel data rather than OLS, include: obtaining more informative 
data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables and being able to control for individual 
heterogeneity. Therefore, to decide which of the two models (fixed or random effects) is more 
appropriate for panel regression, the Hausman test (i.e. Stata command: hausman fe re) and then the 
Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects (xttest0) statistics was conducted to see 
whether the random effects estimator is consistent. The result suggests that the OLS regression is 
appropriate in this study and thus, the table presents this. That is, even though the Hausman test clearly 
selects the random effects, the Breusch-Pagan test (xttest0) shows that σ2u = 0 is not rejected. 
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Table 5 presents the results of the regressions, comprising: parameter estimates, 
t-statistics estimated using White’s (1980) standard error from the pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression,  adjusted R
2
s, F-values, and sample size. Panel A of 
table 5 reports the results of the regression of earnings on returns using members of 
the DJSI for the period 1999 to 2007 and panel B does the same using the GRI 
guidelines as the corporate environmental disclosures for 2000 to 2007.  Consistent 
with a prior accounting research returns on earnings (e.g. Easton and Harris, 1991), 
the results in model1.1 indicate that contemporaneous earnings explain a relatively 
small fraction of returns. For example, even though the earnings coefficient is 
strongly and significantly related to returns, the adjusted R
2
 is relatively low at 7.9%, 
when compared with the other models, the exception to this being model 1.3. Next, 
three models, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, provide evidence on the existence or not of a link 
between return on earnings and corporate environmental performance variables, by 
including three identified variables: corporate environmental reputation, 
environmental disclosures, and physical performance. The next four models, 1.5 
through to 1.8, present the results of regression by including two environmental 
performance variables in each model and the latter using them all together. Finally, 
model1.9 shows the results of regression with the inclusion of other accounting 
variables (i.e. leverage, market-to-book value, risk, and earnings variability). As 
shown in table 5, there is an improvement in the adjusted R
2
 by including corporate 
environmental performance, for which the highest explanatory power of 21.2% is 
obtained for model1.8. As expected, the coefficient (β1) for earnings is positive and 
significant at the 10% level or better, in all cases, except for model 1.9C.  
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Table 5. Regression of returns on earning-environmental performance measures, and earnings interaction with other determinant variables 
Panel A. regression of returns on earnings: DJSI, 1999-2007
11
  
Model 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9A 1.9B 1.9C 
 Variables Dependent variable: Annual Returns Abnormal Returns 
EPSit /Pit-1  (β1) 1.521*** 2.233*** 1.173*** 2.856*** 1.666*** 2.588*** 2.561*** 2.489*** 1.459**   1.746** 0.091** 0.076 
(6.56) (7.26) (4.74) (5.99) (7.86) (4.87) (4.62) (4.53) (2.25) (2.31) (1.99) (1.46) 
fscoreit (β2)  -0.039***   -0.040*** -0.052***  -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.043** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (-3.13)   (-3.39) (-3.13)  (-3.20) (-2.88)    (-2.41) (-4.08) (-4.28) 
DJSIit 
* EPSit /Pit-1 (β3) 
  0.661**  0.473  0.833 0.936* 1.008* 0.976* 0.029 0.032 
  (2.24)  (1.62)  (1.58) (1.83) (1.88) (1.79) (0.76) (0.85) 
ghg-intensity 
*  EPSit /Pit-1 (β4) 
   3.84  0.871 2.571 -0.894 -13.528***  -14.489*** -0.848* -0.799* 
   (0.58)  (0.13) (0.37) (-0.13) (-2.65)    (-2.77) (-1.94) (-1.78) 
Leverageit  
* EPSit /Pit-1 (β5) 
        2.687 2.117 0.245** 0.278** 
        (1.57) (1.05) (2.11) (2.16) 
MTBVit  
* EPSit /Pit-1 (β6) 
        0.015 0.011 0.002 0.002 
        (0.34) (0.26) (0.58) (0.68) 
Riskit  
* EPSit /Pit-1 (β7) 
        0.333 0.315   
        (0.61) (0.58)   
 Earnings variability  
* EPSit /Pit-1 (β8)  
        -0.107**  -0.115** -0.018*** -0.017*** 
        (-2.04)    (-2.09) (-3.04) (-2.93) 
ENVi  (β9)          -0.042  0.003 
         (-1.00)  (0.84) 
_cons (β0) 0.053*** 0.249*** 0.041** -0.051* 0.270*** 0.305*** -0.065* 0.259*** 0.288*** 0.258** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
(3.37) (3.15) (2.43) (-1.69) (3.51) (2.94) (-1.96) (2.66) (2.78) (2.51) (3.39) (3.62) 
N 1029 957 948 299 948 279 292 292 269 269 255 255 
Adj. R2  0.079 0.111 0.067 0.184 0.101 0.175 0.189 0.212 0.164 0.165 0.119 0.118 
F-value 43.064*** 28.939*** 21.945*** 19.939*** 32.148*** 9.848*** 12.788*** 10.141*** 3.975*** 3.846*** 4.915*** 4.521*** 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Panel A-1: regression of returns on earnings, including regional and/or industry effects: DJSI, 1999-2007
11
 
 Variables/dependent variables 
Model 1.9   Model 1.9B 
Annual Returns  Abnormal Returns 
EPSit /Pit-1  (β1) 1.543** 1.575 1.527  0.091* 0.041 0.029 
(2.29) (1.47) (1.1)  (1.95) (0.62) (0.43) 
fscoreit (β2) -0.034* -0.052* -0.043*  -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
(-1.85) (-1.97) (-1.74)  (-3.46) (-4.42) (-3.96)    
DJSIit*EPSit /Pit-1 (β3) 0.856 0.719 0.329  0.013 0.046 0.029 
(1.21) (1.23) (0.42)  (0.29) (1.12) (0.52) 
ghg-intensity*EPSit /Pit-1 (β4) -13.412*** -10.221 -8.926  -0.868** 0.218 0.563 
(-2.62) (-0.99) (-0.81)  (-2.05) (0.23) (0.55) 
Leverageit * EPSit /Pit-1 (β5) 2.85 2.157 2.735  0.241** 0.26 0.314 
(1.64) (0.79) (0.89)  (2.02) (1.43) (1.65) 
MTBVit * EPSit /Pit-1 (β6) 0.04 -0.008 0.017  0.002 -0.000 0.002 
(0.73) (-0.14) (0.26)  (0.67) (-0.01) (0.46) 
Risk * EPSit /Pit-1 (β7) 0.33 0.368 0.349     
(0.58) (0.46) (0.4)     
Earnings variability  
* EPSit /Pit-1 (β8)  
-0.119** -0.07 -0.076  -0.017*** -0.015** -0.016**  
(-2.04) (-1.36) (-1.39)  (-2.86) (-2.35) (-2.46)    
_cons (β0) 0.228** 0.291 0.283  0.026*** 0.050*** 0.053*** 
(2.12) (1.4) (1.08)  (3.09) (3.7) (3.45) 
Industry effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes    
Region effects Yes No Yes   Yes No Yes    
N 269 269 269  255 255 255 
Adj. R2  0.165 0.171 0.169  0.115 0.098 0.1 
F-value 3.441*** 2.325*** 2.300***  4.157*** 2.147*** 2.031*** 
                                                 
11
 Although the data have been thoroughly examined to see whether any observations could have influenced the outcome of regression by using regression diagnostics, the normality test indicated that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. Hence, the full observations  were rechecked using inter-quartile range (iqr), which reported outliers with reference to the residuals which are either 3 inter-quartile-ranges below the first quartile or 3 inter-quartile ranges above 
the third quartile (see more details at www.ata.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/ststsreg2.htm) until the statistical test (i.e. sktest) reported that the residuals of regression are  normal. When comparing the outcomes of regression 
when the residuals are normal with those in panel A and A-1 of table 5, the regression results are consistent with those in table 5, except for the DJSIit*EPSit/Pit-1 variable in panel A, which become insignificant.  
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Table 5 (continued)
 
 
Panel B. Regression of returns on earnings: GRI, 2000-2007
12
  
 Model 1.1A 1.2A 1.3A 1.4A 1.5A 1.6A 1.7A 1.8A 1.9A    1.9AB 1.9AC 1.9AD 
 Variables Dependent variable: Annual Returns Abnormal Returns 
EPSit /Pit-1  (β1) 
 
1.508*** 2.301*** 2.263*** 2.771*** 2.233*** 2.518*** 3.620*** 3.518*** 2.502** 2.767** 0.069 0.065 
(6.78) (8.01) (5.2) (5.82) (4.91) (4.73) (4.7) (4.72) (2.31) (2.43) (1.23) (1.12) 
fscoreit (β2) 
 
 -0.033**   -0.035** -0.051***  -0.049*** -0.040** -0.033* -0.004*** -0.004**   
 (-2.64)   (-2.18) (-2.99)  (-3.12) (-2.43) (-1.90) (-2.68) (-2.46)    
GRIit*EPSit /Pit-1 (β3) 
 
  0.235  -0.028  -0.507 -0.328 -0.151 -0.100 0.025 0.024 
  (0.58)  (-0.06)  (-0.97) (-0.65) (-0.28) (-0.19) (0.71) (0.69) 
ghg-intensity*EPSit /Pit-1 (β4)     4.102  1.402 2.484 -0.906 -10.572** -11.586** -1.013*** -0.995*** 
   (0.62)  (0.21) (0.39) (-0.14) (-2.26) (-2.46) (-3.87) (-3.81)    
Leverage it * EPSit /Pit-1 (β5)          3.269** 2.656 0.118 0.128 
        (1.99) (1.38) (0.96) (0.89) 
MTBVit * EPSit /Pit-1 (β6) 
 
        -0.011 -0.014 0.001 0.001 
        (-0.28) (-0.34) (0.37) (0.38) 
Risk * EPSit /Pit-1 (β7) 
 
        0.058 0.046               
        (0.14) (0.11)               
Earnings variability  
* EPSit /Pit- (β8)  
        -0.088* -0.095* -0.015*** -0.015**   
        (-1.78) (-1.86) (-2.60) (-2.56)    
ENVi (β9)          -0.042  0.001 
         (-1.05)  (0.21) 
_cons (β0)  0.037** 0.192** -0.022 -0.046 0.207** 0.298*** -0.071* 0.249*** 0.219** 0.189* 0.023*** 0.024***  
(2.29) (2.33) (-0.91) (-1.53) (2.07) (2.84) (-1.84) (2.59) (2.30) (1.93) (2.7) (2.61) 
N 920 856 472 291 464 272 269 269 255 255 255 255 
Adj. R2  0.090 0.125 0.103 0.185 0.119 0.176 0.198 0.222 0.189 0.19 0.056 0.052 
F-value  46.029*** 36.924*** 26.453*** 18.889*** 11.091*** 9.217*** 11.771*** 9.255*** 4.844*** 5.023*** 3.498*** 3.130*** 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B-1. Regression of returns on earnings, including regional and/or industry effects: GRI, 2000-2007
12
  
  Model1.9A   Modle1.9AC 
Variables/Dependent variable Annual Returns   Abnormal Returns 
EPSit /Pit-1  (β1) 2.407** 2.118 1.801  0.062 0.031 0.01 
(2.25) (1.61) (1.23)  (1.08) (0.43) (0.14) 
fscoreit (β2) -0.022 -0.054* -0.043  -0.003** -0.005** -0.005*   
(-1.24) (-1.86) (-1.62)  (-2.07) (-2.06) (-1.96)    
GRIit*EPSit /Pit-1 (β3) -0.12 0.236 0.2  0.017 0.022 0.021 
(-0.23) (0.48) (0.4)  (0.48) (0.63) (0.58) 
ghg-intensity*EPSit /Pit-1 (β4) -10.824** -12.696 -12.088  -1.035*** -0.814 -0.741 
(-2.30) (-1.34) (-1.18)  (-3.97) (-1.34) (-1.07)    
Leverageit * EPSit /Pit-1 (β5) 3.454** 3.145 3.807  0.107 0.191 0.234 
(2.06) (1.16) (1.29)  (0.85) (1.01) (1.09) 
MTBVit * EPSit /Pit-1 (β6) 0.018 -0.035 -0.013  0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
(0.37) (-0.67) (-0.23)  (0.52) (-0.73) (-0.53)    
Risk * EPSit /Pit-1 (β7) 0.085 0.306 0.3                  
(0.21) (0.55) (0.47)                  
Earnings variability  
* EPSit /Pit-1 (β8)  
-0.100* -0.077 -0.087*  -0.015** -0.013** -0.014**  
(-1.84) (-1.58) (-1.71)  (-2.44) (-2.09) (-2.19)    
_cons (β0) 0.149 0.274 0.261  0.019** 0.039** 0.039**  
(1.45) (1.31) (1.08)  (2.15) (2.22) (2.06) 
Industry effects No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes    
Region  effects Yes No Yes   Yes No Yes    
N 255 255 255  255 255 255 
Adj. R2 0.192 0.21 0.21  0.055 0.02 0.016 
F-value 3.835*** 2.833*** 2.746***   3.100*** 1.635** 1.586** 
                                                 
12
 Although the data have been thoroughly examined to see whether any observations could have influenced the outcome of regression by using regression diagnostics, the normality test indicated that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. Hence, the full observations  were rechecked using inter-quartile range (iqr), which reported outliers with reference to the residuals which are either 3 inter-quartile-ranges below the first quartile or 3 inter-quartile ranges above 
the third quartile (see more details at www.ata.ucla.edu/stat/stata/webbooks/reg/chapter2/ststsreg2.htm) until the statistical test (i.e. sktest) reported that the residuals of regression are  normal. When comparing the outcomes of regression 
when the residuals are normal with those in panel B and B-1 of table 5, the outcomes are also consistent with those in table 5, except for the leverage variable (Leverageit * EPSit /Pit-1), which becomes significant at the 10% level. 
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Note: Annual returns are measured for the 12 months period from nine months prior to the fiscal year-end 
through to three months after the fiscal year-end. Earnings are the accounting earnings per share. Abnormal 
returns are the average of monthly abnormal returns. The data in Model1.9A did not interact with earnings 
deflated by the beginning of share price. Environmental reputation (fscore) is measured using the Fortune 
Magazine score. Environmental disclosures (DJSI or GRI) are measured by membership of the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI) and use of the GRI guidelines. Environmental performance (ghg-intensity) is 
measured by the ratio of total sales to total greenhouse gases emission. Leverage (Lev) is measured by the ratio 
of total debt to total assets. Risk (risk) is measured by the market model beta. Growth opportunity (growth) is 
measured as the ratio of a firm’s market value to book value. Earnings variability (VAR) is measured as the 
standard deviation of earnings per share for the 36 quarters of 1999 to 2007. Price (P) is the stock price at the 
beginning of the fiscal period. Environmental impacts (ENVi) equal 1 if the firm operated in an industry with 
high significant environmental impacts and 0 otherwise.  Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance 
at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. T-statistics (in Parentheses) are estimated using White’s (1980) 
standard error as measured during the regression. Sample size varies depending on the model and each model 
has been checked for outliers. The sample comprises firm-year observations drawn from the 1999 to 2007 fiscal 
years for the DJSI and from 2000 to 2007 for the GRI.   
 
 
 
The coefficient (β2) of environmental reputation in panel A of table 5, taken from Fortune 
Magazine data, is negative and significant for all models, which is inconsistent with prior 
research. More specifically, in contrast to Belkaoui’s (2004) findings, it can be seen that the 
estimates for this coefficient range from -0.039 to -0.050 in model 1.2 - model 1.9A, which is 
reliably significant at the 5% level or better for all the models. Compared to the other 
environmental performance measures, the coefficient of reputation is stably significant even 
though its disclosures become diminished by a significant level when other explanatory 
variables are included. As in previous studies, it has rarely been attempted to find the 
relationship, if any, between the corporate environmental performance measures and earnings 
as an explanatory variable for returns, it is hard to give clear reasons why the evidence here 
indicates that environmental reputation is negatively related to returns (Hussainey and 
Salama, 2010). One possible reason for these different outcomes could be that companies 
with higher reputation are already in stable profitability so that investors’ expectations may 
not be incrementally increased compared to those with a lower reputation. Roberts and 
Dowling (2002) empirically showed that better performing companies have more chance of 
sustaining high performance levels when they have a relatively good reputation and that 
below average performing companies heavily influenced their reputation. Moreover, 
companies with higher reputation may have small volatility on share price than those with 
low reputation.  
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The disclosure coefficient (β3) in model 1.3 of panel A shows that the effect of earnings on 
returns is positively related to membership of the DJSI and from this it can be inferred that in 
turn, the level of disclosures is also linked to returns, because of the threshold required when 
qualifying to join the index. The β3 parameter measures the relation between the corporate 
environmental disclosures and earnings and reflects the extent to which the information on 
earnings is affected by the quality of disclosures. Hence, the equation of model1.3 can be 
expressed with β1 +β3DJSIit in terms of earnings (i.e. differentiate model1.3 with respect to 
epsit/Pit-1). The regressed result reveals that, the effect of earnings on returns is 
1.173+0.661DJSIit, for members, which is significantly greater than zero at the 5% level.  
Further, models 1.8 to 1.9A of panel A in table 5 show that the effect of earnings on returns 
appears (i.e. is significant at the 10% level) to depend on the level of disclosures. These 
outcomes are similar to those found in previous studies related to market reaction to 
disclosing environmental information (e.g. Belkaoui, 1976; Healy et al, 1999; Jaggi and 
Freedman, 1982).
13
  
 
Unlike for disclosure, the environmental performance coefficient (β4) in Panel A of table 5 is 
insignificant until model1.8, whereas in model 1.9 it is significantly negative at the 1% level, 
which is at variance with extant literatures on the effects of pollution control on company 
performance (e.g. Spicer, 1978a and 1978b; Stanwick and Stanwick, 1998b). That is, in 
contrast to these authors the result suggests that the earnings on returns are negatively 
affected by the level of the corporate physical performance, but this may not be a linear 
relationship. Even though other determinant variables report the same signs as predicted, 
there is no evidence regarding the relationship between other accounting variables and returns 
(i.e. insignificant) other than earnings variability, which is significantly negative at the 5% 
level. Model 1.9A extends Model1.9 by including the control variable, environmental 
impacts (ENVi), defined as being 1 if a firm was operating in an industry with significant 
environmental impact and 0 otherwise and its purpose is to test whether any industry type 
effects exist.  The results suggest that operating in an environmentally sensitive industry is 
not associated with a lower corporate return.   
 
                                                 
13
 The outcomes of regression when the residuals are normally distributed show that the effect of earnings on 
returns does not appear to depend on the level of disclosures.  
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Some researchers have emphasized that the risk of equity should be considered when the 
security’s return is measured (e.g. Alexander and Buchholz, 1978; Cochran and Wood, 1984). 
Thus, the security’s risk measured by using the market model was undertaken in the measure 
of its abnormal return and the results are presented in model 1.9B and model 1.9C, which is 
an extension of model 1.9B by including the control variable (i.e. ENVi).  The estimations of 
an individual security’s systematic risk i were removed from the explanatory variables and 
then used to calculate the abnormal returns. In this regard, an individual security’s abnormal 
returns, which are excess returns to the market portfolio returns, are the sum of the abnormal 
returns over twelve months beginning with nine months prior to the fiscal year-end through to 
three months after. The explanatory power of earnings-returns (adjusted R
2
) has slightly 
dropped to 0.119 and the sample size has also fallen, to 255. The negative relationship 
between the returns and the corporate environmental reputation is robust when systematic 
risk is removed in both cases, whereas physical performance (ghg-intensityit) changes acts to 
lessen the negative significant level. In fact, the coefficient of performance in model 1.9C is 
not much different to that in model 1.8, although the coefficient of leverage (total debt/total 
assets), which is usually termed accounting risk, turns out to be significantly greater than zero 
at 5% level. Like model 1.9A, model 1.9C extends the analysis further by including the 
industry type effect and the results show that there is not much significantly different to 
model 1.9B, except for the explanatory power of earnings in relation to returns diminishing, 
whereas when compared with model 1.9A the sign of the control variable (ENVi) changes to 
positive. This evidence indicates that companies operating in an environmentally sensitive 
industry are more likely to experience systematic risk than their counterparts.  
 
Regarding this, Spicer (1978a) argued that companies’ environmental performance conveys 
some relevant information to investors for judging the riskiness of their equity, in the case of 
polluting industries. To examine whether the effect of systematic risk on these two aspects of 
environmental performance (i.e. reputation (fscoreit) and eco-efficiency (ghg-intensityit)) 
existed during the sample period, a simple statistical analysis, t-test, was conducted to 
determine whether the mean performance in low risk firms (i.e. β<=1) is significantly greater 
than that in high risk ones (i.e. β>1). The results show that there is no significant difference in 
the means for reputation, as these are: 6.4653 for low risk firms and 6.3375 for high risk ones. 
However, there is a significant difference in the environmental performance “eco-efficiency” 
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means, these being: 0.0009 for low risk firms and 0.0021 high risk ones. This evidence 
suggests that high risk companies have better environmental performance (i.e. higher ratio of 
eco-efficiency) than their counterparts. These results can be explained by drawing on 
Orlitzky and Benjamin’s (2001) contention that companies with higher risk have a greater 
incentive to increase their investment in environmental performance than those with low risk, 
without causing negative financial effects by market reaction, because the market will not 
punish them in ways that would make their risk exposure greater. By contrast, as a matter of 
fact, the better environmental performance will reduce business risk and further, low-risk 
companies will be motivated to increase their investment in environmental performance. 
 
In addition, to explore the issue of whether the impact of the environmental performance 
measures on equity performance varies across different industry sectors and/or regions, 
model 1.9 is extended by including the dummy variables for each primary four-digit 
Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) and/or for each region, which is categorized into 3 
groups: the Americas, Europe, and Asia and others, allocation depending on where a 
company is domiciled and Asia and others is the omitted category in the regression.  The 
results are presented in panel A-1 in table 5. Model 1.9 with region effects shows that 
environmental reputation and physical performance are negatively significantly different 
from the zero, which is similar to model 1.9 without region effects. However, when including 
industry effects, most of the results, notably, turn to being insignificant, except for 
environmental reputation, reporting that it is negatively significant at the 10% level. 
Repeating the analysis, including an indicators variable to control for region and industry 
effects, yields the same results. Further, when using abnormal returns as a dependent variable, 
the outcomes from model 1.9B in panel A-1 show a similar pattern, except for earnings 
variability, which is negatively significant at the 5% level or better across industries and 
regions. Regarding the industry effects, the findings (i.e. no significant effects) are similar to 
those reported by Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) and Brammer et al. (2006). That is, the results 
here point to the existence of industry specific unobserved heterogeneous variables having 
different impacts on environmental performance. Therefore, the outcomes for the Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for random effects are questionable and this indicates that 
pooled OLS regression is the more effective form of analysis of these two. 
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Panel B of table 5 presents the OLS regression results for the change to using the GRI 
guidelines to represent corporate environmental disclosures and because of the dropping of 
the year 1999 and outliers, the sample size in each model is different from  those in panel A 
of table 5. For example, the sample size in model 1.9A falls to 255, but the explanatory 
power moderately increases to 18.9%. The environmental performance measures have similar 
results to those in panel A of table 5, except for the change to insignificant and a negative 
sign for disclosures. One possible explanation for this is that companies’ earnings will be 
justified if the extensive or higher environmental disclosures generate extra spending costs 
for companies even though it has been proven that the extensive or higher voluntary 
disclosures are related to the higher returns from the majority of the extant literature. In 
general, the evidence from table 5 suggests that there is no relationship between disclosures 
(i.e. DJSIit or GRIit) and returns, which is consistent with Murray et al. (2006) and Moneva 
and Ortas (2008). Further, panel B-1 of table 5 provides similar evidence to that reported in 
panel A-1 except, notably, environmental reputation becomes insignificant when including 
region effects as in model 1.9A.  
 
The residuals of the regression were not normal so model 1.9 for DJSI and model 1.9A for 
GRI were re-tested using non-parametric quantile regression, specifying the 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentiles. Table 5-1 presents the two groups (i.e. DJSI and GRI) of results of the 
regression, comprising t-statistics estimated using White’s (1980) standard error from 
quantile regression
14
, sample size, and R
2
. The results of regression provide weak evidence 
on the existence of a link between return on earnings and corporate environmental variables, 
which are not consistent with the reported regression results in table 5 as well as the results 
from the regression when the residuals are normal. For example,  in the case of the DJSI, the 
environmental reputation is negatively significant at the 5% level or  better for the 25th and 
75th percentiles, whereas the environmental disclosures (DJSI) is only significant at the 5% 
level for the 50th percentile. Further, in the case of GRI, environmental reputation is 
negatively significant at the 5% level for the 75th percentile. Unlike the results from the DJSI, 
those from GRI report that there is no significant association with returns at any percentile 
                                                 
14
 In STATA, “qreg2” is a wrapper for “qreg” (see STATA 11 manual reference p.1446-1465 for more detail) 
which estimates quantile regression and reports standard errors and t-statistics that are asymptotically valid 
under heteroscedasticity and misspecification. (STATA 11 help qreg2)  
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level. Interestingly, the results from the cases of the DJSI and GRI show that physical 
performance is insignificant at any percentile level.  
 
Table 5-1. Non-parametric quantile regression analysis 
 
 
DJSI 
 
GRI 
 Variables Q 25 Q 50 Q 75   Q 25 Q50 Q 75 
EPSit /Pit-1  (β1) 
3.008** 2.741** 3.106* 
 
2.953*** 3.142*** 2.451*   
 
(2.58) (2.10) (1.76) 
 
(2.68) (2.96) (1.80) 
fscoreit (β2) 
-0.048*** -0.024 -0.065** 
 
-0.034 -0.018 -0.070**  
 
(-2.60) (-1.48) (-2.36) 
 
(-1.56) (-1.10) (-2.07)    
DJSIit or GRIit*EPSit /Pit-1 (β3) 
1 0.911** 1.449 
 
-0.079 -0.612 0.018 
 
(1.59) (2.01) (1.61) 
 
(-0.15) (-1.24) (0.02) 
ghg-intensity*EPSit /Pit-1 (β4) 
0.109 -0.106 -0.06 
 
0.035 -0.147 -0.283 
 
(0.36) (-0.48) (-0.17) 
 
-0.26 (-0.62) (-0.45)    
Leverageit * EPSit /Pit-1 (β5) 
-0.867 -0.559 -1.665 
 
-0.454 -0.432 -0.329 
 
(-0.71) (-0.47) (-0.60) 
 
(-0.42) (-0.40) (-0.18)    
MTBVit * EPSit /Pit-1 (β6) 
0.133* 0.166** 0.004 
 
0.155** 0.185** 0.14 
 
(1.95) (2.19) (0.02) 
 
(2.20) (2.58) (0.85) 
Risk * EPSit /Pit-1 (β7) 
-1.280* -0.933 -0.95 
 
-1.311* -0.819 -0.761 
 
(-1.66) (-1.21) (-0.39) 
 
(-1.83) (-1.04) (-0.81)    
Earnings variability* EPSit /Pit-1 (β8)  -0.041 -0.11 -0.164** 
 
-0.016 -0.109 -0.119 
 
(-0.47) (-1.26) (-2.15) 
 
(-0.28) (-1.12) (-0.77)    
_cons (β0) 
0.095 0.082 0.536*** 
 
0.045 0.074 0.594**  
  (0.81) (.78) (2.73)   (0.34) (0.66) (2.51) 
N 310 310 310 
 
291 291 291 
R2 0.155 0.148 0.172   0.119 0.100 0.136 
Note:  The t-statistics (in parentheses) were estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error in the 
regression. Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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4.3.3 Further analysis on environmental reputation 
 
The results from the analysis above suggest that the environmental reputation contained 
within a firm’s earnings information is negatively significantly related with its stock return, 
which is inconsistent with the findings of Belkaoui (2004). Hence, to test the multivariate 
relationship between the environmental performance and firm performance, further 
regression analysis without deflated by earnings has been conducted. The statistical test for 
normality of residuals (i.e. sktest) indicated that the residuals of the regression before 
dropping some observations in the case of DJSI and GRI are normally distributed. Table 6A 
presents the results from regressions for the DJSI in panel A and the GRI in panel B. 
However, the evidence from results show that the models do not fitted to the data when 
including industry and/or regional effects dummy variables (i.e. models 5, 6, 9 and 10 in both 
cases). Thus, outliers indicated by reference to residuals have been removed from the data so 
that the sample size for which all variables were available was reduced to 275 for the DJSI 
(i.e. panel A of table 6) and 258 for the GRI (i.e. panel B of table 6) for measuring 
environmental disclosure. The normality test also reports that the residuals of regression are 
normal (i.e. sktest) and the results are presented in table 6. Further, the additional variable 
which was dropped in the analysis above owing to multicollinearity, namely, company size 
(i.e. logarithm of total assets) is introduced in this statistical test because the variance of 
inflation (VIF) test revealed no such problem. Moreover, larger companies, probably because 
of visibility issues, are subject to greater public scrutiny than smaller companies. Thus, they 
are under greater pressure to behave in a more socially responsible manner and are more 
likely to disclose social responsibility information (e.g. Neu et al., 1998; Patten, 1991). It is 
also more likely that larger, more visible companies will consider social responsibility 
activities as a way of enhancing corporate reputation.  For example, Fombrun and Shanley 
(1990) showed that these firms have a higher level of corporate reputation, as measured by 
Fortune’s reputation rankings. In addition, the control variables, industry and/or the region 
ones, are added to test whether there exist any differences across industries and/or region. 
 
Table 6 sets out the results from tests examining the impact of environmental disclosures and 
physical performance variables with/without control variables, industry and/or region effects. 
Models 1 and 2 show separate effects adding, respectively, environmental disclosures and 
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physical performance without control variables and further, models 3 to 6 show the results for 
the full model, in this case including environmental disclosure and physical performance 
with/without control variables. The last models from 7 to 10 show the results when including 
other financial and control variables.  
 
The evidence presented in table 6 for the DJSI in panel A and the GRI in panel B shows that 
environmental reputation is negatively significantly related with annual returns in all cases at 
the 10% level or better, suggesting that companies with higher reputations generate lower 
stock return than their counterparts.  The findings are consistent with those in table 5, but 
inconsistent with evidence reported by previous studies (Herremans et al., 1996; McGuier et 
al., 1988 and 1990). On explanation for the negative outcome, could be that high ESG 
performance information may be overpriced by the market, as put forward by several scholars 
(Derwall et al., 2005; Manescu, 2011).  In particular, Manescu (2011) empirically provided 
some evidence, albeit weak, that it is not incorporated into share prices, when using KLD 
data. However, there is, so far, no robust evidence and hence, future research is required into 
the precise nature of this relationship. 
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Table 6A. Regression analysis before drop outliers 
 
Panel A. DJSI for environmental disclosures from 1999 to 2007 
  Dependent variable: environmental reputation 
Variables/Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Annual return -0.212*** -0.436*** -0.464*** -0.266** -0.370*** -0.293*** -0.350** -0.193* -0.260** -0.209**  
 
(-3.54) (-3.40) (-3.64) (-2.20) (-3.17) (-2.64) (-2.48) (-1.68) (-2.34) (-1.98)    
Earnings 0.000*** 0.003 0.001 0.005 -0.004 0 0.054*** 0.036*** 0.017 0.021*   
 
(5.86) (0.53) (0.20) (1.22) (-0.97) (-0.01) (4.69) (3.96) (1.41) (1.93) 
Environ. Disclosure (DJSI)  0.309*** 
 
0.210** 0.449*** 0.074 0.249** 0.052 0.275*** -0.118 0.017 
 
(5.37) 
 
(2.06) (5.44) (0.70) (2.55) (0.53) (3.37) (-1.15) (0.19) 
Physical performance 
 
-0.071** -0.059* -0.098*** -0.060* -0.097*** -0.038 -0.070** -0.031 -0.059 
  
(-2.28) (-1.85) (-3.15) (-1.74) (-2.65) (-1.08) (-2.16) (-0.87) (-1.61)    
Leverage 
      
-1.176*** -1.270*** 0.309 -0.357 
       
(-3.59) (-4.32) (0.73) (-0.86)    
Growth 
      
0.029** 0.011*** 0.025** 0.019*** 
       
(2.58) (2.74) (2.47) (2.94) 
Risk 
      
-0.075 -0.125* -0.05 -0.227*** 
       
(-0.83) (-1.69) (-0.63) (-3.11)    
Earning variability 
      
-0.178*** -0.112*** -0.090*** -0.082*** 
       
(-5.85) (-4.59) (-2.85) (-2.95)    
Size 
      
0.128** 0.125*** 0.460*** 0.365*** 
       
(2.34) (2.82) (6.54) (4.97) 
_cons 5.987*** 6.343*** 6.226*** 5.532*** 6.738*** 6.314*** 4.586*** 3.909*** -1.498 -0.32 
 
(163.69) (116.08) (81.01) (60.83) (42.08) (31.04) (4.63) (4.96) (-1.17) (-0.24)    
Industry effects No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes    
Region effects No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes    
N 1063 338 338 338 338 338 310 310 310 310 
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.022 0.031 0.276 0.395 0.446 0.183 0.4 0.516 0.558 
F-value 30.688*** 5.51*** 5.234*** 34.219*** . . 11.963*** 36.035*** . . 
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Table 6A. (Continued) 
Panel B. GRI for disclosures from 2000 to 2007 
  Dependent variable: environmental reputation 
Variables/Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Annual return -0.233*** -0.450*** -0.444*** -0.260** -0.356*** -0.282** -0.341** -0.183 -0.261** -0.202*   
 
(-3.02) (-3.45) (-3.35) (-2.01) (-3.00) (-2.45) (-2.35) (-1.57) (-2.30) (-1.88)    
Earnings 0 0.002 0.002 0.008* -0.004 0 0.056*** 0.046*** 0.021* 0.024**  
 
(-0.05) (0.51) (0.49) (1.83) (-1.03) (-0.09) (4.62) (4.70) (1.67) (2.08) 
Environ. Disclosures (GRI) 0.246*** 
 
0.220** 0.094 0.007 -0.003 0.06 -0.069 -0.038 -0.036 
 
(2.85) 
 
(2.11) (1.00) (0.07) (-0.04) (0.55) (-0.70) (-0.43) (-0.43)    
Physical performance 
 
-0.070** -0.083** -0.123*** -0.069** -0.111*** -0.045 -0.077** -0.022 -0.056 
  
(-2.24) (-2.58) (-3.93) (-2.04) (-3.04) (-1.24) (-2.26) (-0.60) (-1.50)    
Leverage 
      
-1.129*** -1.320*** 0.451 -0.208 
       
(-3.31) (-4.34) (0.98) (-0.47)    
Growth 
      
0.027** 0.009** 0.019** 0.016*** 
       
(2.53) (2.18) (2.44) (2.84) 
Risk 
      
-0.073 -0.136* -0.004 -0.185**  
       
(-0.79) (-1.77) (-0.05) (-2.48)    
Earning variability 
      
-0.181*** -0.137*** -0.103*** -0.092*** 
       
(-5.64) (-5.24) (-2.99) (-3.09)    
Size 
      
0.120** 0.136*** 0.432*** 0.366*** 
       
(2.09) (2.84) (6.36) (4.95) 
_cons 6.131*** 6.336*** 6.232*** 5.795*** 6.760*** 6.487*** 4.716*** 3.979*** -1.027 -0.29 
 
(121.75) (114.88) (89.16) (69.26) (39.65) (28.31) (4.60) (4.72) (-0.83) (-0.22)    
Industry effects No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes    
Region effects No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes    
N 536 327 318 318 318 318 291 291 291 291 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.023 0.032 0.226 0.407 0.443 0.184 0.388 0.532 0.569 
F-value 5.82*** 5.569*** 5.034*** 19.358*** . . 11.259*** 30.085*** . . 
Note:  Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. T-statistics (in Parentheses) are estimated using White’s (1980) standard error during the regression. 
Sample size varies depending on the model. The sample comprises firm-year observations drawn from the 1999 to 2007 fiscal years for the DJSI and from 2000 to 2007 for the GRI.   
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Table 6. Regression analysis after drop outliers 
Panel A. DJSI for environmental disclosures from 1999 to 2007 
Variables/ Models 
Dependent variable: Environmental Reputation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Annual return 
-0.205*** -0.435*** -0.471*** -0.258** -0.328*** -0.250** -0.293** -0.159* -0.214** -0.166*   
(-2.81) (-3.56) (-3.91) (-2.41) (-3.34) (-2.56) (-2.55) (-1.76) (-2.42) (-1.90)    
Earnings 
0.002 0.017** 0.016* 0.013*** -0.002 0.002 0.078*** 0.021 0.001 -0.002 
(0.47) (1.99) (1.73) (3.03) (-0.24) (0.32) (3.45) (0.99) (0.05) (-0.08)    
Environ. Disclosure (DJSI) 
0.305***  0.270** 0.447*** 0.214** 0.384*** 0.14 0.261*** 0.009 0.096 
(5.08)  (2.57) (5.32) (2.01) (3.88) (1.44) (3.06) (0.09) (0.98) 
Physical performance 
 
 -4.394*** -4.831*** -3.022** -2.06 -2.325 -10.651*** -8.037*** 0.812 -3.175 
 (-4.09) (-4.42) (-2.57) (-0.72) (-0.92) (-7.11) (-5.59) (0.36) (-1.46)    
Leverage 
      -1.371*** -1.187*** -0.938** -1.331*** 
      (-4.54) (-4.29) (-2.41) (-3.91)    
Growth 
      0.109*** 0.045*** 0.086*** 0.065*** 
      (6.46) (2.96) (4.61) (3.68) 
Risk 
      -0.024 -0.064 -0.197* -0.368*** 
      (-0.22) (-0.67) (-1.85) (-3.41)    
Earning variability 
      -0.169*** -0.108*** -0.098*** -0.109*** 
      (-5.11) (-3.54) (-2.93) (-3.44)    
Size 
      0.329*** 0.304*** 0.429*** 0.353*** 
      (6.25) (5.95) (6.35) (5.17) 
_cons 
5.998*** 6.415*** 6.261*** 5.616*** 6.654*** 6.294*** 0.766 0.73 -0.847 0.086 
(156.03) (97.42) (73.61) (60.49) (42.11) (31.26) (0.82) (0.82) (-0.68) (0.07) 
Industry effects 
No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes    
Region effects 
No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes    
N 982 303 303 303 303 303 275 275 275 275 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.045 0.062 0.321 0.444 0.492 0.349 0.474 0.584 0.613 
F-value 12.057*** 10.637*** 9.653*** 41.183*** 27.776*** 30.667*** 23.394*** 33.86*** 26.673*** 27.943*** 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Panel B. GRI for disclosures from 2000 to 2007 
  
Variables/ Models 
Dependent variable: Environmental Reputation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Annual return 
-0.291*** -0.473*** -0.485*** -0.273** -0.335*** -0.263** -0.312** -0.176* -0.240*** -0.186**  
(-2.81) (-3.84) (-3.95) (-2.55) (-3.30) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-1.90) (-2.67) (-2.06)    
Earnings 
0.019** 0.017** 0.016** 0.015*** -0.002 0.001 0.071*** 0.013 -0.002 -0.007 
(2.07) (2.02) (2.58) (3.89) (-0.26) (0.20) (2.92) (0.57) (-0.08) (-0.24)    
Environ. Disclosure  (GRI) 
0.292***  0.332*** 0.159* 0.079 0.061 0.106 0.054 0.034 0.038 
(3.28)  (3.12) (1.67) (0.88) (0.67) (0.97) (0.54) (0.39) (0.43) 
Physical performance 
 -4.308*** -4.714*** -2.656** -2.009 -2.255 -10.445*** -7.795*** 0.198 -3.486 
 (-4.02) (-4.65) (-2.31) (-0.69) (-0.79) (-7.11) (-5.46) (0.09) (-1.58)    
Leverage 
      -1.280*** -1.156*** -0.790* -1.121*** 
      (-4.08) (-3.93) (-1.90) (-3.10)    
Growth 
      0.115*** 0.052*** 0.076*** 0.057*** 
      (6.39) (3.04) (3.79) (3.04) 
Risk 
      0.022 -0.03 -0.125 -0.299**  
      (0.19) (-0.29) (-1.11) (-2.55)    
Earning variability 
      -0.173*** -0.130*** -0.108*** -0.120*** 
      (-5.13) (-4.08) (-3.10) (-3.57)    
Size 
      0.322*** 0.300*** 0.412*** 0.350*** 
      (5.98) (5.60) (6.14) (5.08) 
_cons 
6.141*** 6.415*** 6.271*** 5.854*** 6.704*** 6.469*** 0.87 0.954 -0.545 0.199 
(113.02) (97.61) (83.44) (66.81) (38.85) (27.93) (0.92) (1.04) (-0.44) (0.16) 
Industry effects 
No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes    
Region effects 
No No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes    
N 472 294 285 285 285 285 258 258 258 258 
Adjusted R2 0.031 0.048 0.076 0.283 0.448 0.475 0.348 0.463 0.594 0.619 
F-value 7.459*** 11.31*** 12.253*** 24.532*** 27.552*** 28.33*** 20.664*** 27.687*** 52.149*** 53.551*** 
Note:  Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. T-statistics (in Parentheses) are estimated using White’s (1980) standard error during the regression. 
Sample size varies depending on the model and each model has been checked for outliers. The sample comprises firm-year observations drawn from the 1999 to 2007 fiscal years for the DJSI and from 2000 to 
2007 for the GRI.   
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Turning to the other environmental performance variables, the results from the environmental 
disclosures in panel A and B suggest that an improvement in environmental reputation might 
not be generated from expanded environmental disclosures, which is inconsistent with 
evidence reported by some studies (e.g. Hasseldine et al., 2005: Toms, 2002). For example, 
membership of the DJSI as a proxy for disclosures shows that there is significant relationship 
between the two at the 5% level or better until the other financial variables are introduced. 
Further, the environmental disclosures turn out to be significant at the 1% level if the region 
effects variable is included (i.e. model 8 in panel A), whilst the industry effects variable 
appears not to have any significant impact on disclosures when the other financial variables 
are included. Moreover, the evidence from Panel B shows that the status of using the GRI 
guidelines for disclosures is significantly related to environmental reputation at the 10% level 
or better in only model 1 to 4 and otherwise there is no relationship between the two, 
inconsistent with the assertion that reporting using the guidelines can lead to an enhancement 
of reputation (GRI, 2002). Regarding the impact of industry effects, previous studies have 
revealed that the higher polluting or larger companies are more likely to provide extensive 
environmental disclosure that their counterparts (e.g. Cho and Patten, 2007; Hasseldine et al., 
2005; Patten, 1992 and 2002; Toms, 2002). However, there is a relative lack of direct 
evidence regarding the relationship between environmental reputation and environmental 
disclosures, as noted by Hasseldine et al. (2005) and further, even though they found that 
there are significant industry impacts on both reputation and disclosures, their study was 
focused on the UK rather than being international. Moreover, regarding the region effects, 
unlike the results in panel A, those in panel B show that the level of significance of disclosure 
falls the region effects are included (i.e. model 4) does not register at all in the other models. 
Hence, the evidence from the results in panel A and B of table 6 suggests that there is likely 
to be unobserved heterogeneous differences in environmental disclosure related to industry-
specific firm characteristics and across regions.  
 
In addition, the identical evidence reported in panel A and B shows, notably, that 
environmental reputation is negatively significantly related to environmental performance 
(e.g. ghg-intnesityit) at the 5 % level or better. In other words, this indicates that higher eco-
efficiency ratio has no incremental effect on a company’s environmental performance, 
consistent with the finding by Cho et al. (2012). These authors contended that the negative 
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relationship between the two is due to the voluntary nature of environmental disclosure 
practices and further, found that the level of disclosure is negatively significantly related to 
environmental performance, that is, the worse performing companies provide the most 
extensive disclosure information to mitigate the influence of  poorer environmental 
performance on environmental reputation. Further, the findings show that the significant link 
between environmental performance (i.e. ghg-intensityit) and environmental reputation fades 
away if industry effects are added (i.e. model 5 and 6 in both cases), whereas such a 
relationship is moderated when including region effects (i.e. model 6 in both cases). However, 
in models 7 and 8 in panels A and B the environmental variable becomes more significant if 
other financial performance variables are added, with/without region effects. Regarding the 
region effects, the evidence from this analysis suggests that there is no systematic difference 
across regions in this sample data, whereas there is difference across industry sectors. In 
relation to the latter point, Brammer and Pavelin (2006) noted that since industry 
environments are correlated with significant pressure from multiple stakeholders (e.g. 
investors or institutions), it could be that industry type plays a mediating role in the 
relationship between environmental performance and corporate reputation. Thus, in the light 
of heightened stakeholder expectations regarding environmental performance across 
industries, environmental reputation may be differentially related to environmental 
performance across industry sectors. Considering the impacts of the financial performance 
variables, the results of table 6 are consistent with the earlier findings that reputation is 
significantly related to: market risk, growth, leverage and size (e.g. Brammer and Pavelin, 
2006; McGuire et al., 1988; Toms, 2002).  
   
Taken together, these findings indicate that environmental reputation is negatively 
significantly related with stock returns and physical performance, whereas it seems to be 
weakly related to environmental disclosures. There is a lack of comparable international 
evidence, for most studies have been confined to a single domestic region (e.g. Cho et al., 
2012; Hasseldine et al., 2005), but, nevertheless, the findings from this analysis seem to 
support those in the most recent study, Cho et al.’s (2012). However, even though they 
elicited comprehensively the relationship among environmental performance, its disclosure 
and its reputation, using the most recent environmental reputation scores (i.e. reported by 
Newsweek launched in 2009), the outcomes need to be treated with caution owing to the 
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relative newness of the measuring of environmental ratings and the short-time test period (i.e. 
one year).  In sum, it could well be that because reputation is a subjective concept,  the 
correct way of measuring it has yet to be uncovered and hence, the inconsistency in the 
reporting on the links between environmental performance and environmental disclosures 
(e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2001; Patten, 2002).   
 
4.3.4 Accounting-based measurements 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
Panel A of table 7 contains a summary of the descriptive statistics for the 310 observations 
based on model 2.8, after excluding outliers, for the period 1999 to 2007.  Note that the 
number of observations reported in the regression analysis in this section may not equal 310, 
because the lack of availability of corporate environmental performance data (i.e. the ratio of 
firm’s sales to greenhouse gases emissions) results in reduced sample size. All variables were 
scaled by the closing of book value per share for the period t-1, except for the corporate 
environmental performance measures, which were assumed to be independent of company 
size, following Hassel et al. (2005). The high standard deviation of MVi,t/BVPSi,t-1, giving a 
range of 0.5838 to 18.5081, shows that this is spread out over wide range and the distribution 
of this variable is positively skewed (i.e. 2.19). Moreover, the deflated earnings variable, 
EPSit/BVPSi,t-1, result indicates that the mean  profitability in the sample is 19.84% on a 
yearly basis, but there is a wide range from very negative to very high scores. Regarding 
extreme negative profitability, this is found among a few consumer services firms, especially 
airline companies for the period 2000 to 2003 (e.g. Dutsche Lufthansa), which could reflect 
the financial recession between those times. The corporate environmental performance 
measures, except for the ratio of company sales to greenhouse gas emissions, show similar 
results to those in Panel A of table 3, but there distribution is wider, with it having a 
minimum of 0.0002 and a maximum of 10.0018, which is roughly 10 times bigger. Further, 
the environmental performance variable, ghg-intensityit, has a mean of 0.0843 and a lower 
median of 0.0127 (0.0125), in the case of the DJSI (GRI). However, using the sales to 
greenhouse gases emissions ratio as a proxy for environmental performance has only been 
adopted in a few studies and hence it is difficult to identify the boundary between high and 
low performers. Hassel et al. (2005) also encountered a wide range of environmental 
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performance when investigating Swedish industry and chose to differentiate between high 
and low environmental performers in their discussion.  
 
Panel B in table 7 provides the parametric (Pearson) and nonparametric (spearman) pairwise 
correlation analysis, with each yielding similar results. As expected, the deflated market 
value is statistically significantly correlated with earnings and the inversed book value at the 
1% level. However, whilst the results show that there is significant positive (0.1012) 
relationship between the inversed book value and deflated earnings at the 10% level, such a 
finding is inconsistent with evidence reported by Hassel et al. (2005), who found  that the link 
between the two was significantly negatively (-0.49) different from zero at the 1% level.  In 
contrast to the results in panel B in table 3, the corporate environmental reputation measure 
(fscorei,t ) is positively and significantly related to: deflated market values, book values, and 
earnings, thus suggesting: the higher the reputation score, the better the firm value.  Finally, 
the corporate environmental performance measure (ghg-intensityit) is significantly negatively 
related with environmental disclosure at the 10% level, while environmental disclosure 
(DJSIit) is not significantly related to any variables.  
 
To test whether following the GRI guidelines for disclosures is favourable to firm value, 
descriptive and correlation analysis were conducted again using 292 observations for the 
period 2000 to 2007. Panel A of table 7 reports the corresponding results to those presented 
for the DJSI. In contrast to finding of correlation between DJSIit and other variables, the 
Pearson correlation matrix findings show that its disclosure (GRIit) is statistically 
significantly related to inversed book values (-0.1619) and deflated earnings (0.1870) at the 1% 
level, which is consistent with Schadewitz and Niskala (2010), whereas the other variables 
show similar outcomes to those for the DJSI in table 7. Further, use of the guidelines is 
positively significantly associated with reputation (0.1395) at the 5% level, suggesting that 
companies with effective environmental disclosures have higher reputations than those that 
do not (Toms, 2002). The correlation matrix does not suggest the presence of any serious 
multicollinearity problems, supported by the outcome that the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
statistics testing are less than 10. Next, to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the value 
relevance of the corporate environmental performance measures, multivariate analysis was 
conducted for each measured variable.  
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics and correlation 
Panel A. Descriptive analysis 
  
Variables 
DJSI (N=310) 
 
GRI (N=292) 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median Min Max Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median Min Max 
MVi,t/BVPSi,t-1 3.8926 2.7805 3.2135 0.5838 18.5081 3.8323 2.7659 3.0787 0.5838 18.5081 
1/BVPSi,t-1 0.1619 0.175 0.1042 0.0027 1.3477  0.1616 0.1781 0.103 0.0027 1.3477 
EPSi,t/BVPSi,t-1 0.1984 0.1496 0.1843 -0.2809 0.7901  0.1969 0.1504 0.1843 -0.2809 0.7901 
Environ. Reputation (fscoreit) 6.3053 0.9474 6.225 3.78 8.44  6.2972 0.9494 6.225 3.78 8.44 
Environ. Disclosures (DJSIit) or (GRIit) 0.6226 0.4855 1 0 1  0.4623 0.4994 0 0 1 
Environ. Performance (ghg-intensityit) 0.0843 0.7927 0.0127 0.0002 10.0018  0.0886 0.8166 0.0125 0.0002 10.0018 
 
Panel B. Correlation analysis 
  
Variables 
DJSI  GRI 
1 2 3 4 5 6    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. MVi,t/BVPSi,t-1 1 0.2787*** 0.7281*** 0.2528*** 0.0449 0.1860***  1 0.2579*** 0.7373*** 0.2422*** 0.2029*** 0.1822*** 
2.1/BVPSi,t-1 0.2795*** 1 0.1124** -0.0975* 0.0235 -0.0459  0.2710*** 1 0.0890 -0.0998* -0.1519*** -0.0432 
3. EPSi,t/BVPSi,t-1 0.6680*** 0.1012* 1 0.2268*** 0.0199 0.0648  0.6612*** 0.0798 1 0.2294*** 0.2302*** 0.0438 
4. Environ. Reputation (fscoreit) 0.2486*** -0.1923*** 0.1976*** 1 0.1016* -0.0699  0.2380*** -0.1979*** 0.2005*** 1 0.1460** -0.0704 
5. Environ. Disclosures 
 (DJSIit) or (GRIit) 0.0591 -0.0143 0.0680 0.0868 1 0.0320  0.0219 -0.1619*** 0.1870*** 0.1395** 1 0.1059* 
6. Physical Performance 
 (ghg-intensityit) 0.0814 -0.009 0.0437 -0.0618 -0.1008* 1    0.0862 -0.0088 0.0454 -0.0628 0.0942 1 
Note: market value (MVit) is cum-dividend market value, which is the three months after fiscal year-end share price plus dividend per share for the period t. Book value per share (BVPSi,t-1) is firm i’s book value 
per share for the period t-1, and earnings per share (EPSi,t) is firm i’s earnings per share for fiscal period-end t. Corporate environmental reputation (fscorei,t)  is represented by the Fortune Magazine’s WMAC 
scores. Members of the DJSI (DJSIi,t) and statute of the GRI guidelines (GRIit)  are assigned a 1, otherwise 0, and the ghg-intensity (ghg-intensityi,t)  is measured by the ratio of a firm’s sales divided by the 
greenhouse gas emissions. Superscripts *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, an1d 0.01 levels, respectively. The top of right half of the correlation matrix above the main diagonal provides 
the non-parametric spearman correlation estimations.  A total of 310 observations for the DJSI and 292 for the GRI after drop outliers are included in table 7and the sample firm-year observations were drawn from 
the 1999 to 2007 fiscal years. 
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Regression analysis 
The objective of the multivariate analysis was to test whether corporate environmental 
performance measures and financial performance implicit in model 2.1 to model 2.8A, which 
is an extension of model 2.8, are relevant to company market value. The financial 
performance information, book value and earnings presented per share, were expected to be 
positively related to the market values (i.e. Pit + DPSit). Even though it is still unresolved 
whether environmental performance has a positive or negative effect on market values, it 
cannot be ignored that it is a fact that corporate environmental performances has emerged as 
one of the investment decision making criteria. Furthermore, the stock market today 
participates in sustainable investment as evidenced by launching SRI indices. Thus, the 
empirical question is whether they are positively or negatively related to the market values. 
Table 8 provides the regression results for model 2.1 to model 2.8A in panel A, using the 
DJSI as a measure of corporate environmental disclosure, for the period 1999 to 2007 and 
model 2.1A to model 2.8AA in panel B, using the GRI guidelines to represent disclosure for 
the period 2000 to 2007. In panel A in table 8, model 2.1 shows the results for the earnings 
regression, whilst model 2.2 to model 2.4 show the outcomes including each environmental 
performance measured variable. Model 2.5 to model 2.7 reports the findings of regression for 
two environmental performance variables in each model and model 2.8 shows the results 
including all the environmental performance variables. Finally, model 2.8A provides the 
results of interaction with environmental impacts (ENVi), which is 1 if companies are 
operating in an industry with environmentally significant impacts and 0 otherwise. Panel B in 
table 8 reports the results using the GRI as an alternative environmental disclosure measure 
and the regression for each model involves the same approach as for those in panel A.  
 
The evidence presented in table 8 for model 2.1 shows that the coefficients for earnings and 
book values are substantially greater than zero (11.876 and 1.817, respectively) at the 1% 
significance level, consistent with prior value relevance studies (e.g. Hassel et al., 2005; 
Kallapur and Kwan, 2004; Schadewitz and Niskala, 2010). Adding the corporate 
environmental performance variables (model 2.2 to model 2.4) slightly increases the adjusted 
R
2
 and their F-statistics are significant, which indicates that the corporate environmental 
performance measures (i.e. reputation (fscoreit), disclosures (DJSIit) and physical 
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Table 8. Valuation model regressions results 
Panel A.  Regression for the DJSI, 1999 to 2007
15
 
 Variables/Model 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8A 
1/BVPSit-1 (β1) 1.817*** 2.429*** 1.853*** 5.546*** 2.436*** 6.224*** 3.423*** 4.041*** 4.396*** 
(5.36) (6.7) (5.51) (3.8) (6.72) (4.24) (3.73) (4.19) (4.53) 
EPSit /BVPSit-1 (β2) 11.876*** 10.793*** 11.817*** 11.425*** 10.919*** 10.646*** 11.933*** 11.197*** 10.232*** 
(20.97) (20.18) (20.84) (9.18) (20.58) (8.86) (9.64) (9.47) (8.30) 
fscoreit  (β3)  0.705***   0.696*** 0.539***  0.533*** 0.650*** 
 (8.90)   (8.64) (4.18)  (4.13) (4.94) 
DJSIit (β4)   0.232*  0.048  0.139 0.075 0.369 
  (1.66)  (0.35)  (0.59) (0.33) (1.48) 
ghg-intensityit (β5)    0.193***  0.241*** 0.202** 0.245*** 0.288*** 
   (2.78)  (4.74) (2.69) (4.27) (5.37) 
ENVi (β6)         2.927* 
        (1.84) 
fscoreit*ENVi  (β7)         -0.437* 
        (-1.79)    
DJSIit*ENVi  (β8)         -0.466 
        (-0.94)    
ghg-intensityit*ENVi  (β9)         73.710*** 
        (3.49) 
_cons  (β0) 
  
1.315*** -2.914*** 1.226*** 0.780*** -2.907*** -2.578*** 0.867*** -2.411*** -3.307*** 
(11.65) (-5.87) (9.87) (2.9) (-5.84) (-2.96) (2.96) (-2.75) (-3.77)    
N 979 979 979 305 970 305 310 310 310 
Adj. R2 0.486 0.529 0.487 0.511 0.530 0.540 0.489 0.517 0.55 
F-value  220*** 164.21*** 150.756*** 42.827***  128.319***  43.765***  31.53***  33.322*** 25.905*** 
                                                 
15
 Although the data have been thoroughly examined to see whether any observations could have influenced the outcome of the regression by using regression diagnostics, the normality test indicates that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. Hence, regression diagnostics have been conducted with the full sample and its processes repeated until the normality test (i.e. sktest) is accepted and then the regression rerun to compare the results with those in panel A in table 
8. The outcomes under the meeting of normally distributed condition are consistent with those in panel A (regression for the DJSI for 1999 to 2007). 
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Table 8. (Continued) 
Panel B. Regression for the GRI, 2000 to 2007
16
 
 Variables/Model 2.1A 2.2A 2.3A 2.4A 2.5A 2.6A 2.7A 2.8A 2.8AA 
1/BVPSit-1 (β1) 
1.817*** 2.173*** 2.274*** 5.740*** 2.798*** 6.386*** 3.221*** 3.786*** 4.082*** 
(5.36) (6.15) (3.87) (3.8) (4.7) (4.2) (3.59) (4.03) (4.35) 
EPSit /BVPSit-1 (β2) 
11.876*** 10.378*** 10.219*** 11.569*** 9.644*** 10.798*** 12.050*** 11.370*** 10.556*** 
(20.97) (18.78) (13.61) (9.09) (13.61) (8.77) (9.07) (8.99) (8.5) 
fscoreit  (β3)  
0.606***  
 
0.578*** 0.528***  0.523*** 0.659*** 
 
(8.3)  
 
(5.57) (3.98)  (3.81) (4.76) 
GRIit (β4)   
-0.342* 
 
-0.493**  -0.406 -0.481 0.079 
  
(-2.04) 
 
(-2.91)  (-1.66) (-1.97) (0.35) 
ghg-intensityit (β5)   
 0.193**  0.239*** 0.221** 0.270*** 0.253*** 
  
 (2.75)  (4.6) (3.02) (4.79) (5.08) 
ENVi (β6)   
 
 
    4.658**  
  
 
 
    (2.88) 
fscoreit*ENVi  (β7)   
 
 
    -0.603*   
  
 
 
    (-2.41)    
GRIit*ENVi  (β8)   
 
 
    -1.903**  
  
 
 
    (-3.24)    
ghg-intensityit*ENVi  (β9)   
 
 
    87.462*** 
  
 
 
    (4.16) 
_cons  (β0) 
  1.288*** -2.343*** 1.708*** 0.715* -1.808** -2.565** 1.107*** -2.111* -3.135*** 
(11.19) (-5.09) (10.47) (2.53) (-2.74) (-2.86) (4.77) (-2.42) (-3.56)    
N 875 875 504 296 496 296 292 292 292 
Adj. R2 0.529 0.567 0.457 0.514 0.494 0.541 0.487 0.514 0.575 
F-value  193.97*** 144.444*** 68.055*** 41.244*** 55.659*** 41.751*** 34.028*** 35.457*** 26.774*** 
                                                 
16
 Although the data have been thoroughly examined to see whether any observations could have influenced the outcome of the regression by using regression diagnostics, the normality test indicates that the residuals are not normally 
distributed. Hence, regression diagnostics have been conducted with the full sample and its processes repeated until the normality test (i.e. sktest) is accepted and then the regression rerun to compare the results with those in panel B in table 
8. The outcomes under the meeting of normally distributed condition are inconsistent with those in panel B (i.e. regression for the GRI 2000 to 2007). Hence, the new results for GRI are reported in panel B-1and B-2, which are the outcomes 
from the descriptive and correlation analysis and B-3 which is the outcome of the regression in table 8-1. 
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Note: market value (MVit) is cum-dividend market value which is three months after fiscal year-end share price 
plus dividend per share for the period t. Book value per share (BVPSi,t-1) is firm i’s book value of per share for 
the period t-1, and earnings per share (EPSi,t) is firm i’s earnings per share for the fiscal period end t. These 
variables are scaled by the beginning of book value per share (BVPSit-1). Corporate environmental reputation 
(fscorei,t)  is represented by Fortune Magazine’s WMAC scores. Members of the DJSI (DJSIi,t)  are assigned a 1, 
otherwise 0, and the ghg-intensity (ghg-intensityi,t)  is measured by the ratio of a firm’s sales divided by its 
greenhouse gas emissions. The environmental impacts variable (ENVi) is given a score of 1 if companies were 
operating in an industry with high environmental impact and 0 otherwise. GRIit is assigned a 1 if a firm’s 
reporting is based on the GRI guidelines and 0 if not.  Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 
the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. The t-statistics (in parentheses) were estimated using White’s 
heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error in the regression.  Sample size varies depending on the model and 
each model is checked for outliers each time by graph. The sample comprises firm-year observation drawn from 
the 1999 to 2007 fiscal years for the DJSI and from 2000 to 2007 for the GRI.  
 
performance (ghg-intensityit)) have incremental value. This outcome gives partial support to 
the perspective that financial performance represents information of firm value.  Moreover, 
the results indicate that companies are more valued by the market if they have a high 
environmental reputation than those with a lower one, which is consistent with the extant 
corporate reputation on value relevance literature (e.g. Black et al., 2000; Smith et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, the outcomes show that environmental performance (ghg-intensityit) is 
positively related to market value, consistent with Cormier et al. (1993) and King and Lenox 
(2002).
17
 When the corporate environmental performance measures are together included in 
models (model 2.4 to model 2.8), reputation and performance are still statistically 
significantly greater than zero at the 1% level, whereas disclosures are insignificant. The 
adjusted R
2
 moderately increases and is in the range of 0.489-0.54 and the F-statistics are 
strongly all significant. These results suggest that companies with both high reputation and 
eco-efficiency can experience more of an increase in their market values than those that do 
not.  
 
Model 2.8A reports the findings after including the control variable environmental impact 
and the adjusted R
2
 increases marginally to 0.55. The environmental impact (ENVi) is 
significant at the 10% level, inconsistent with Hassel et al.’s (2005) finding that there are no  
unknown systematic unexplained differences between the high polluting and low polluting 
industries. The interaction between environmental impact and environmental reputation 
(ENVi*fscoreit) as well as that with disclosure (ENVi*DJSIit) are negative but only the latter is 
significant, at the 10% level, suggesting that low environmental impact companies have 
                                                 
17
 Cormier et al. (1993) measured the pollution index as actual levels recorded by the environment ministries for 
a given plant divided by the pollution standard set by the same body. King and Lenox (2002) used Tobin’s q as 
a market valuation, rather than a price model and defined total emissions as the actual level of pollution, as 
published by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI). 
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higher environmental reputation than those with a high impact.  However, ENVi*ghg-
intensityit is positively significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. This result indicates 
that high environmental impact companies with good environmental performance have higher 
market values than those with low impact and performance levels. That is, high eco-
efficiency is more sensitive to high polluting industries than their counterparts, which is 
consistent with Hughes II (2000) contention that a nonfinancial pollution proxy is value-
relevant for high polluting industry. Regarding the evidence reported by table 7 and 8, it may 
be that the companies operating in low polluted industries tend to focus more on improving 
their environmental reputation than their counterparts. 
 
Panel B in table 8 provides the results of regression by changing the environmental 
disclosures measure to that of the GRI guidelines for the period 2000 to 2007. Under this 
treatment, earnings and book values remain significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. 
Further, environmental reputation (fscoreit) and performance (ghg-intensityit) remain positive 
and significant, at the 5% level or better. In panel A of table 8, the DJSI is positive but 
insignificant for most models, whereas in panel B the GRI is significantly negative in model 
2.3A and model 2.5A, but remains insignificant for models 2.7A and 2.8A. These results are 
inconsistent with those in the extant disclosure literature (see Appendix I for more detail). 
Further, in a recent study Schadewitz and Niskala (2010) found that following the GRI 
guidelines for voluntary responsibility disclosures is an incremental explanatory factor in 
determining a firm’s market value, but this finding may contain a potential sample selection 
bias for it focused on one specific market (i.e. Finland). One possible interpretation of the 
findings in table 8 is that voluntary environmental disclosures, which represent non-financial 
performance, may be less efficient and hence, more costly to firm than mandated financial 
disclosures, because some or all of what is reported may not be valued by potential investors 
(Hughes II, 2000).  
 
Model2.8AA reports that environmental disclosures are insignificantly positive after adding 
environmental impact (ENVi). Consistent with panel A in table 8, the variable ENVi is 
statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that companies operating in 
environmentally sensitive industries have higher firm values than their counterparts. Having 
interacted the corporate environmental performance variables with ENVi, the coefficients of 
fscoreit* ENVi and GRIit*ENVi, are negative and significantly greater than zero at the 10% 
126 
 
level or better, whilst environmental performance (ghg-intensityit*ENVi) remains significantly 
positive. These results suggest that the market value of companies operating in 
environmentally significant industries is significantly influenced by the level of corporate 
environmental performance. For example, the environmental performance variables-
environmental impact interaction parameter for environmental performance variables show 
that the higher market value of companies in environmentally significant industries (i.e. 
ENVi=1) might be increased more than 5% of market values depending on the level of 
reputation, whereas decreased by more than 180% of market values depending on following 
GRI guidelines under the assuming that other variables are same. 
18
  In sum, table 8 has 
shown that the market value of companies operating in an environmentally significant 
industry is positively and significantly influenced by the level of their corporate 
environmental reputation and performance except environmental disclosures (GRIit).  
 
                                                 
18
 When the parameter estimates of  model 2.8AA are rearranged by including the corporate environmental performance measures, the 
model can be expressed as follows: 
 MVit=  -3.135 +4.082*1/BVPSit-1+10.556*EPSit/BVPSit-1+(0.659-0.603*ENVi)*fscoreit + (0.079-1.903*ENVi) GRIi + 
(0.253+87.462*ENVi)*ghg-intensityit +4.658*ENVi 
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Table 8-1. Descriptive statistics and regression results when the residuals of regression are normal 
Panel B-1. Descriptive analysis, GRI from 2000 to 2007 
 
GRI (N=244) 
Variables Mean Standard deviation Median Min Max 
MVi,t/BVPSi,t-1 3.1606 1.5897 2.8119 0.6622 8.9907 
1/BVPSi,t-1 0.1227 0.1001 0.0901 0.0027 0.5015 
EPSi,t/BVPSi,t-1 0.1817 0.135 0.1773 -0.2809 0.7901 
Environ. Reputation (fscoreit) 6.2302 0.9407 6.14 3.78 8.44 
Environ. Disclosures (GRIit) 0.4918 0.501 0 0 1 
Environ. Performance (ghg-intensityit) 0.1036 0.8929 0.0123 0.0002 10.0018 
Panel B-2. Correlation analysis, GRI from 2000 to 2007 
      
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. MVi,t/BVPSi,t-1 1 0.1537** 0.7166*** 0.1219* 0.3229*** 0.2053*** 
2. 1/BVPSi,t-1 0.1959*** 1 0.0147 -0.1317** -0.0591 -0.041 
3. EPSi,t/BVPSi,t-1 0.6851*** 0.0373 1 0.1534** 0.3208*** 0.0297 
4. Environ. Reputation (fscoreit) 0.0752 -0.2010*** 0.1357** 1 0.1858*** -0.1428** 
5. Environ. Disclosures(GRIit) 0.3142*** -0.0341 0.3202*** 0.1731*** 1 0.1093* 
6. Environ. Performance (ghg-intensityit) 0.2078*** 0.0245 0.0668 -0.0626 0.0966 1 
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Table8-1. (Continued) 
Panel B-3. Regression for the GRI, 2000 to 2007  
 Variables/Model 2.1A 2.2A 2.3A 2.4A 2.5A 2.6A 2.7A 2.8A 2.8AA   
1/BVPSit-1 (β1) 0.807*** 0.421*** 1.561*** 2.663*** 1.730*** 2.792*** 2.697*** 2.782*** 3.385*** 
(4.48) (3.08) (3.98) (3.82) (4.14) (3.87) (3.8) (3.84) (4.48) 
EPSit /BVPSit-1 (β2) 3.593*** 3.757*** 4.020*** 7.909*** 3.612*** 7.840*** 7.485*** 7.468*** 6.864*** 
(10.97) (10.09) (10.82) (10.79) (10.2) (10.73) (9.67) (9.76) (9.00) 
fscoreit  (β3) 
 
0.278*** 
  
0.116** 0.067 
 
0.028 0.181*   
 
(8.11) 
  
(2.32) (0.83) 
 
(0.35) (1.68) 
GRIit (β4) 
  
0.082 
 
0.056 
 
0.362** 0.316** 0.419**  
  
(0.84) 
 
(0.56) 
 
(2.25) (1.99) (2.26) 
ghg-intensityit (β5) 
   
0.279*** 
 
0.284*** 0.263*** 0.272*** 0.277*** 
   
(5.35) 
 
(5.64) (5.25) (5.46) (6.32) 
ENVi (β6) 
        
3.069*** 
        
(3.09) 
fscoreit*ENVi  (β7) 
        
-0.442*** 
        
(-2.90)    
GRIit*ENVi  (β8) 
        
-0.721**  
        
(-2.45)    
ghg-intensityit*ENVi  (β9) 
        
66.186*** 
        
(7.29) 
_cons  (β0) 1.144*** -0.379* 1.546*** 1.400*** 0.841*** 0.977* 1.301*** 1.103** 0.136 
(21.39) (-1.85) (18.93) (9.50) (2.83) (1.82) (9.08) (2.07) (0.20) 
N 216 228 232 249 224 249 248 244 244 
Adj. R2 0.446 0.532 0.415 0.499 0.417 0.498 0.509 0.523 0.601 
F-value  61.384*** 65.422*** 58.049*** 66.694*** 41.141*** 51.085*** 59.077*** 46.795*** 45.532*** 
Note:  The t-statistics (in parentheses) were estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error in the regression. Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.
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The full observations have been thoroughly rechecked by removing outliers identified 
by reference to residuals until the statistical test for the normality of residuals could be 
accepted. The results from panel B-2 of table 8-1 are similar to those from panel B 
(GRI) of table 7, except for the relationship between the measured environmental 
performance variables and firm value. For example, the relationship between 
environmental reputation and firm value has faded away, whereas the other variables 
(i.e. GRI and physical performance) turn out to be significantly related to firm value 
at the 1% level in the Pearson correlation analysis. Further, the significant relationship 
between GRI and book value has diminished in the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
analysis. The regression analysis in panel B-3 of table 8-1 shows that the outcomes for 
the other variables are consistent with those in panel B of table 8, except for GRI, the 
measurement for environmental disclosures, which has become significant at the 5% 
level in models 2.7A, 2.8A and 2.8AA. Further, when comparing the outcomes of 
GRI in panel B of table 8 with those in panel B-3 of table 8-1, the latter provide a 
more consistent relationship between firm value and GRI (i.e. there is a positive 
relationship between the two in all models), than the former. Weak value relevance of 
environmental reputation on firm value can be deduced from the level of association 
between the two in panel B-2 (i.e. there is no association in the Pearson treatment and 
this is only significant at the 10% level in Spearman correlation analysis). 
 
Because the residuals of the regression for the full sample are not normal, non-
parametric quantile regression has been conducted using model 2.9 with full 
observations for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. The results from this quantile 
regression, presented in table 8-2, are relatively consistent with those in the case of 
the DJSI and GRI in table 8. For example, the environmental disclosures (DJSI or 
GRI) are insignificant in the quantile regression for all the percentile cases, except the 
DJSI, which is significant at the 10% level in the 25th percentile. Environmental 
reputation is significant at the 5% level or better in the cases of the DJSI and GRI for 
all percentiles. Further, the physical performance is significant at the 5% level or 
better, except for the 75th percentile for the DJSI and 50th percentile for the GRI. 
Whereas the book value (1/BVPSit-1) is significant at the 10% or better for the DJSI 
and GRI, except for the 50th percentile for the GRI, the earnings (EPSit/BVPSit-1), 
interestingly, are only significant at the 10% level for the 75th percentile for the DJSI 
and GRI.  Unlike the outcomes from quantile regression for the DJSI, those for the 
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GRI provide different evidence for environmental disclosure (GRI) compared to those 
of table 8-1, which suggests that GRI does have value relevance. In general, the 
results from the non-parametric analysis imply that they are closer to those in table 8 
than those in table 8-1 where the residuals are normal.  
 
Table 8-2. Non-parametric quantile regression analysis 
Variables 
DJSI 
 
GRI 
Q25 Q50 Q75   Q25 Q50 Q75 
1/BVPSit-1 (β1) 3.123** 5.231* 11.140*** 
 
2.396*** 5.314 11.002*** 
 
(2.09) (1.69) (4.03) 
 
(3.47) (1.14) (4.18) 
EPSit /BVPSit-1 (β2) 3.329 7.159 10.948* 
 
3.42 7.748 10.115*   
 
(0.88) (1.41) (1.67) 
 
(0.77) (0.94) (1.73) 
fscoreit  (β3) 0.638** 0.616*** 0.576*** 
 
0.563** 0.693** 0.583**  
 
(2.57) (3.75) (2.78) 
 
(2.12) (2.32) (2.41) 
DJSIit or GRIit (β4) 0.546* 0.484 -0.855 
 
0.233 0.316 0.4 
 
(1.96) (1.56) (-1.13) 
 
(0.74) (0.72) (0.82) 
ghg-intensityit (β5) 0.484*** 0.308** 0.14 
 
0.445*** 0.246 0.185*** 
 
(4.84) (2.08) (1.36) 
 
(3.86) (1.40) (3.09) 
ENVi (β6) 6.573** 5.337** 3.153 
 
5.319 6.765* 7.451*** 
 
(2.54) (2.49) (0.67) 
 
(1.57) (1.86) (3.26) 
fscoreit*ENVi  (β7) -0.859*** -0.779*** -0.652 
 
-0.722 -0.995* -1.006*** 
 
(-2.64) (-2.83) (-1.00) 
 
(-1.47) (-1.90) (-2.97)    
DJSIit or GRIit *ENVi  
(β8) -1.075** -0.86 1.015 
 
-0.243 -1.092 -1.899**  
 
(-2.06) (-1.56) (1.06) 
 
(-0.31) (-1.50) (-2.05)    
ghg-intensityit*ENVi  
(β9) 60.536*** 58.207*** 53.613 
 
52.121*** 67.087*** 63.458 
 
(3.76) (3.32) (1.13) 
 
(3.74) (3.21) (1.58) 
_cons  (β0) -3.158** -2.938*** -2.012* 
 
-2.527* -3.264** -2.691**  
  (-2.18) (-2.67) (-1.68)   (-1.82) (-2.00) (-2.39)    
N 338 338 338   318 318 318 
R2 0.349 0.330 0.354   0.316 0.324 0.365 
Note:  The t-statistics (in parentheses) were estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error in 
the regression. Superscripts *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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4.4 Discussion 
 
The negative results for this research, regarding environmental reputation and 
physical performance with equity performance, which are somewhat counterintuitive, 
have been found in other studies (e.g. Brammer et al., 2006).  However, in the 
majority of the extant studies high levels of such performance measures have been 
associated with a strong stock market or firm financial performance (e.g. Belkaoui, 
2004; Derwall et al., 2005; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
Regarding the value relevance of environmental performance to investors’ decision 
making, in this research this has emerged as being strongly significantly positive, 
which reflects positive expectation of future cash flows and this is in line with several 
previous works (e.g. Clarkson et al., 2004; Hughes II, 2000).  Therefore, taking the 
results for this research together it would appear that they are contradictory.  
 
The findings for the negative environmental and equity performance outcome could 
be down to the traditional economic notion that increased costs in environmental 
issues result in decreased earnings and market values for firms, or it could be that 
there is the presence of altruistic investors who are willing to forgo returns to salve 
their ethical conscience (Aupperle et al., 1985; Brammer et al., 2006; Hassel et al., 
2005; Mahapatra, 1984; Vance, 1975). One further possible explanation for this 
anomaly is the aforementioned lack of a standardized metric of environmental 
performance to measure something that is non-financial and hence, the variation in the 
representative variables chosen could be the cause of the inconsistent outcomes 
(Ilinitch et al., 1998; Ullman, 1985). Further, even though it has been posited by this 
researcher in chapter 3 that the inclusion of third party measures would be expected to 
enhance environmental performance information for investors, the evidence for this 
thesis suggests that some such reporting, e.g. Fortune’s environmental reputation 
ranking, is an insufficient proxy for non-financial environmental performance. 
Regarding such measures, some scholars have expressed concern about their validity, 
that is, whether the measures identify performance (e.g. environmental performance) 
is important to investors and society, because there is no information provided as to 
how these reputational measures are compiled at the internal level (Chatterji and 
Levine, 2006; Illiniotch et al. 1998). That is, it could well be that the reputational 
scores from year to year are perceived by investors as reflecting the immediate 
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concerns of the assessor organization, rather than what is of interest to them when 
making investment decisions. However, the problem still remains that in this work the 
relationship is negative and hence, further reasoning is required to explain this, as put 
forward next.         
 
It is suggested, that one plausible explanation for the negative relationship between 
reputation and physical performance with returns relates to risk.  That is, a higher 
level of CSR implies lower CSR risk (i.e. firm-specific risk) and therefore, the lower 
expected stock return.  By way of explanation, risk, the premier element in investment 
decisions, can be distinguished as systematic risk, known as market risk or beta, and 
firm-specific or idiosyncratic risk. The former can be contrasted with the latter in that 
it is likely to affect most companies to some degree, in the form of: economic growth 
rate shocks, interest rate shocks, and inflation shocks. Further, systematic risk has 
been deemed as a risk factor that must be included in the return-risk link in the asset 
pricing model (e.g. CAPM), whilst firm specific risk can be theoretically eliminated 
through portfolio diversification.  However, a few studies have contended that 
idiosyncratic risk does matter as it is priced by the market (Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; 
Malkiel and Xu, 1997). More specifically, Malkiel and Xu (1997) provided evidence 
of existence the positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and stock returns. In 
sum, the negative relationship between CSR and stock market returns found in this 
research could be attributed to the low level of firm-specific risk experienced by high 
performers. 
 
4.5 Chapter summary  
 
In this chapter the results have been reported of an investigation into how information 
on corporate environmental performance, in the form of reputation, disclosures and 
eco-efficiency, affects the level of earnings and hence, that of stock returns, by using 
an earnings-returns model based on the work of Belkaoui (2004). Furthermore, results 
have been presented regarding whether the performance measures are value relevant 
to financial decision-makers as reflected by their investment decisions, thereby 
extending a study of Hassel et al. (2005).  
 
133 
 
The first and second tested hypotheses were aimed at establishing whether 
information on earnings in explaining stock returns is systematically related to 
corporate environmental performance measures and whether this relationship is 
positive.  Regarding the first hypothesis, the results in table 4 show that all of the 
corporate environmental performance measures are determinants of information on 
earnings. More specifically, it has been elicited that the higher level of the corporate 
environmental disclosures (DJSIit), the greater the weight investors will attach to the 
information on earnings and hence, on the determination of stock returns. However, 
this relationship was not established for other environmental performance measures 
(i.e. reputation (fscoreit), physical performance (ghg-intensityit), and the use of GRI 
guidelines, as alternative measure of disclosure). Turning to the outcomes from testing 
the second hypothesis, the findings in table 5 illustrate that environmental reputation 
is significant and negatively associated with equity performance and the same result 
has emerged for environmental performance, assessed using eco-efficiency data (ghg-
intensityit), when other variables are included in the regression model. However, the 
results of the test in general for the direction of the link between environmental 
disclosures and equity performance, measured by membership of the DJSI and the use 
of the GRI guidelines, revealed that they are not associated with stock returns.   
 
The third hypothesis involved testing whether useful corporate environmental 
performance information is value relevant for investment decision-making. The 
results in table 7, table 8 and table 8-1 indicate that this is the case and further, 
performance varies across industries. Moreover, the evidence from table 8 and table 
8-1 suggests that companies operating in industries with significant levels of 
environmental impact are positively sensitive, in terms of their market values, to the 
level of the environmental reputation and environmental performance information, 
whereas this relationship is negative for such industries when it comes to voluntary 
environmental disclosures (i.e. GRI guidelines).  
 
In sum, the evidence in this chapter has shown that investors confer high value 
relevance on information about corporate environmental reputation (fscoreit) and 
environmental performance (ghg-intensityit), but these aspects are negatively 
associated with earnings and annual stock returns. One possible reason for this result 
could be due to the correlation values between earnings and returns shown in table 4, 
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where no monotonically increasing relationship between them is found. Whereas the 
outcomes regarding environmental disclosures (DJSIit and/or GRIit) have 
demonstrated that they are not incorporated into company equity performance, the 
evidence from environmental disclosure as measured by the GRI Guidelines shows 
that it is considered by investors when making investment decisions.  This difference 
may be attributable to the fact that financial-decision makers give more credit to GRI 
disclosures, which are more voluntary in nature when compared with the DJSI, i.e. the 
latter involves greater formality in the disclosures process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
135 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
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Chapter 5. SRI Index Membership and Equity performance 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the badge of SRI index membership may be a quick way of 
conveying the information regarding on a company’s social responsibility practices to 
financial market participants. In this respect, although some researchers have 
examined how the market reacts to a specific event (i.e. SRI index announcement), 
whether SRI index membership as non-financial information for CSR is relevant to 
financial information for firm value has not, as yet, been comprehensively empirically 
investigated. Thus, by means of market-based and accounting-based valuations, this 
chapter explores the different ways in which SRI index membership influences 
shareholder value through equity performance. Regarding the former, an event study 
is used to test the effect of membership of an SRI index, as a measure of CSR related 
information, on the share price of a set of companies. In relation to latter, the 
valuation methodology used in Hassel’s (2005) work is used to examine whether or 
not this information has value relevance. These two approaches employing data from 
extended sample periods of the best known SRI indices (i.e. the DJSI and the 
FTSE4Good index) and thus, may fill the aforementioned gap the empirical literatures. 
However, the main empirical emphasis in this chapter is focused on the event study, 
because the value relevance investigation is fundamentally the same as that carried 
out in chapter 4.   
 
Event studies are a useful method for assessing the effect of new stories or events on 
share price in that they reflect how the market, analysts, and investors react to good 
news or bad news about specific companies. In particular, they have been used in 
order to assess the financial impact of new information on the share prices of a 
corporation in terms of market efficiency. With regards to this, given the semi-strong 
form of market efficiency, investors react quickly and rationally to any newly 
available information by incorporating it into their investment decision. In general, 
understandably, a firm’s share price declines when there is bad news, whereas it rises 
in the case of good news.  Empirically, event studies have been used to determine the 
impact of CSR related events, such as: the disclosure of corporate environmental 
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performance (Freedman and Jaggi, 1986), releases of pollution data (Hamilton, 1995) 
and environmental news (Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996).  In this chapter, the 
announcement of the constituents of SRI indices is used as the proxy for CSR related 
events.  More specifically, the market reaction of stock prices to the inclusion 
(deletion) of a company in (from) an SRI index is employed to test the hypothesis that 
inclusion in (exclusion from) such indices affects significantly and positively 
(negatively) its share price changes. The data on these announcements is analyzed 
over the sample period using both the whole sample and subsamples for each year 
covered. 
 
First, previous event studies on CSR are reviewed to aid hypothesis development and, 
the descriptive statistics are provided for the independent and dependent variables as 
well as there being an overview of the data (section 5.2). Subsequently, section 5.3 
contains the results of the correlations between the independent variables and the 
overall findings from the empirical models used for the event study as well as 
discussion of the results for the accounting based valuation. Section 5.4 contains 
further consideration of the findings, whilst section 5.5 is the chapter summary. 
 
5.2 Research Design 
 
5.2.1 Hypothesis development 
 
Market reaction to CSR event announcements 
As noted in the previous chapter, because of the difficulties of measuring the 
construct of CSR, CSR related announcements (e.g. environmental performance) have 
been used as a proxy in the event studies that have the goal of estimating the market 
value impacts of specific happenings. Moreover, such studies have been used to 
determine the impact of both positive and negative CSR related events. For instance, 
in their research relating to the announcement of environmentally-related company 
news, Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) and Filbeck and Gorman (2004) found that the 
stock price reacted significantly and positively to environmental awards news and 
negatively when an environmental group makes a detrimental statement about a 
company. However, Lorraine et al. (2004) showed that no significant effects occurred 
on the day of the issuing of environmental news when testing UK companies’ share 
price movements from 1993 to 2000 over a 21 day window surrounding the 
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announcement day (Day t), but notably on Day t-7 the market reacted significantly 
positively and on Day t+7 it reacted negatively. These authors suspected that the 
market may have been responding to something unrelated to environmental 
information or there may have been some leakage of this information (ibid). Studies 
relating to market reaction on the quality of disclosures have provided evidence that 
those that disclose environmental performance are less risky than those that do not 
(Anderson and Frankle, 1980; Belkaoui, 1976; Jaggi and Freedman, 1982 and 1986). 
However, Freedman and Stagliano (1991) reported that the market reacted negatively 
to mandated environmental disclosures ordered by the US Supreme Court for the 
cotton and textile industry, i.e. levels of cotton-dust emissions. 
 
Other information sources employed to represent environmental events include: 
announcements by the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) (Hamilton, 1995; Konar and 
Cohen, 1995) and those by the Council on Economic Priorities (CEP) (Shane and 
Spicer, 1983; Stevens, 1984). Regarding the latter, Shane and Spicer (1983) 
investigated whether investors’ perception of company performance might be affected 
by such third party information and found that CEP firms experienced negative 
abnormal returns on the two days prior to an announcement as well discovering that 
companies with low pollution control performance rankings had significant and more 
negative returns than those with high rankings, on the announcement day.  Using the 
same dataset, Stevens (1984) examined whether estimated future pollution control 
expenditure influences investment decisions and found that portfolios with low 
estimated expenditure had a higher return than those with high estimated expenditure. 
Hamilton (1995) examined whether the market takes into account TRI information for 
investment decision making and found that firms had statistically significant and 
negative abnormal returns on the TRI release date. As an extension to Hamilton’s 
study, Konar and Cohen (1997) examined whether or not firms reduced toxic 
emissions after they had significantly negative returns and they elicited that 
companies who received the largest negative returns owing to high emissions 
significantly lowered their emission rates after the release of TRI information, which 
was not the case for those with low levels of emissions. Furthermore, Frooman (1997) 
conducted a meta-analysis of 27 event studies of socially irresponsible and illicit 
behaviour and discovered that this type of behaviour had a statistically significant and 
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negative effect on shareholder wealth. Therefore, they concluded that firms should act 
in a socially responsible manner aimed at promoting their shareholders’ interests.  
 
The results from these studies, in general, show a consistent trend of positive 
movements in share price when good news is released and the converse when there is 
bad news.  However, even though they can provide information as to whether or not 
investors care about CSR performance in relation to a specific event, the evidence is 
still weak regarding its impact on equity performance. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, there is no single concept of CSR nor is there a commonly accepted way of 
measuring it and because it requires multidimensional measurement, if its effect is to 
be robustly estimated, these earlier research endeavours, focused on specific events 
rather than a variety of measures, have failed to provide clear evidence of the role of 
CSR in determining market value changes of companies. Therefore, in this chapter 
CSR related events are defined as inclusion in or exclusion from SRI indices, because 
membership requires companies to qualify on a range of environmental, social and 
financial performance measures. 
  
Index inclusions and exclusions  
Prior research has involved considering whether change in the composition of indices 
over a period of time provides information that affects the market.   For example, 
scholars have examined the impact of listing and/or delisting from the S&P 500 index 
on returns and have consistently shown that companies that were delisted experienced 
negative market returns (Goetzmann and Garry, 1986; Jain, 1987). Further, Chen et al. 
(2004) discovered that companies added to the S&P 500 index could enjoy a 
permanent increase in share price, but those delisted only suffered temporary losses 
over the period from 1962 to 2000. It is notable that these authors elicited that 
investors’ reaction is more sensitive to addition to an index than deletion from it. A 
recent paper by Elliott et al. (2006) has supported the perspective put forward by Chen 
et al. (2004) regarding investor awareness, but they also found that the benefits of 
inclusion in the index would involve only a temporary price increase rather than one 
that is permanent. 
 
Compared to event studies relating to general stock indices, the list of extant studies 
on SRI indices is quite short (Cheung, 2011; Clacher and Hagendorff, 2011; 
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Consolandi et al., 2009; Curran and Moran, 2007; Doh et al., 2010; Lackmann et al., 
2011; Robinson et al., 2011; Schroder, 2007). Regarding this particular research, three 
previous studies are closely related: Robinson et al. (2011), Cheung (2011), Clacher 
and Hagendorff (2011), and Curran and Moran (2007), all of which examined the 
impact of inclusion and exclusion from the DJSI World or the FTSE4Good index. 
Cheung (2011) used only US companies from 2002 to 2008, whilst Robinson et al. 
(2011) focused on North American companies over the period 2003 to 2007. The 
former found that DJSI inclusion (exclusion) stocks reported a significant, but 
temporary, increase (decrease) in returns on the day of exchange (i.e. the effective day 
of index exclusion and index inclusion), whereas the latter discovered that companies 
being added to this index experienced a sustained increase in share price and those 
being deleted from it had a decrease in share price for the first 10 days subsequent to 
the announcement.  Curran and Moran (2007) tested whether being included in or 
excluded from the FTSE4Good UK 50, tradable index, resulted in a significant impact 
on share price over the period 2001 to 2002 and found that there was no significant 
difference in the returns between companies being added to the index when compared 
to those being deleted. More recently, Clacher and Hogendorff (2011) also did not 
find the strong evidence in favour of a positive market reaction to the announcement 
of FTSE4Good index from 2001 to 2008.   
 
Value relevance of SRI indices 
The results of the above event studies have provided some evidence of market 
reaction on the announcement-day of SRI indices composition change. In other words, 
the literature would appear to support the view that SRI indices announcements, as a 
proxy for CSR, convey new information to the market. However, there has been no 
prior research on whether and how inclusion in or exclusion from such indices affects 
a firm’s value, which is the aim of this particular study. Moreover, the question arises 
as to whether the market is genuinely concerned about firms’ efforts to be members of 
an SRI index and whether listed companies can boost their firm value. Another matter 
of interest is whether investors are genuinely concerned about SRI investments or 
whether they are just investing in brand imaging when they are making investment 
decisions. If there is a significant relationship between being listed on an SRI index 
and a company’s value, then it can be concluded that environmental/CSR 
performance, as proxied by membership of SRI indices, conveys new information to 
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the market and further, that this knowledge can be considered as being relevant to a 
company’s firm value.  
 
There is some evidence that firms want to be members of SRI indices. For instance, 
when the FTSE4Good index was launched, Tesco, the Royal bank of Scotland and 
Marconi could not join at first, because they did not meet the criteria (Foley, 2001).  
In particular, unlike Sainsbury and BP, Tesco failed to gain membership as it did not 
meet the necessary environmental criteria and this was widely reported in the media, 
which may have had a negative impact on its firm value.  However, since then it has 
made efforts to report more transparently on social and environmental policies and 
hence, has been allowed to join the index. In fact, the company now produces more 
public information than before, which may be due to its desire to remain on the index.  
 
In the case of investors’ assessments of a firm’s CSR, if they consider membership of 
an SRI index as a factor that affects their investment decision, this will have an 
influence on share prices and thus it is to be considered as relevant to a firm’s value. 
Under such circumstances, this will motivate corporations to improve continuously 
CSR related to social and environmental performance as well as human rights in order 
to remain on the indices. That is, companies will assume that they can increase their 
market value if investors are cognizant of the fact they are listed in SRI indices and 
thus, are doing their business ethically and in an environmentally friendly way.  
 
Hence, two hypotheses are formulated as follows:  
 
H4a: Announcements of firms being included in an SRI index are associated with 
their experiencing significant and positive share price changes.  
 
  H4b: Announcements of firms being deleted from an SRI index are associated with 
their experiencing significant and negative share price changes.  
 
  H5:  Membership of an SRI index is relevant information in that it has an impact on 
the market value of firms.  
The development of hypotheses in this chapter is shown in figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5. Summary of development of hypotheses for SRI indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.2 Sample and Data 
 
The lists of firms included in or excluded from SRI indices were extracted or provided 
from these websites: DJSI World for 2000 to 2007 and FTSE4Good Global for 2002 
to 2007.  
 
Inclusions and exclusions from the DJSI 
The Dow Jones Sustainability World Index (DJSI World) comprises the top 10% of 
the largest companies in the Dow Jones Global Index (DJGI), in terms of economic, 
environmental and social criteria and consists of a composite index and five indices: 
DJSI World excluding alcohol, DJSI World excluding gambling, DJSI World 
excluding tobacco, DJSI World excluding armaments & firearms, and DJSI World 
excluding alcohol, gambling, tobacco, armaments and firearms.  
 
DJSI World, the first global index for tracking the performance of sustainably driven 
companies worldwide, was started with 227 members on 8 September 1999, which 
have since been annually monitored as to whether they meet the corporate 
sustainability assessment criteria, in terms of: economic, environmental and social 
performance. In cooperation with the Sustainable Asset Management group (SAM), 
the organisation announces the list of companies included in and excluded from the 
index during the first week in September of each year and the new composition comes 
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into effect on the third Friday following the declaration. The DJSI serves as a 
benchmark for investors who integrate sustainability considerations into their 
portfolios, and provides an effective engagement platform for companies who want to 
adopt sustainable best practices. According to the DJSI webpage, “Currently more 
than 70 DJSI licenses are held by asset managers in 19 countries to manage a variety 
of financial products including active and passive funds, certificates and segregated 
accounts. In total, these licensees presently manage over 8 billion USD based on the 
DJSI.” 19  Panel A of table 9 provides the number of companies included in and 
excluded from the DJSI index from 2000 to 2007. 
Table 9. The number of companies included in and excluded from the DJSI from 
2000 to 2007 and the FTSE4Good index from 2002 to 200720 
 
Panel A. DJSI 
DJSI world Announcement date Effective date Additions Deletions 
2000 07/September 06/October 91 (42) 82 (37) 
2001 04/ September 08/ October 131 (59) 45 (20) 
2002 04/ September 23/ September 81 (45) 70 (39) 
2003 04/ September 22/ September 51 (27) 42 (27) 
2004 02/ September 20/ September 38 (27) 32 (15) 
2005 07/ September 19/ September 57 (35) 54 (36) 
2006 06/ September 18/ September 46 (30) 36 (20) 
2007 06/ September 24/ September 42 (31) 33 (18) 
Total   537 (296) 394 (212) 
 
Panel B. FTSE4Good 
Global Index Announcement date Effective date Additions Deletions 
March/2002 13/March 18/March 62 (38) 4 (0) 
September/2002 17/September 23/September 48 (23) 7 (4) 
March/2003 19/March 24/March 33 (21) 4 (1) 
September/2003 18/September 22/September 57 (34) 19 (11) 
March/2004 12/March 22/March 62 (38) 29 (13) 
September/2004 10/September 20/ September 63 (50) 8 (3) 
March/2005 10/ March 21/ March 70 (45) 22 (8) 
September/2005 07/ September 19/ September 30 (15) 20 (9) 
March/2006 08/ March 20/ March 29 (17) 19 (9) 
September/2006 07 / September 18/ September 20 (15) 8 (6) 
March/2007 07/ March 19/ March 15 (7) 16 (6) 
September/2007 12/ September 24/ September 20 (9) 24 (13) 
Total   509 (312) 180 (83) 
Note: The table provides the number of companies being included in and excluded from the DJSI World (panel A) 
and the FTSE4Good Global index (panel B) over the periods 2000 to 2007 and 2002 to 2007, respectively. The 
figures in parentheses are the total numbers of companies used for calculating abnormal returns, the share price 
information for which is taken from DataStream.  
                                                 
19
 Retrieved from http://www.sustainability-indexes.com on April 30, 2011 
 
20
  For the FTSE4Good index biannual announcement in 2002, the announcement date for the inclusion in and 
exclusion from index is from the Regulatory News Services (RNS), but from the website otherwise. 
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Inclusions and exclusions from the FTSE4Good index 
Similar to the aims of the DJSI, the FTSE4Good index series were designed in 
response to the increasing focus on CSR by investors seeking to measure the social, 
environmental and ethical performance of the companies that they invested in.  To 
qualify for inclusion in these indices, companies must be listed on the FTSE All-Share 
(UK) or FTSE Developed Index (Global) and must meet criteria in five areas: 
working towards environmental sustainability; developing positive relationships and 
stakeholders; up-holding and supporting universal human rights; ensuring good 
supply chain labour standards and countering bribery. The index selection criteria 
have been designed to “reflect a broad consensus of what constitutes good corporate 
responsibility practice globally.” 21 Companies involved with or investing in sectors 
where products or activities are deemed to be unethical, such as the weapons and 
tobacco industries, are excluded from the indices.  The inclusion criteria have been 
regularly reviewed and tightened since the launch, with tougher environmental and 
human rights requirements being introduced as well as new supply chain labour 
standards and countering bribery rules. Those companies deemed to be no longer 
meeting the standards are deleted from the indices. 
 
The FTSE4Good Global index was initiated with 525 companies in 2001 and the 
performance of companies is monitored every six months by the FTSE4Good Policy 
Committee. Company screening information for the indices is also provided by the 
Ethical Investment Research Service (EIRIS), who act as a third party scrutinizing: 
annual reports, research company websites and publicly available other material as 
well as regularly updating and reviewing the company’s information. The 
FTSE4Good comprises eight indices, four benchmark indices (FTSE4Good UK; 
FTSE4Good Europe; FTSE4Good US; FTSE4Good Japan; and FTSE4Good Global), 
and four tradable ones (FTSE4Good UK 50; FTSE4Good Europe 50; FTSE4Good US 
100; and FTSE4Good global 100).
22
  A benchmark index includes all those companies 
from the given country/region whose performance meets the inclusion criteria, 
whereas the tradable indices are the largest 50 or 100 companies in the benchmark 
                                                 
21
 For further details see http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good index 
series/Downloads/FTSE4Good Inclusion Criteria.pdf.  
22
 For more detail see 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_index_Series/Downloads/indexrules.pdf.  “Ground rules for 
the management of the FTSE4Good index series” Version 1.3 August 2005. 
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index. Of these indices, the FTSE4Good Global Index, which covers the same 
geographical region as DJSI World, was used for this research to examine the market 
reaction to the entrance to and exit from the index. The data has been taken from the 
Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) and panel B of table 9 gives the number of 
companies included in and excluded from the FTSE4Good Global Index for each 
announcement (i.e. in March and September) year from 2002 to 2007. 
 
The LexisNexis Group database
23
 (a database of newspaper articles and newswire 
stories) was searched for news stories for each company in each sample and then 
confounding events are controlled for by eliminating from the sample those 
companies for which confounding events were found for a period of 5 days prior to 
and after the event-date. The objective was to see whether companies in each sample 
had been subject to any significant confounding events during the event window. A 
confounding event would have been a very big news story involving the company in 
question, for example, declarations of dividends, announcements of an impending 
merger and/or acquisitions, filings of damage suit or strike, announcements of 
earnings. Furthermore, companies whose addition to or deletion from theses indices 
was caused by significant contemporaneous events have been excluded.  That is, if 
they had experienced happenings during a year, such as a: merger, takeover, spin-off 
or they were entered on the secondary line of a company that already existed, then 
they were not included in the analysis. For example, in the additions to the 
FTSE4Good in September, 2002, Henkel Kagg Ord and Telus Corporation A were 
dropped, because they were on the secondary line of the Henkel and Telus 
corporations, respectively. Moreover, if companies were added to or deleted from one 
of the FTSE4Good index review in the same year, they were also excluded from the 
sample. For instance, in the 2003 two companies, Alumina and ConocoPhillips, were 
included in the index in the March review, but they were excluded in the September, 
because they failed to meet the requirements of the newly approved human rights 
criteria. Consequently, of the total initial number of 1,620 observations, 903 were 
used for testing the hypotheses in this study, as indicated by the parentheses in table 9. 
 
 
                                                 
23
 LexisNexis Group: see www.lexis-nexis.com 
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5.2.3 Empirical models 
 
Similar to the empirical approach in chapter 4, a market based valuation approach is 
adopted. However, in this case an event study is employed in addition to accounting 
based valuation as in the last chapter, but with different variables taken from a study 
by Hassel et al. (2005), which is an empirical analogue of Ohlson’s (1995) model. 
That is, these techniques are employed to examine the market reaction to companies 
added to or deleted from the chosen SRI indices.  
 
Event Study 
Event studies have been used from the late 1960’s (Fama, 1970) and are probably the 
most common way to examine how the market responds to new publicly available 
information, such as: regulation announcements, earning announcements, and merger 
or acquisition announcements. Even though this type of study is the best way to 
examine market behaviours and share prices, it can generate different outcomes for 
the same event, depending on how the event date and periods are defined or how the 
normal returns are estimated with the application of the different models. Some 
researchers have reviewed the various approaches employed in event studies, with the 
aim of establishing a rigorous approach that reduces the impact of sensitive issues, 
such as the length of the interval around an event, whilst controlling for market-wide 
influences on stock prices (Bowman, 1983; Brown and Warner, 1980 and 1985; 
Henderson Jr., 1990; MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
In this research, regarding the structure of the event study, Bowman’s (1983) 
approach is adopted, as follows: (i) identify the event of interest and event date; (ii) 
model the normal returns; (iii) estimate excess returns i.e. abnormal returns; (iv) 
aggregate excess returns; and (v) analyze the results. That is these steps are carried out 
in order to examine the market behaviour towards new information. The first task is to 
define the event of interest and to identify the event window, the period over which 
the security prices of the companies in this event will be examined. The events of 
interest in this study are the information content of the announcement of addition to or 
deletion from the FTSE4Good index and the DJSI from the year after the indices were 
launched, 2002 and 2000, respectively, up until to 2007. Thus, the event dates (Day t 
= 0) are the press release days in March and September for the FTSE4Good index and 
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in September for the DJSI. The event window is taken as five days before and after 
the event day (from Day t -5 to Day t+5) and the estimation window, which is used 
for calculating a security’s systematic risk (), is estimated over the 250 days prior to 
Day t-5 . The length of the estimation period used in previous research has varied and 
so the most commonly used of 250 days is adopted here (Binder, 1998; Brown and 
Warner, 1985; Mackinlay, 1997). 
 
In the determination of which methods (e.g. mean adjusted returns, market adjusted 
returns, risk controlled portfolio returns, and market model) are the most suitable for 
calculating the normal returns and to estimate the abnormal returns for the best 
explanatory power in event studies, the market model, the most commonly employed 
model, has been found slightly to outperform the other models (Armitage, 1995; 
Cable and Holland, 1999). In this regard, Armitage (1995) elicited that the market 
model was relatively more powerful than the others available when estimating returns 
in an event study. Moreover, most researchers who have examined the effect of CSR 
on share prices have adapted the market model to measure normal returns in event 
studies (Curran and Moran, 2007; Freedman and Jaggi, 1982; Freedman and Stagliano, 
1991; Hamilton, 1995; Konar and Cohen, 1997; Shane and Spicer, 1983).  Hence, in 
this research the market model is used for measuring the abnormal returns.  
 
The daily security prices are obtained from DataStream from 2000 to 2007 for the 
DJSI and from 2002 to 2007 for the FTSE4Good. From the raw daily share prices the 
logarithmic returns are used to calculate the security returns, because they are more 
likely to be normally distributed than the discrete returns (Strong, 1992). The share 
returns are calculated from the share price using the formula:  
 
        
       
     
                                 
 
where Pit is the price of security i on day t, Pit-1 is the price of security i on Day t-1, 
and Dit is the  dividend paid on the share of security i on Day t. The security’s share 
price is the DataStream price data type P, which the database delivers already 
adjusted for stock splits and other capital events. The model posits a linear 
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relationship between the return on a stock and the market return over a given time 
period as: 
 
                                               
 
where Rit is the return of stock i on Day t, αi is the intercept of the relationship for 
stock i, βi is the slope of the relation for stock i with respect to the market return, Rmt is 
the return on a market index, the FTSE All-World Index or the Dow Jones Global 
Index for Day t, depending on the firm’s membership of the index, and it is the part 
of the return that cannot be explained by market movement and thus captures the 
effect of firm-specific information. The parameters αi and βi are estimated by using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression over the estimation period of 250 daily 
observations before the start of the event window (i.e. Day t-255 to Day t-6). 
 
The abnormal returns (ARit) for firm i on Day t are calculated as the difference 
between the actual security return of firm i and its expected return: 
 
                                                  
 
where the assumed E (it) = 0, and   (it, jt) = 0 i  j 
 
The average abnormal return (          ) can provide information as to whether the event 
is associated with a change in security holder wealth and can also predict the sign of 
the average effect (Kothari and Warner, 2004).  The mean abnormal return (MAR) for 
Day t is calculated as:   
  
          
    
 
 
   
                                       
   
                                 
where N is the number of securities in the event.   
 
To test the statistical significance of the average abnormal return, each mean 
abnormal return ARit is divided by its estimated standard deviation S (        ), which is 
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estimated from the time series of mean excess returns, thereby addressing cross-
sectional dependence. If the average ARit is normal, independent and identically 
distributed, then this test statistic is distributed Student-t with 249 degrees of freedom 
(Brown and Warner, 1980). Brown and Warner (1980) called this method “Crude 
Dependence Adjustment”, because according to this test the standard deviation of the 
Day t average excess return is estimated from the values of the mean excess returns 
over the estimation period. The portfolio t-test explicitly takes into account any 
potential cross-sectional dependence in the security specific excess returns and hence 
this helps to avoid the potential problem of cross-sectional correlation of security 
returns. To test the null hypothesis, which is that the mean abnormal return on the Day 
0 (i.e. event day) is equal to zero, the test statistic TSt  for Day t can be expressed as 
(for more details see Brown and Warner, 1980, p.251-252 ; 1985, p7):  
 
    
        
            
                                      
where 
                                  
    
      
              
       
 
   
         
    
      
                           
  
The number of average abnormal returns can be aggregated over the event period 
(Day t-5, Day t+5) for each security i to investigate whether a security holder’s 
wealth changes around event periods (Kothari and Warner, 2004). The average 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) can be measured for a given time period (t1, t2) as 
follows:  
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The test statistic TSCAR for a period spanning multiple days is derived in a manner 
similar to that for a single day. For the test interval (t1, t2) the test statistic is the ratio 
of the cumulative mean abnormal return to its estimated standard deviation and is 
given by:  
 
       
 
  
   
         
  
    
           
                   
 
where the terms in the denominator are from equation (6) above and k is the number 
of days in the event window.  
 
In addition, a non-parametric statistic is used to test the robustness of the conclusions 
based on parametric testing. This approach usually does not require such stringent 
assumptions concerning the distribution of returns as parametric tests and is regularly 
used in conjunction with its parametric counterparts (Cowan, 1992). Further, it is not 
as sensitive to outliers when compared with parametric testing. Regarding these, 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) pointed out that deleting outlying observations is an 
extreme approach, because outliers may provide an important signal of the existence 
of confounding effects. Hence, for the non-parametric testing the generalized sign test 
proposed by Cowan (1992) is used in this study, which is the the proportion of 
positive to negative returns that exceeds the number expected from the market model. 
 
The number expected is based on the fraction of positive abnormal returns in the 250 
day estimation period for the sample of N security-events, 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
    
    
     
                           
 
   
 
where 
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The test statistic (e.g. Z-statistic) uses the normal approximation of a binomial 
distribution with parameter  . The generalized sign test is as follows: 
   
   
     
            
                           
 
where w is the number of stocks in the event window for which the abnormal return 
(AR) or the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is positive. 
 
Accounting Based Valuation  
As noted earlier, an event study is suitable for testing for immediate market reaction, 
that is, whether investors are aware of a specific event as measured over a short-time 
period.  To test whether membership of these indices is relevant to a firm’s value over 
a long-time period the model used in Hassel et al.’s (2005) study is also used here, 
and the variable non-financial information measures as a dummy variable, for which a 
value of 1 is taken, if a company is added to the SRI index and 0 otherwise.  The 
regression model is as follows: 
 
           
        
       
 
         
   
     
        
                          
 
where the other variables are those presented chapter 4, the variable, BVPSit-1 is the 
book value per share for firm i at the ending of fiscal period t-1. Pit is the price per 
share of firm i at the end of fiscal year t after three months, EPSit is earnings per share 
of firm i at the end of fiscal year, with the exception being the variable indexit, which 
is the SRI index membership status, assigned the value of 1 for the addition to and 0 
for the deletion from the DJSI or the FTSE4Good index for year t.  
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5.3 Empirical analysis and results 
 
5.3.1 Event study 
 
Preliminary test of individual security stock for each index 
Table 10 reports the properties of daily normal returns and abnormal returns for the 
250 day estimation period and 11 day event period for the sample for the DJSI and the 
FTSE4Good, from 2000 to 2007 and 2002 to 2007, respectively. The standard 
deviations indicate the distribution of the returns is highly condensed and close to zero. 
Further, the bulk of the normal and abnormal returns lie to the left (i.e. positively 
skewed) of the mean for the DJSI and to the right (i.e. negatively skewed) of the mean 
for the FTSE4Good index. Moreover, the p-values of skewness and the kurtosis 
normality test are significantly different to zero at the 5% level and this indicates that 
the returns depart from normality. The fraction of positive returns for both the DJSI 
and the FTSE4Good index is over 45% during the estimation and event periods, 
indicating that the positive and negative returns are evenly spread.   
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Table 10. Descriptive statistics of daily returns and abnormal returns for the 
estimated and event periods 
Type of return  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
% Days 
returns>0 
DJSI: estimated period       
Raw return 0.0019 0.0859 41.3430 
(0.0000) 
1905.498 
(0.0000) 
-0.5765 4.6357 47.86% 
Abnormal return 0.0000 0.0835 39.4135 
(0.0000) 
1803.558 
(0.0000) 
-0.5830 4.4373 48.27% 
DJSI: event period       
Raw return 0.0000 0.0705 44.2814 
(0.0000) 
2209.612 
(0.0000) 
-0.2725 3.6565 45.15% 
Abnormal return -0.0009 0.0671 40.2670 
(0.0000) 
1955.010 
(0.0000) 
-0.3049 3.3752 47.21% 
FTSE4Good: estimated period overall      
Raw return 0.0006 0.0217 0.0645 
(0.0000) 
11.0069 
(0.0000) 
-0.3176 0.3013 48.83% 
Abnormal return 0.0000 0.0203 0.0959 
(0.0000) 
11.0658 
(0.0000) 
-0.3006 0.2707 48.46% 
FTSE4Good: event period overall      
Raw return 0.0001 0.0200 -0.2741 
(0.0000) 
8.9507 
(0.0000) 
-0.2259 0.1162 47.39% 
Abnormal return -0.0002 0.0186 -0.1906 
(0.0000) 
11.1708 
(0.0000) 
-0.2365 0.1277 47.09% 
Note: the table reports the mean of 508 stocks for the estimated and event periods of the DJSI from 2000 to 2007 
and the mean of 395 stocks for these periods of the FTSE4Good from 2002 to 2007.  The figures in parentheses 
exhibit the p-value of the skewness and kurtosis normality test conducted by the Stata program at the 5% level. 
The last columns contain the percentage of positive returns for the estimation and event periods over the sample 
test period.  
 
 
Market reaction to SRI index announcements  
Table 11 presents the results of the mean abnormal returns (MARs) for each day 
during the 11 day interval as well as those for total focal period, for inclusion in and 
deletion from the DJSI (panel A) and the FTSE4Good index (panel B), for the periods 
2000 to 2007 and 2002 to 2007, respectively. There were 296 inclusions and 212 
exclusions for the DJSI and 312 inclusions and 83 exclusions for the FTSE4Good 
index over the sample periods and further, as table 9 shows, the number of inclusions 
and exclusions for each index varies by year. The results of the parametric, t-test, and 
the non-parametric, generalized sign z test, following Brown and Warner (1980 and 
1985) and Cowan (1992), respectively, are also reported in table 11. Figure 6 and 7 
and 8  contain graphs of the MARs for inclusion in and deletion from the DJSI and the 
FTSE4Good index for the March and September announcements, respectively, for 
each day in the event window.  
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Regarding the full sample of the DJSI announcements, the results of the parametric 
test in panel A indicate that the MARs are not significant nor are those for the event 
period as a whole throughout the sample period. The one exception being the mean 
return for Day -4 and Day -3 is significantly different from zero at the 10% level.  
Further, in the case of exclusions the MARs during the event period are not 
statistically distinguishable from zero. However, the generalized sign z test provides 
some statistical evidence of market reaction to DJSI announcements. In particular, the 
MARs for Day 0 for the inclusions are negatively statistically significant at the 5%, 
with values of -0.0063 and generalized sign z-statistics of -2.0612. Further, regarding 
post-announcement Day 1 for inclusions and Day 2 for deletions are significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level or better.  
 
Whilst the MAR for the whole 11 day window (Day (-5, 5)), is significant and 
negative for the additions, there is no significant difference from zero for the deletions. 
When considering the MARs results in general, no sustained trend in share prices for 
either good news or bad news, before or after the announcement, can be observed, but 
a temporary effect following the announcement is seen. That is, regarding inclusions, 
for Day 1 a marked rise in MAR occurs and there is slight fall on this day for 
exclusions, with, the former rising from -0.0063 to -0.0035. Moreover, figure 6 
reveals that the pattern of the share price movements for inclusions and exclusions is 
similar before the announcement, indicating some anticipation of it happening. More 
specifically, the MAR for both inclusions and exclusions starts increasing from 
negative territory then fluctuating before the announcement.  However, there is a loss 
of momentum after the announcement. Similar evidence was found by Cheung (2011), 
when investigating US companies being added to or deleted from the DJSI World 
over the period 2002-2008.  
 
When considering the subsamples for the years 2000 to 2007, in panel A of table 11 
the results show that market reaction to the announcement differs substantially over 
the years. In this regard, whilst the parametric test for the MAR is not significantly 
different from zero for inclusions on the announcement day, for the non-parametric 
generalized sign test it is reported that there is some evidence of market reaction on 
that day.  For example, for the event day in the year 2000 the MAR is negatively and 
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significantly different from zero at the 1% level, whilst in the years 2001 and 2002 
these are cases at the 10% level. However, there is no significant evidence for any of 
the other years in the case of deletions from the index on Day 0. With respect to the 
pre-announcement days for the event, in the case of both inclusions in and exclusions 
from the index the results show that there is some expectation of the announcement of 
index constituents changing as they register as significantly different from zero at the 
10% level or better. In the case of the post-announcement period, the results show that 
the MARs for inclusion companies seems to be better than those for excluded ones 
after the announcement of index constituents changing, in: 2002, 2005 and 2007. 
Taken together, the results for the index inclusion stocks for the subsamples over the 
years from 2000 to 2007 provide weak evidence that the announcement has any 
significant impact on stock returns, but the index exclusion stocks are not significantly 
influenced by it.  
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Table 11. Mean abnormal returns (MARs) in the 11 days for companies included and excluded from the indices 
 
Panel A. Inclusions and exclusions from the DJSI over the period 2000 - 2007  
Year Overall 2000 2001 2002 
Event days MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic Sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test 
DJSI inclusion             
Day -5 -0.0036 -0.5211 -0.4327 -0.0049 -0.2494 -0.6425 -0.0037 -0.3942 -0.5416 -0.0028 -0.5300 -1.3047* 
Day -4 0.0092 1.3108* 0.3815 0.0741 3.7397*** -0.0247 0.0028 0.2968 1.2812 -0.0035 -0.6709 -1.3047* 
Day -3 0.0102 1.4546* 0.6142 -0.0060 -0.3038 -0.3336 -0.0037 -0.3920 -0.2812 0.0044 0.8447 1.0805 
Day -2 -0.0030 -0.4294 -0.6654 -0.0016 -0.0803 -1.5692* 0.0005 0.0485 0.7604 -0.0012 -0.2347 -0.1121 
Day -1 -0.0006 -0.0913 0.4979 0.0043 0.2188 0.5931 -0.0001 -0.0061 0.5000 0.0018 0.3467 0.7823 
Day 0 -0.0063 -0.9061 -2.0612** -0.0128 -0.6452 -2.8048*** -0.0109 -1.1614 -1.3229* -0.0034 -0.6428 -1.3047* 
Day 1 -0.0035 -0.4926 -1.8286** 0.0006 0.0311 0.2842 -0.0107 -1.1438 -3.9269*** -0.0030 -0.5646 -0.4102 
Day 2 -0.0020 -0.2907 0.2652 -0.0029 -0.1461 1.2109 -0.0031 -0.3364 -0.5416 0.0007 0.1239 -1.3047* 
Day 3 -0.0028 -0.4068 -0.2001 -0.0093 -0.4690 -0.3336 0.0014 0.1445 1.0208 0.0005 0.0992 -0.4102 
Day 4 -0.0039 -0.5606 -0.0838 -0.0040 -0.2017 0.9020 -0.0111 -1.1874 -1.8437** 0.0025 0.4817 0.4842 
Day 5 -0.0041 -0.5795 -0.8980 -0.0048 -0.2419 -1.8781** -0.0085 -0.9132 1.2812 -0.0020 -0.3864 -2.1991** 
Day (-5,5) -0.0106 -0.4560 -1.5959* 0.0327 0.4981 -1.8781** -0.0471 -1.5210* -2.1041** -0.0060 -0.3417 -1.0065 
DJSI Exclusion             
Day -5 -0.0017 -0.3850 -0.4827 -0.0059 -0.8581 -0.9553 0.0031 0.4290 1.3649 0.0025 0.4644 1.5284* 
Day -4 0.0018 0.4146 1.7163 0.0088 1.2734 2.6633*** 0.0008 0.1137 -0.8712 -0.0056 -1.0478 -2.3150** 
Day -3 0.0021 0.4818 0.2045 0.0021 0.3105 -1.2843* -0.0040 -0.5599 -0.4240 0.0007 0.1321 -0.0730 
Day -2 -0.0009 -0.2010 -0.4827 -0.0031 -0.4480 -1.2843* -0.0019 -0.2674 -0.8712 -0.0001 -0.0123 1.2081 
Day -1 0.0025 0.5761 -1.0324 0.0110 1.6026* -1.9422** 0.0033 0.4525 -0.4240 0.0090 1.6786** 1.8487** 
Day 0 -0.0023 -0.5239 -1.0324 -0.0018 -0.2668 0.0316 0.0027 0.3725 0.9177 -0.0036 -0.6676 -1.0339 
Day 1 -0.0030 -0.6989 -1.0324 -0.0011 -0.1563 -0.6264 -0.0100 -1.3908* -1.3184* -0.0039 -0.7255 0.8878 
Day 2 -0.0025 -0.5726 -1.4447* -0.0063 -0.9082 -0.9553 -0.0054 -0.7453 0.0233 -0.0023 -0.4371 -0.3933 
Day 3 0.0005 0.1113 1.1665 -0.0051 -0.7430 -0.6264 0.0132 1.8257** 1.8121** 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.3933 
Day 4 -0.0032 -0.7386 -0.4827 -0.0030 -0.4401 0.3606 -0.0109 -1.5080* -1.7656** -0.0094 -1.7582** -2.6353*** 
Day 5 -0.0012 -0.2764 -0.0704 -0.0061 -0.8832 -1.6133* 0.0022 0.3070 0.9177 0.0009 0.1667 -0.3933 
Day (-5,5) -0.0078 -0.5466 -0.0704 -0.0105 -0.4575 -0.9553 -0.0070 -0.2928 -0.8712 -0.0119 -0.6663 -0.7136 
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Table 11. (continued) 
Panel A. (continued) 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Event days MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test 
DJSI inclusion                
Day -5 -0.0097 -0.3550 0.0786 0.0038 0.9069 1.4243 -0.0045 -1.2547 -2.3087** -0.0077 -0.1892 1.9305** 0.0006 0.0478 0.8883 
Day -4 -0.0042 -0.1552 -0.3068 0.0011 0.2775 -0.1155 0.0070 1.9740** 2.7661*** -0.0124 -0.3022 -0.6347 -0.0062 -0.4815 -0.9113 
Day -3 -0.0026 -0.0958 0.0786 -0.0001 -0.0258 1.0393 0.0032 0.8837 0.3979 0.1080 2.6412*** 0.0982 0.0003 0.0230 -0.1915 
Day -2 -0.0132 -0.4824 -1.0776 0.0004 0.0909 1.0393 0.0014 0.4046 0.3979 -0.0118 -0.2885 -0.2682 -0.0047 -0.3662 -1.2712 
Day -1 -0.0051 -0.1865 -0.6922 0.0035 0.8522 1.8092** -0.0007 -0.1901 0.0595 -0.0118 -0.2875 -1.3676* -0.0010 -0.0793 -0.5514 
Day 0 -0.0075 -0.2738 0.4641 -0.0006 -0.1428 -1.2703 -0.0017 -0.4838 0.0595 -0.0042 -0.1020 1.1976 -0.0047 -0.3676 -0.1915 
Day 1 -0.0009 -0.0316 0.4641 0.0003 0.0765 0.2695 -0.0013 -0.3602 0.0595 -0.0086 -0.2094 -0.2682 0.0011 0.0846 -0.5514 
Day 2 -0.0014 -0.0494 0.8495 0.0018 0.4328 0.2695 0.0072 2.0124** 1.4128* -0.0127 -0.3118 -0.6347 -0.0066 -0.5177 -0.1915 
Day 3 -0.0040 -0.1480 -0.3068 -0.0049 -1.1800 -1.2703 0.0033 0.9173 -0.2788 -0.0116 -0.2835 0.4647 -0.0026 -0.2061 0.1684 
Day 4 -0.0001 -0.0019 0.0786 -0.0004 -0.1025 0.6544 -0.0022 -0.6287 -0.9554 -0.0150 -0.3680 -1.0012 0.0029 0.2244 1.9680** 
Day 5 -0.0056 -0.2061 -0.3068 0.0028 0.6716 -0.5004 0.0010 0.2942 0.3979 -0.0074 -0.1819 0.4647 -0.0046 -0.3575 0.1684 
Day (-5,5) -0.0543 -0.5987 0.0786 0.0077 0.5600 1.0393 0.0127 1.0760 2.4277*** 0.0048 0.0353 -0.6347 -0.0256 -0.6018 -1.6311* 
DJSI Exclusion                
Day -5 0.0000 0.0023 -0.4589 -0.0122 -0.4544 -1.0290 -0.0050 -0.2533 -2.0228** 0.0096 2.6273*** 1.5199* -0.0066 -1.4765 -1.2213 
Day -4 0.0019 0.3391 1.0811 0.0016 0.0611 -0.5114 0.0021 0.1057 2.6503*** 0.0027 0.7510 1.5199* 0.0027 0.6108 0.1944 
Day -3 0.0143 2.4846*** 0.6961 -0.0049 -0.1823 0.0062 -0.0022 -0.1094 0.9813 0.0041 1.1285 0.1772 0.0054 1.2095 0.6663 
Day -2 0.0015 0.2571 -0.0739 -0.0033 -0.1239 0.5238 -0.0009 -0.0460 -0.3538 0.0070 1.9182** 0.6248 -0.0069 -1.5426* -1.2213 
Day -1 0.0025 0.4308 0.3111 -0.0023 -0.0868 -1.0290 -0.0063 -0.3152 -1.0214 -0.0042 -1.1608 -0.7179 -0.0012 -0.2663 -0.2775 
Day 0 -0.0036 -0.6186 -0.0739 -0.0027 -0.1024 -0.5114 -0.0044 -0.2217 -1.0214 0.0018 0.4966 -0.2703 -0.0036 -0.7960 -0.7494 
Day 1 0.0017 0.2956 1.8511** -0.0108 -0.4025 -1.5466** -0.0025 -0.1239 -1.0214 0.0002 0.0471 -1.1655 -0.0025 -0.5471 -0.7494 
Day 2 0.0030 0.5213 -0.0739 -0.0014 -0.0518 -1.5466** -0.0006 -0.0299 -0.6876 0.0004 0.1081 0.6248 -0.0077 -1.7112** -1.2213 
Day 3 0.0024 0.4175 0.6961 0.0009 0.0318 1.0414 0.0008 0.0414 1.3151* -0.0026 -0.7081 0.1772 -0.0015 -0.3364 -0.2775 
Day 4 0.0009 0.1570 1.0811 -0.0026 -0.0981 0.5238 -0.0039 -0.1966 0.3138 0.0084 2.2972** 1.5199* 0.0007 0.1537 -0.2775 
Day 5 -0.0032 -0.5622 -0.4589 -0.0011 -0.0407 -1.5466** 0.0014 0.0703 1.6489** 0.0005 0.1389 1.0724 -0.0035 -0.7815 0.1944 
Day (-5,5) 0.0214 1.1230 2.2361** -0.0389 -0.4372 -1.0290 -0.0215 -0.3253 0.6476 0.0278 2.3047** 1.5199** -0.0247 -1.6534** -1.2213 
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Table 11. (continued) 
Panel B. Inclusions and exclusions from the FTSE4Good index over the period 2002-2007 
Month/Year March/Overall September/Overall March/2002 September/2002 
Event days MAR t-statistic Sign z test MAR t-statistic Sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test 
FTSE4Good inclusion            
Day -5 -0.0026 -0.7547 -2.3811 -0.0046 -1.1605 -2.5474*** -0.0043 -0.5220 -1.9078** -0.0039 -0.4396 -2.2670** 
Day -4 0.0034 0.9916 0.7241 0.0082 2.0688** 4.9059*** 0.0188 2.2825** 3.6079*** 0.0047 0.5287 0.2352 
Day -3 0.0008 0.2226 -0.5180 0.0041 1.0221 0.5996 -0.0049 -0.5905 -1.2589 0.0081 0.9041 1.0693 
Day -2 -0.0006 -0.1662 -0.5180 -0.0002 -0.0423 -1.0567 0.0058 0.7069 1.0123 -0.0108 -1.2139 -2.6840** 
Day -1 -0.0001 -0.0249 -0.0522 -0.0042 -1.0431 -3.2099*** -0.0101 -1.2225 -2.8811*** -0.0061 -0.6854 -2.6840*** 
Day 0 -0.0027 -0.7628 -1.9153** -0.0002 -0.0564 -2.0505** -0.0057 -0.6855 0.6878 0.0138 1.5472* 1.4863* 
Day 1 0.0053 1.5361 3.0531*** -0.0003 -0.0692 -1.0567 0.0041 0.4915 1.6612** -0.0055 -0.6139 -1.0159 
Day 2 -0.0037 -1.0558 -2.6916*** 0.0045 1.1177 2.0902** 0.0011 0.1357 -0.6100 0.0164 1.8365** 2.3204** 
Day 3 0.0019 0.5517 1.6557** -0.0065 -1.6298 -1.5536** -0.0114 -1.3752* -2.5567*** -0.0153 -1.7163** -2.2670** 
Day 4 0.0028 0.7911 2.4320*** -0.0018 -0.4532 -0.2286 0.0039 0.4763 2.3101** -0.0069 -0.7699 -0.1818 
Day 5 -0.0011 -0.3225 -1.1390 -0.0057 -1.4190* -2.3817*** 0.0044 0.5314 1.0123 -0.0086 -0.9668 -2.2670** 
Day (-5,5) 0.0035 0.3034 1.1899 -0.0066 -0.5020 -1.0567 0.0019 0.0690 -0.6100 -0.0142 -0.4792 -0.1818 
FTSE4Good exclusion            
Day -5 0.0047 1.7088** 0.4094 -0.0028 -0.8395 -0.5786    0.0018 0.1110 0.0000 
Day -4 -0.0049 -1.7595** -2.8813*** 0.0016 0.4686 -0.2834    -0.0015 -0.0967 -1.0000 
Day -3 0.0024 0.8507 0.7384 0.0005 0.1577 0.0118    -0.0097 -0.6075 -1.0000 
Day -2 -0.0025 -0.9030 -0.5778 -0.0052 -1.5402** -2.0545**    -0.0253 -1.5797* -1.0000 
Day -1 -0.0005 -0.1678 -0.2488 -0.0031 -0.9114 -0.5786    -0.0073 -0.4581 -1.0000 
Day 0 -0.0011 -0.4136 0.0803 -0.0048 -1.4126* -2.0545**    -0.0150 -0.9336 -2.000** 
Day 1 0.0009 0.3068 0.0803 0.0022 0.6539 0.8974    0.0035 0.2179 0.0000 
Day 2 0.0015 0.5289 1.0675 0.0042 1.2469 2.9637***    -0.0270 -1.6861** -1.0000 
Day 3 -0.0017 -0.6033 -1.8941** 0.0015 0.4548 0.8974    0.0168 1.0512 -1.0000 
Day 4 0.0055 1.9655** 1.3965* 0.0011 0.3203 1.1926    -0.0061 -0.3776 0.0000 
Day 5 -0.0009 -0.3152 -0.2488 -0.0059 -1.7475** -2.0545**    -0.0261 -1.6259* -2.000** 
Day (-5,5) 0.0033 0.3613 -1.2360 -0.0107 -0.9495 0.0118       -0.0959 -1.8046** -1.0000 
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Table 11. (continued) 
Panel B. (continued) 
Month/Year March/2003 September/2003 March/2004 September/2004 
  MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test 
FTSE4Good Inclusion            
Day -5 -0.0108 -1.4292* -2.0375** -0.0124 -1.5515* -2.8479*** 0.0023 0.2318 0.3171 -0.0058 -0.5764 -2.2948** 
Day -4 -0.0050 -0.6695 -1.6011* 0.0101 1.2596 1.6148* -0.0054 -0.5516 -3.2565*** 0.0120 1.1931 5.0638*** 
Day -3 0.0058 0.7680 0.1449 0.0030 0.3703 -1.1315 0.0076 0.7787 1.9414** 0.0014 0.1368 -0.3136 
Day -2 -0.0033 -0.4374 -0.2916 0.0119 1.4944* 1.9581** -0.0072 -0.7305 -2.6068*** -0.0004 -0.0364 -0.3136 
Day -1 0.0029 0.3904 0.5814 0.0079 0.9838 1.2716 0.0030 0.3060 0.9668 -0.0130 -1.2966* -4.2759*** 
Day 0 0.0041 0.5379 -0.7281 0.0045 0.5591 0.2417 -0.0075 -0.7642 -2.2819** -0.0086 -0.8605 -3.7099*** 
Day 1 0.0051 0.6741 0.1449 0.0118 1.4711* 2.3014** 0.0083 0.8496 3.2409*** -0.0017 -0.1746 -1.7287** 
Day 2 -0.0127 -1.6843 -1.1646 0.0006 0.0740 -0.1016 0.0027 0.2731 0.3171 0.0052 0.5227 1.9506** 
Day 3 0.0052 0.6883 0.5814 -0.0025 -0.3079 2.3014** 0.0100 1.0217 3.2409*** -0.0060 -0.6010 -2.2948** 
Day 4 -0.0055 -0.7340 -1.1646 0.0061 0.7680 1.6148* 0.0058 0.5928 1.2917* -0.0018 -0.1768 -0.5966 
Day 5 0.0045 0.6003 1.0179 -0.0114 -1.4228** -1.1315 -0.0043 -0.4408 -2.2819** -0.0103 -1.0246 -4.5589*** 
Day (-5,5) -0.0098 -0.3906 0.5814 0.0296 1.1150 2.6447*** 0.0154 0.4723 1.9414** -0.0290 -0.8727 -4.5589*** 
FTSE4Good Exclusion            
Day -5 0.0309 0.9463 0.8936 -0.0058 -0.7086 -0.7821 0.0045 0.9437 0.5226 -0.0184 -1.7463** -0.5543 
Day -4 0.0053 0.1611 0.8936 0.0069 0.8462 2.2351** -0.0027 -0.5694 -0.5893 -0.0027 -0.2578 -1.7091** 
Day -3 0.0594 1.8170** 0.8936 -0.0032 -0.3920 -0.1786 0.0035 0.7177 1.0786 0.0051 0.4829 0.6005 
Day -2 -0.0189 -0.5779 -1.1190 -0.0005 -0.0577 -0.1786 -0.0050 -1.0393 -0.5893 -0.0042 -0.3994 -0.5543 
Day -1 -0.0381 -1.1649 -1.1190 -0.0005 -0.0564 -0.1786 -0.0014 -0.2966 0.5226 0.0137 1.2992* -0.5543 
Day 0 0.0138 0.4230 0.8936 -0.0048 -0.5927 -0.1786 -0.0077 -1.6045* -1.1453 0.0026 0.2507 -0.5543 
Day 1 0.0449 1.3744* 0.8936 0.0207 2.5421*** 2.8386*** 0.0008 0.1597 -0.0334 0.0128 1.2122 0.6005 
Day 2 -0.0629 -1.9224** -1.1190 0.0099 1.2159 1.6317* 0.0043 0.8906 1.0786 0.0010 0.0930 0.6005 
Day 3 0.0295 0.9028 0.8936 -0.0066 -0.8137 -0.7821 -0.0016 -0.3278 -0.5893 -0.0080 -0.7596 -0.5543 
Day 4 -0.0146 -0.4461 -1.1190 0.0103 1.2620 1.0283 0.0031 0.6352 1.0786 0.0091 0.8658 1.7553** 
Day 5 0.0195 0.5961 0.8936 -0.0147 -1.8045** -1.9889** 0.0010 0.2069 -0.0334 -0.0045 -0.4224 -0.5543 
Day (-5,5) 0.0690 0.6360 0.8936 0.0117 0.4344 1.0283 -0.0014 -0.0856 -0.0334 0.0065 0.1864 0.6005 
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Table 11. (continued) 
Panel B. (continued) 
Month/Year March/2005 September/2005 March/2006 September/2006 
  MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test 
FTSE4Good Inclusion            
Day -5 0.0000 0.0009 -0.3459 0.0027 0.6303 -0.0951 -0.0039 -0.9310 -1.0486 0.0090 1.5123* 3.0382*** 
Day -4 0.0029 0.4993 1.7414** 0.0128 2.9767*** 3.5229*** 0.0051 1.2297 1.3787* -0.0029 -0.4843 -0.5812 
Day -3 -0.0033 -0.5723 -1.5386 0.0042 0.9787 0.9386 -0.0013 -0.3216 -0.5631 0.0103 1.7346** 2.0041** 
Day -2 0.0014 0.2473 0.8468 -0.0026 -0.6010 -1.1288 0.0031 0.7513 0.4078 0.0010 0.1715 0.4529 
Day -1 0.0031 0.5449 1.4432* -0.0066 -1.5319* -2.1625** 0.0024 0.5758 0.4078 0.0002 0.0362 0.9700 
Day 0 -0.0017 -0.3047 -1.5386* 0.0010 0.2322 -0.6120 -0.0029 -0.6975 -1.0486 -0.0040 -0.6658 -1.0982 
Day 1 0.0049 0.8511 1.4432* -0.0034 -0.7982 -1.1288 0.0058 1.3896* 0.4078 0.0017 0.2933 0.4529 
Day 2 -0.0074 -1.2947* -2.1349** -0.0012 -0.2710 -0.6120 -0.0076 -1.8333** -2.0195** -0.0054 -0.9176 -0.0641 
Day 3 0.0052 0.9083 1.7414** -0.0024 -0.5532 0.4218 0.0003 0.0692 0.4078 -0.0097 -1.6412* -2.1323** 
Day 4 0.0016 0.2782 0.5486 0.0075 1.7394** 0.4218 0.0036 0.8604 0.8932 -0.0003 -0.0560 -0.5812 
Day 5 -0.0034 -0.5893 -0.9422 0.0076 1.7699** 2.4892*** -0.0001 -0.0286 -0.0777 0.0016 0.2725 1.4870* 
Day (-5,5) 0.0033 0.1716 -0.0477 0.0197 1.3785* 1.4555* 0.0044 0.3208 1.3787* 0.0015 0.0771 1.4870* 
FTSE4Good Exclusion            
Day -5 0.0123 2.4570 -0.6394 0.0030 0.6109 0.5562 0.0023 0.4017 0.4108 0.0028 0.4729 0.9418 
Day -4 -0.0050 -0.9925 -1.3467* -0.0031 -0.6391 -0.7808 -0.0070 -1.2493 -2.9236*** -0.0009 -0.1479 -1.5108** 
Day -3 -0.0050 -0.9947 -0.6394 -0.0030 -0.6057 -0.7808 -0.0001 -0.0094 -0.2561 -0.0038 -0.6445 -1.5108** 
Day -2 0.0079 1.5726* 1.4825* -0.0003 -0.0667 -2.1178** -0.0028 -0.4983 -0.2561 -0.0050 -0.8473 -0.6933 
Day -1 -0.0013 -0.2624 -1.3467* -0.0016 -0.3375 1.2247 0.0072 1.2816 1.0777 0.0034 0.5689 1.7594** 
Day 0 0.0039 0.7811 0.7752 -0.0058 -1.1830 -2.1178** 0.0044 0.7822 1.0777 0.0057 0.9675 0.9418 
Day 1 0.0025 0.4984 0.7752 -0.0059 -1.2170 -1.4493* -0.0066 -1.1776 -0.9230 0.0077 1.2932* 0.9418 
Day 2 0.0001 0.0232 -0.6394 0.0004 0.0900 -0.1123 0.0079 1.3996* 1.7446** 0.0125 2.1174** 2.5769*** 
Day 3 -0.0039 -0.7874 -2.0540 0.0054 1.1139 1.2247 0.0026 0.4652 -0.2561 -0.0009 -0.1505 0.1243 
Day 4 0.0052 1.0406 0.7752 0.0026 0.5275 0.5562 0.0136 2.4161*** 1.0777 0.0056 0.9408 1.7594** 
Day 5 -0.0033 -0.6601 0.0679 -0.0082 -1.6868** -2.1178** -0.0023 -0.4072 -0.2561 -0.0054 -0.9131 0.1243 
Day (-5,5) 0.0134 0.8068 0.0679 -0.0165 -1.0232 -1.4493* 0.0192 1.0265 -0.9230 0.0217 1.1027 1.7594** 
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Table 11. (continued) 
Panel B. (continued) 
Month/Year March/2007 September/2007 
  MAR t-statistic sign z test MAR t-statistic sign z test 
FTSE4Good Inclusion      
Day -5 -0.0095 -1.3029* -1.8477** -0.0055 -0.4829 0.5129 
Day -4 -0.0068 -0.9386 -1.0917 0.0006 0.0489 0.5129 
Day -3 0.0103 1.4170* 0.4204 0.0024 0.2128 -0.1549 
Day -2 -0.0133 -1.8316** -1.0917 -0.0155 -1.3548* -2.1585** 
Day -1 0.0018 0.2434 -1.0917 0.0014 0.1186 0.5129 
Day 0 0.0146 2.0050** 1.1764 -0.0029 -0.2557 -0.1549 
Day 1 -0.0011 -0.1577 -1.0917 -0.0223 -1.9462** -2.1585** 
Day 2 -0.0035 -0.4772 -1.8477** 0.0101 0.8783 1.1808 
Day 3 0.0031 0.4291 0.4204 -0.0032 -0.2819 0.5129 
Day 4 0.0100 1.3764* 2.6884*** -0.0370 -3.2278*** -2.1585** 
Day 5 -0.0186 -2.5549*** -1.8477** 0.0149 1.2987* 1.8486** 
Day (-5,5) -0.0130 -0.5403 -0.3357 -0.0573 -1.5052* -2.1585** 
FTSE4Good Exclusion      
Day -5 -0.0055 -0.9592 0.1210 -0.0048 -0.6770 -1.2042 
Day -4 -0.0079 -1.3680* -1.5140* 0.0034 0.4844 0.4621 
Day -3 0.0039 0.6773 0.9385 0.0102 1.4346* 2.1284** 
Day -2 -0.0078 -1.3481* -1.5140* -0.0068 -0.9485 -0.6487 
Day -1 -0.0025 -0.4347 -0.6965 -0.0119 -1.6649** -2.3150** 
Day 0 -0.0045 -0.7792 -0.6965 -0.0075 -1.0536 -1.2042 
Day 1 0.0027 0.4712 0.1210 -0.0131 -1.8457** -0.6487 
Day 2 -0.0017 -0.2991 0.1210 0.0086 1.2020 2.6838** 
Day 3 -0.0105 -1.8216** -1.5140* 0.0044 0.6148 2.1284** 
Day 4 0.0021 0.3652 0.1210 -0.0095 -1.3284* -1.2042 
Day 5 -0.0030 -0.5121 -0.6965 0.0087 1.2262 1.0175 
Day (-5,5) -0.0347 -1.8116** -2.3315*** -0.0182 -0.7708 -0.6487 
Note: The table presents the results for the total sample and the subsamples in each year. The event days refers to the days in the event window, where Day 0 is the announcement day of index composition, and Day (-5, 5) is the cumulated 
mean abnormal returns for 11 day which is from Day-5 to Day 5. The t-statistic values are calculated as in Brown and Warner (1980 and 1985), whilst the generalized sign statistic values are calculated as in Cowan (1992).The DJSI sample 
consists of 296 index inclusion and 212 index exclusion stocks and the FTSE4Good consists of 312 index inclusion and 83 index exclusion stocks. The two-tail t-test and z-test are used to test the statistical significance of the abnormal 
returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). Superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Figure 6. The mean abnormal returns (MARs) for inclusion and deletion from the DJSI 
from 2000 to 2007. 
 
 
Figure 7. The mean abnormal returns (MARs) for inclusion and deletion in March from 
the FTSE4Good index from 2002 to 2007. 
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Figure 8. The mean abnormal returns (MARs) for inclusion and deletion in September 
from the FTSE4Good index from 2002 to 2007. 
 
 
Panel B of table 11 presents the results for the mean abnormal returns (MARs) around 
the event days for addition to and deletion from FTSE4Good index over the period 
2002 to 2007, for both the March and September announcements. In the case of 
inclusions in March, the non-parametric generalized sign z test, reports some 
statistical evidence in relation to index composition changes, with, for example, the 
return for the announcement day (i.e. Day 0) being negatively significant at the 5% 
level and the MAR registering -0.0027 with a generalized sign z-statistic of -1.9153.  
Further, the results for index membership in March show that the MARs are 
statistically significant on the post announcement days from Day 1 to Day 4, thus 
suggesting that market participants may have some expectation regarding inclusion 
announcements, but this is only temporary.  In the case of exclusions, from 2003 to 
2007 (company data for 2002 is unavailable) the MAR is insignificant on the 
announcement day, whereas other Days in the event window report these as 
statistically significant at the 10% significant level or better. Figure 7 graphically 
shows the behaviour of MARs for the event days from Day -5 to Day 5 and further, it 
shows they move in an opposite pattern before the announcement, whilst the MARs 
movements for inclusion show more volatility than for exclusion, post-announcement. 
Further, it is notable that the results indicate that market participants do not seem to be 
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affected by unfavourable news. For example, the MARs on the day of announcement 
is insignificant and subsequently actually increased until Day 2.    
 
The September announcement day MARs for inclusions is significantly different from 
zero at the level 5%, and significance is also found for a number of the other event 
days (i.e. Day -5, -4, -1, 2, 3 and 5). For instance, these values are significantly 
positive for Day -4 and significantly negative for other event Days at the 10% 
significance level or better. In the outcomes for exclusions, the MARs on Day 0 is 
also significantly different from zero at the level 5%.  More specifically, when 
considering the two statistical treatments, the MARs is -0.0048 with t-statistic value 
of -1.4126 and there is a generalized sign test value of -2.0545 on the announcement 
day. Further, it is significantly negative for Days -2 and 5, and significantly positive 
for Day 2.  
 
The trend in share price for inclusion in the FTSE4Good index in September, around 
the announcement day, clearly shows that the share price increases, with this good 
news, but as with the DJSI and the FTSE4Good in March this effect is only temporary. 
That is, on announcement day the stock return for inclusions shows a significant 
increase, with the MAR values changing from -0.0042 to -0.0002 between Day-1 and 
Day 0, but subsequently levels off until eventually decreasing significantly on Day 5. 
Regarding exclusions in September, there would appear to be anticipation of bad news 
as the MAR drops on the day of the announcement from -0.0031 to -0.0048 between 
Day -1 and Day 0, but it bounces back immediately after this. The magnitude of these 
share price movements is illustrated in figure 8, where the difference in the trend of 
share prices for inclusion and exclusion stocks can clearly be seen. That is, the share 
price starts from negative territory for both inclusions and exclusions, followed by a 
mirrored up and down movement until the announcement day, but after this the 
inclusions are more volatile than the exclusions, which remain in positive territory 
until day 4. Subsequent to the announcement day, inclusion share price movements 
are in negative territory except Day 2, whereas exclusion stocks are positive until Day 
4. Unlike the trend of MARs movements in figure 8, that in figure 7, the FTSE4Good 
index announcement in March, suggests that the market is not particularly sensitive to 
an exclusion announcement, that is, the share price increases from Day 0 until Day 2 
and then diminishes. Further, the market reaction for addition announcements is 
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similar to that in the case in DJSI, but the movements are more volatile. Taking the 
results in panel B of table 11 together with those depicted in figure 7 and  8, they 
would appear to show that the announcement of index composition changing conveys 
new information to the market, for there is a significant but temporary price impact 
for index inclusion stocks. However, the outcomes for exclusions would seem to 
indicate that these do not have this affect on the market. 
 
Market reaction to the FTSE4Good announcement of the index’s constituents 
changing differs substantially across the years.  In relation to inclusions in March, the 
subsamples for the years 2004, 2005, and 2007 in panel B of table 11 show that the 
announcement day MARs are significantly different from zero at the 10% level or 
better, positively or negatively. Comparing the behaviour of the MARs from Day -1 to 
Day 1 among these results except 2007, the trend of share price movements is to drop 
on the day of announcement and then increase on Day 1, indicating that the new 
information is not recognized immediately in the market. Moving on to inclusion in 
September, the MARs for the years 2002 and 2004 report that they are significant at 
the 10% and 5% level, respectively, with actual figures being 0.0138 and -0.0086, 
also respectively. Moreover, the significant level for 2002 presents in the t-statistic 
(1.5472) and the generalized sign z (1.4863) test, respectively, whilst it show in  
-0.8605 and -3.7099, respectively for 2004.  
 
In relation to exclusions in March, the MARs for the year 2004 are negatively 
significantly different from zero at 10% level. In addition, these movements are 
temporary and further, the value in March 2004 (-0.0077) is very close with that in 
inclusion case (-0.0075). Next, regarding the cases of exclusions in September, the 
MARs for the years 2002 and 2005 are negatively significant. The results from the 
pre-announcement and post-announcement day periods by yearly subsample are 
mixed, with some years showing strong significant effects at the 1% level, but others 
being insignificant. 
 
In general, the results from the event study have elicited the differences in share price 
movements around the time of announcements regarding changes in the composition 
of the DJSI and the FTSE4Good, in both March and September for the latter. For 
example, on the day of the DJSI announcement it has emerged that both included and 
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excluded companies experience a significant decrease in stock returns, but regarding 
the former this reverses immediately after, whereas for the latter there is little change 
for the most of the remainder of the event interval. However, in the cases of the 
FTSE4Good index announcements in both March and September, being added to 
and/or deleted from the index results in a statistically significant but much more 
random movement of share price, when compared to the DJSI results. Further, the 
evidence regarding FTSE4Good index change in March and September indicates that 
the market participants are more concerned with the latter announcements than the 
former. In other words, it suggests that there is some expectation of the announcement 
of index constituents changing in September as they register as significantly different 
from zero at the 1% level on Day -1 and at the 5% level on Day 0. This evidence from 
the FTSE4Good index is inconsistent with the earlier findings reported by Curran and 
Moran (2007), suggesting that there is insignificant market reaction to the 
announcements. 
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Table11-1. The average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for addition to and 
deletion from SRI indices in small event windows 
 
DJSI   FTSE4Good 
 Month September   March September 
Window  CAR t-statistics sign z test   CAR t-statistics sign z test CAR t-statistics sign z test 
Inclusion 
          
CAR (-1, 0) -0.0070 -0.7053 -0.5297 
 
-0.0027 -0.5570 -1.6108* -0.0044 -0.7775 1.6677** 
CAR  (0, 1) -0.0053 -0.8647 0.7751 
 
-0.0003 -0.0756 -1.2826* -0.0005 -0.0888 0.7308 
CAR (-1, 1) -0.0104 -0.8603 -1.2196 
 
0.0026 0.4321 -1.0764 -0.0047 -0.6747 1.7079** 
CAR (0, 2) -0.0118 -0.9754 -1.9583** 
 
-0.0010 -0.1631 -0.8075 0.0040 0.5728 1.4210* 
           
Exclusion 
          
CAR (-1, 0) 0.0002 0.0369 1.8441** 
 
-0.0016 -0.4111 -1.2826* -0.0079 -1.6433* -3.1142*** 
CAR (0, 1) -0.0053 -0.8647 0.7751 
 
-0.0003 -0.0756 -1.2826* -0.0026 -0.5365 -3.3229*** 
CAR (-1, 1) -0.0028 -0.3734 1.7031** 
 
-0.0008 -0.1586 -1.5708* -0.0057 -0.9642 -3.7289*** 
CAR (0, 2) -0.0077 -1.0366 0.6716   0.0012 0.2436 -1.5708* 0.0017 0.2819 -3.3881*** 
Note: Superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. The average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for inclusion and deletion 
from the DJSI from 2000 to 2007. 
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Figure 10. The average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for inclusion and deletion 
in March from the FTSE4Good index from 2002 to 2007. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for inclusion and deletion 
in September from the FTSE4Good index from 2002 to 2007. 
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To investigate whether there exists a trend in the announcement of membership of 
SRI indices in the event window, further analysis has been conducted on small 
windows (event days) using average cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), the results 
of which are presented in table 11-1. Further, the time-series behaviours of average 
CARs in the event window (are illustrated in figures 9, 10, and 11. Table 11-1 shows 
that the average CARs are negatively significant in the CAR (0, 2) window for the 
DJSI index inclusion, whereas they are positively significant in the CAR (-1, 0) and 
CAR (-1, 1) windows for exclusion stocks.  The analysis of the behaviours of CSRs 
for the DJSI announcement, figure 9, suggests that they do not have a different trend 
regarding the inclusion in or exclusion from the index.  
 
In the case of the FTSE4Good index, the average CARs for the March and September 
exclusion announcements are negatively significantly related at 10% level or better. 
Whilst the average CARs in the March inclusion announcement are negatively 
significant at the 10% level for CAR (-1, 0) and CAR (0, 1),  those in September are 
positively related at the 10% level or better  for  CAR(-1,0), (-1,1) and (0, 2). This 
would appear to indicate that the September announcement has more impact on 
companies’ stock prices than the March one. In general, unlike the trend of the CARs 
movement in figure 10, the findings in figure 11 suggest that the market is sensitive to 
the index membership announcement although the trend is diminished. 
 
Taken as whole, Hypothesis 4a, which states that announcement of firms being 
included in an SRI index is associated with significant and positive share price change 
for those firms cannot be rejected in the cases of September announcements in 
FTSR4Good index. Further, Hypothesis 4b, stating that announcements of firms being 
deleted from the index are associated with significant and negative share price 
changes for those firms, cannot be rejected in the FTSE4Good index changing in 
September.  The next section analyses whether the badge of index membership has 
value relevance or not, that is, whether investors can be expected increased future 
earnings from having it.   
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5.3.2 Accounting based measurement: value relevance of SRI index membership 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Descriptive statistics were calculated for the dependent and independent variables in 
order to obtain an overview of the nature of data to be analysed and the results are 
presented in table12. The outliers lying at an abnormal distance from other values that 
would distort the results were eliminated when calculating these statistics by using a 
graphical method: leverage versus squared residual plot. Further, all of these variables 
except index, a binary variable, are scaled by the closing book value per share for the 
period t-1 (i.e. BVPSi, t-1). Note that the number of observations reported in this 
section is not equal to the sample sizes in the event study, because of the exclusion of 
outliers and missing accounting performance data from DataStream.  
 
Panel A of table 12 provides the descriptive statistics results for 704 observations for 
the DJSI over the period 2000 to 2007 and 549 observations for the FTSE4Good 
index from 2002 to 2007. For the sample firms, the market value for the DJSI is on 
average 3.5 higher than the book value and that for the FTSE4Good index is 2.9 
higher, suggesting that firms included in the DJSI have a higher market value than 
those in the FTSE4Good index. Further, the median of the MVi,t /BVPSi,t-1 for both 
indices is less than the mean, being 2.4998 and 3.5177 for the DJSI, respectively and 
2.2211 and 2.9256 for FTSE4Good index, indicating that the sample distribution is 
heavily concentrated on the left of the mean figure and that there are relatively few 
high values. In fact, the actual measures for skewness for each index are 2.6326 for 
the DJSI and 2.6212 for the FTSE4Good. However, the means and medians of EPSi,t / 
BVPSi,t-1 for both the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index are very close and negatively 
skewed, with skewness values of -0.2537 and -1.0614, respectively.  
 
Panel B of table 12 shows the parametric (Pearson) and non-parametric (Spearman) 
correlation relationships between the chosen variables for the DJSI and the 
FTSE4Good index over the sampled period.  The statistics show that MVi,t /BVPSi,t-1 is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level for the parametric and non-parametric 
tests when correlated with inversed book value, 1/BVPSi,t-1, and earnings, EPSi,t 
/BVPSi,t-1, for both the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index. However, the MVi,t /BVPSi,t-1 
is not significantly related to the dummy index variable, defined as a binary variable 
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which is assigned the value 1 if firms are included in an SRI index and 0 otherwise, 
with the exception being the Spearman correlation analysis for the DJSI, with a value 
of 0.0874 at the 5% level. The inversed book value, 1/BVPSi, t-1, is strongly related to 
earnings, EPSi,t /BVPSi,t-1, at the 1% level for the DJSI (0.1243) and the FTSE4Good 
(0.1507) index in the Pearson correlation test, but it is significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level for the DJSI (0.1187),  in the Spearman test. It should be noted that the 
correlation analysis between the indices and 1/BVPSi,t-1 and EPSi,t /BVPSi,t-1 provides 
different results for the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index. That is, in the case of the 
parametric test for the DJSI, the index is negative and insignificantly related to 
1/BVPSi,t-1 (-0.0092), but positively and significantly related to EPSi,t /BVPSi,t-1 
(0.0767), at the 5% level. Whilst in the case of the FTSE4Good index, it is 
significantly related to 1/BVPSi,t-1 (0.1330) at the 1% level, but negatively and 
insignificantly related to EPSi,t /BVPSi,t-1 (-0.0060). This suggests that firms in the 
DJSI are positively associated with book value and profitability, whilst those in the 
FTSE4Good index are negatively associated with these two factors. The correlation 
matrix outcomes do not indicate the existence of any serious multicollinearity 
problems as no value of the variance inflation factor (VIF) is greater than 10. Next, to 
provide a more comprehensive analysis of the value relevance of SRI index 
membership, multiple regression analysis is conducted for the DJSI and the 
FTSE4Good index. 
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Table 12. Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A. All companies in the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index 
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
DJSI        
MVi,t / BVPSi,t-1  3.5177 2.4998 3.4746 -4.6970 26.0490 2.6326 12.0294 
1/  BVPSi,t-1 0.3126 0.1459 0.6351 -1.6556 8.6957 6.9699 69.9719 
EPSi,t / BVPSi,t-1  0.1393 0.1321 0.2148 -1.3038 1.4790 -0.2537 11.7346 
FTSE4Good        
MVi,t / BVPSi,t-1  2.9256 2.2211 2.5532 -0.9688 17.1785 2.6212 11.1490 
1/  BVPSi,t-1 0.2678 0.1377 0.4470 -0.0548 5.8140 6.9190 73.1375 
EPSi,t / BVPSi,t-1  0.1173 0.1121 0.1722 -1.1403 0.8619 -1.0614 13.2746 
Panel B. Correlation Analysis 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
DJSI     
1. MVi,t / BVPSi,t-1 1   0.3115*** 0.5943*** 0.0874** 
2. 1/ BVPSi,t-1 0.3294***    1 0.1187*** 0.0128 
3. EPSi,t / BVPSi,t-1 0.5106***    0.1243***   1 0.0840** 
4. Index_DJSI 0.0431   -0.0092   0.0767**   1 
FTSE4Good     
1. MVi,t / BVPSi,t-1 1 0.1828*** 0.7081*** -0.0596 
2. 1/ BVPSi,t-1 0.3173***   1 0.0307 0.1992*** 
3. EPSi,t / BVPSi,t-1 0.5546***   0.1507***   1 -0.1255*** 
4. Index_FTSE4Good 0.0359   0.1330***  -0.0060   1 
Note: market value (MVit) is cum-dividend market value, which is three months after fiscal year-end share price plus dividend per share for the period t. Book value per share (BVPSi, t-1) is firm i’s book value per 
share for the period t-1 and earnings per share (EPSi,t) is firm i’s earnings per share for fiscal period-end t. These variables are scaled by the ending of book value per share (BVPSit-1).  The index is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if company i is included in the SRI index in year t and otherwise 0. Superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Pearson and 
Spearman correlation estimates (i.e. the top right half of correlation matrix above the main diagonal) are presented in the parentheses in panel B.  The sample after dropping outliers comprises 704 observations 
drawn from 2000 to 2007 for the DJSI and 549 observations drawn from 2002 to 2007 for the FTSE4Good index.  
 
 
 
 173 
 
Regression analysis 
The purpose of this analysis is to test whether SRI index membership is relevant to 
company market value.  In this regard, the financial statement information, book value 
and earnings per share explicated in model 3, were expected to be positively related to 
the market value, Pi,t +DPSi,t . Whilst a few studies have investigated whether the 
announcement of inclusions in or exclusions from SRI indices conveys new 
information, there is not much empirical evidence on whether this has a statistically 
significant positive or negative effect on the firm value. Hence, in this part of the 
thesis the analytical testing is aimed at addressing this gap in the literature. Panel A of 
table 13 provides the regression results for model 3, using the DJSI for the period 
2000 to 2007, whereas panel B shows the same for the FTSE4Good index for the 
period 2002 to 2007. The second and third columns show the results for the earnings 
and the earnings plus SRI index status regressions, for the whole sample, respectively.  
The remainder of panels A and B contain the outcomes for the latter for the yearly 
subsamples. 
 
The results presented in panel A of table 13, relating to the DJSI, show that the 
coefficients for the earnings and book values are substantially greater than zero 
(7.7150 and 1.4779, respectively) at the 1% significance level, which is consistent 
with prior studies (e.g. Hassel et al., 2005; Kallapur and Kwan, 2004; Schadewitz and 
Niskala, 2010). Moreover, the adjusted R
2
 equals 33.06% and the F-statistic is 
significant (i.e. p-value is 0.0000). Adding the DJSI status variable slightly decreases 
the adjusted R
2
 (32.98%), whilst the F-statistic is still significant (p-value 0.0000). 
Further, DJSI membership is positive but insignificantly different from zero, 
indicating that its status for the inclusions or exclusions does not provide significant 
incremental value to the firm. That is, this suggests that there is no difference in a 
firm’s value in relation to being included in or removed from the DJSI, which 
corresponds with the findings of Moneva and Ortas (2008).  
 
Moreover, when considering the yearly subsamples, the results also indicate that there 
are no differences between companies that are included in the DJSI and those that are 
not, with the exceptions being years: 2001, 2005 and 2006. Although the figures for 
the years 2003 and 2007 are not significant, the adjusted R
2
 fell substantially to 13.6 % 
and 26.53%, respectively, after adding the index variable and further, the coefficients 
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of this variable are negatively related to firm value (-0.62 and -0.4155, respectively). 
For the year 2001, the evidence suggests that there is a weak significant relationship 
between DJSI membership and firm value, with the coefficient of the index being 
different from zero (1.0572) at the 10% level. Moreover, the results for 2005 show 
that the companies being included in the DJSI had higher market value than those 
being removed, but those for 2006 show a marked contrast. In this regard, the 
coefficients of the index membership variable for the 2005 and 2006 regressions are 
substantially different from zero in opposite directions, standing at 0.9797 and  
-2.2344 at the 5% significance level, respectively.  
 
Panel B in table 13 provides the results of the regressions after changing the SRI 
index status measure to that of the FTSE4Good for the period 2002 to 2007. Using the 
same treatment, earnings and book values remain significantly greater than zero at the 
1% level and the index variable still shows that there is no difference in market value 
between those companies being included in the FTSE4Good and those being removed 
from it. Further, as with the DJSI, the adjusted R
2
 slightly decreases from 36.11% to 
36%. The F-statistics are significant whether the index status variable is included or 
not. However, in contrast to the DJSI findings, the results from the subsamples of 
individual years report no significant difference between companies being added to or 
excluded from the FTSE4Good index, which is consistent with the findings of Curran 
and Moran (2007) for their event study. 
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Table 13. Valuation model regression results 
 
Panel A. Regression for the DJSI, 2000 – 2007 
  A B 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1/ BVPSi,t-1 1.4779*** 
(4.71) 
1.4788*** 
(4.70) 
0.5573 
(0.79) 
1.2816*** 
(3.52) 
2.8318** 
(2.96) 
1.0918* 
(1.89) 
1.1879 
(0.55) 
1.6164*** 
(3.02) 
1.8543*** 
(3.86) 
1.6312 
(1.21) 
EPSi,t / BVPSi,t-1 7.7150*** 
(6.46) 
7.7034*** 
(6.38) 
11.7530*** 
(4.86) 
6.0948* 
(1.96) 
5.8686** 
(3.26) 
3.5813** 
(2.45) 
13.8270*** 
(3.70) 
10.1826** 
(2.47) 
9.3308** 
(2.48) 
9.6611** 
(2.51) 
Index_djsi 
 
0.0638 
(0.28) 
0.1774 
(0.34) 
1.0572* 
(1.66) 
0.1994 
(0.51) 
-0.6200 
(-1.06) 
0.4804 
(0.57) 
0.9797** 
(2.17) 
-2.2344** 
(-2.21) 
-0.4155 
(-0.57) 
_cons 
 1.9809*** 
(11.81) 
1.9447*** 
(10.26) 
1.3750*** 
(2.87) 
1.4154*** 
(4.04) 
1.3550*** 
(4.35) 
3.0195*** 
(5.88) 
0.8979 
(1.06) 
0.8092 
(1.45) 
3.5056*** 
(4.03) 
1.8886** 
(2.42) 
N 704 704 115 127 109 76 47 93 71 66 
Adj. R2 0.3306 0.3298 0.2956 0.3309 0.4834 0.136 0.4168 0.4148 0.4588 0.2653 
F value 48.7031*** 33.2477*** 8.2761*** 25.6271*** 8.8322*** 3.214** 5.2259*** 14.1092*** 63.4087*** 3.526** 
Panel B. Regression for the FTSE4Good index, 2002 – 2007   
  A B 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007   
1/ BVPSi,t-1 
1.3660*** 
(6.2) 
1.3602*** 
(6.13) 
0.7967 
(1.29) 
1.1910*** 
(4.96) 
1.3906 
(1.62) 
1.0340*** 
(2.98) 
2.8395** 
(2.02) 
1.0287 
(0.56) 
  
  
EPSi,t / BVPSi,t-1 
7.6864*** 
(7.23) 
7.6893*** 
(7.21) 
2.8008*** 
(2.66) 
6.1892** 
(2.29) 
8.4617*** 
(3.69) 
14.3286*** 
(6.15) 
8.4873*** 
(2.81) 
10.1504*** 
(3.98) 
  
  
Index_ftse4good 
 
0.0434 
(0.25) 
0.3453 
(0.80) 
-0.2774 
(-0.45) 
0.3158 
(1.06) 
0.2300 
(0.58) 
0.2466 
(0.60) 
0.3943 
(0.76) 
  
  
_cons 
1.6584*** 
(12.26) 
1.6272*** 
(8.41) 
1.2640*** 
(3.00) 
1.9953*** 
(3.28) 
1.0094** 
(2.30) 
0.6129 
(1.36) 
1.4121** 
(2.23) 
1.5273*** 
(3.72) 
  
  
N 549 549 85 91 135 104 66 68   
Adj. R2 0.3611 0.36 0.211 0.2613 0.2297 0.6062 0.2811 0.4245   
F value 57.538*** 39.576*** 2.8232** 16.2869*** 5.2625*** 37.2633*** 4.5471*** 8.4373***   
Note:  market value (MVit) is cum-dividend market value, which is the three months after fiscal year-end share price plus dividend per share for the period t. Book value per share (BVPSi,t-1) is firm i’s book value 
per share for the period t-1, and earnings per share (EPSi,t) is firm i’s earnings per share for fiscal period-end t. The index is defined as members of the DJSI or the FTSE4Good are assigned a 1, otherwise 0. 
Superscripts *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics (in parentheses) were estimated using White’s heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error in the 
regression.  Sample size varies depending on the model and each model is checked for outliers each time by a graph. A total of 704 observations for the DJSI over the period from 2000 to 2007 and 549 for the 
FTSE4Good index from 2002 to 2007, were employed. 
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Taken together, these results lead to the conclusion that the null hypothesis, which is 
that SRI index membership is not relevant to the firm value, cannot be rejected. That 
is, the fifth hypothesis which states that membership of SRI indices is relevant non-
financial information that has an impact on the market values of firms cannot be 
accepted owing to the results being statistically insignificant.  
 
5.4 Discussion  
 
SRI index membership could be an important part of brand-marketing by signalling 
sustainability leadership as well as having a positive effect on a firm’s reputation. In 
this respect, some scholars have investigated these matters (Cho et al., 2012; Collison 
et al., 2009; Robinson et al., 2011) and reported that companies with good corporate 
responsibility standards are better able to attract stakeholders and hence, increase the 
value of the firm. The DJSI committee itself has pointed out that there are now more 
than 60 DJSI licenses held by asset managers worldwide, with an estimated value of 
these funds standing at around 8 billion USD, thus indicating the importance of this 
index to investors. Further, in the 10 years of impact and investment reports issued by 
the FTSE4Good index, these state that the total return on investment for its Global 
Index has been an impressively high 52.3% since its launch in 2001. 
  
However, in the context of the SRI index membership status investigation, the 
findings cannot strongly support the assertion that firms with index membership 
experience an increase in their value. That is, the results indicate that companies are 
not always rewarded for being included in SRI indices nor are they penalized for 
being excluded from the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index in the March announcement, 
but they are if are ejected from the FTSE4Good index in the September 
announcement. However, its effects are temporary for both the SRI indices. These 
findings are not corroborated by similar studies that tested the DJSI (Cheung, 2011; 
Robinson et al., 2011) and FTSE4Good index announcement effects (Curran and 
Moran, 2007). This inconsistency may be due to the background noise of other events 
that have not been identified. In addition, investors who watch companies in SRI 
indices may still pay more attention to straightforward financial information when 
making investment decisions, rather than the CSR effects (Curran and Moran, 2007). 
However, the empirical evidence in this research indicates that the markets make 
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adjustments during the event window, thus suggesting that SRI index information is 
moderately useful to financial decision markers. More specifically, the results for the 
impact of the announcement of inclusion in the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index in 
March, as measured by the change in mean abnormal returns, are weakly significant, 
but opposite to what was expected regarding a firm’s inclusion in SRI indices. That is, 
being added to the DJSI and the FTSE4Good index has a slightly negative impact, but 
both effects are temporary. However, the outcomes for the announcement of inclusion 
in the FTSE4Good index in September show that the share prices are increased on the 
event day, but the effect also is temporary. With regards to deletion from the indices, 
both produced negative outcomes and in the case of the FTSE4Good index in 
September this was significant, whereas for the latter’s March announcement this was 
not so. This short term market reaction for inclusions indicates that investors do not 
consider this to be a key part of their information portfolio when making decisions. 
This could be because they have access already to reputational information regarding 
companies that have been built up over a number of years and hence, index 
membership does not significantly have an impact on their behaviour. In addition, in 
relation to the volatility of MARs for a firm’s exclusion after announcement day this 
might relate to the wider qualification for the DJSI than for the FTSE4Good index. 
That is, the former is a sustainability index that does not restrict a company operating 
in unethical industries, such as weaponry, nuclear power, alcohol and so on and as 
such industries entertain high risk it could well be that their deletion from the index 
provokes a stronger and slightly longer negative reaction than being ejected from the 
much narrower FTSE4Good index.  
 
Further, the results from the application of inclusions and exclusions from the SRI 
indices to the Ohlson (1995) model were insignificant, indicating that these actions 
have no impact on firm value. Prior research has produced inconsistent results 
regarding whether there is a significant difference in performance between firms that 
have the index badge and those that do not (Artiach et al., 2010; Collison et al., 2008; 
Lopez et al., 2007; Schroder, 2007). However, the outcome in this case supports one 
study by Artiach et al. (2010), who found that US companies included in the DJSI 
from 2002 to 2006 did not have higher free cash flows than those not included in the 
index.  
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The evidence in this chapter has shown that the announcement of SRI index 
membership has a relatively significant impact, albeit weak and temporary, on stock 
return on the event day. However, it has emerged that it is not relevant to firm value 
and could be that other CSR information is more important to investment decision 
making and hence, firm value (Stone, 2001). With respect to this, Fowler and Hope 
(2007) have criticized simply focussing on SRIs, because they lack clear consistent 
foundations owing to their having emerged from fund managers in the investment 
community, rather than being compiled based on robust theory. However, although 
the results obtained have indicated that companies would appear not to benefit from 
sustained increases in share prices, if they are included in an SRI index and do not 
generate higher firm values than for those being removed from such indices, 
membership could still be important, in the long run. This is because they can 
improve their reputation as they will they be considered to be ethical operators, which 
will have a more positive impact on their bottom line advantage, when compared to 
competitors who are not members of such indices (Collison et al., 2009; Curran and 
Moran, 2007; Robinson et al., 2011).  
 
5.5 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter the announcement of index composition changing, in terms of 
companies being included in or excluded from SRI indices, namely, the DJSI and the 
FTSE4Good index has been investigated and by adopting an event study approach 
new understanding has been elicited regarding the impact of CSR performance the 
market. Further, the relationship between market value and SRI index membership, in 
conjunction with financial statement information, has been probed using an analytical 
approach suggested by Hassel et al. (2005).   
 
The fourth tested hypothesis established whether companies are rewarded for 
inclusions in SRI indices or penalized when excluded. The findings have provided 
asymmetrical evidence regarding whether event announcements in relation to the 
DJSI and the FTSE4Good index status have a significant impact on stock returns. 
More specifically, in the case of the DJSI, companies subject to inclusion in the index 
experience a significant but temporary decrease in stock return on the announcement 
day. However, subsequent to this there is a temporary increase following positive 
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news (i.e. Day 1) (see figure 6). Further, in the case of the FTSE4Good index 
announcements, the changing MARs in March and September emerge as being 
differently on announcement days, but these effects are only temporary. For the 
composition changing announcement in March, the findings show that there is a 
significant decrease in stock return on the announcement day, whilst there is an 
increase on the following day of a firm’s inclusion and notably there is also an 
increase at this time for exclusions, thus indicating that companies are not penalized 
for being deleted from this particular index. By contrast, the results in September 
indicate that companies experience significant negative impacts on the stock return for 
being deleted from index but these are also temporary. Moreover, even though 
temporary positive market reaction does occur on announcement day, the results 
indicate that there is some significant expectation before the event day. The fifth 
hypothesis involved testing whether the SRI index label is relevant to firm value and, 
in general, the outcomes indicate that this is not the case, but there is some weak 
significant evidence showing a relationship between DJSI status and firm value when 
it comes to the yearly subsamples. Hence, the results obtained by some similar studies 
are corroborated (Curran and Moran, 2007; Moneva and Ortas, 2008). 
 
In sum, the findings for SRI membership, both inclusions and exclusions, are 
generally weak in that even where they revealed significant results they were only 
temporary for both applied methods. However, in the long run as these indices 
become more widely seen to reap reputational benefits, as suggested by some studies 
(Collison et al., 2009; Curran and Moran, 2007; Robinson et al., 2011), membership 
may prove to have a significant impact on firm value.   
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Chapter 6. CSR ratings and share selection in SRI versus 
non-SRI funds 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
In chapter 4 the link between the CSR representative measures and equity 
performance was investigated and further, chapter 5 presented tests on SRI index 
membership, as a measure of CSR, to evaluate its impact on market reaction, as well 
as examining whether CSR has value relevance, which was a pursuit in both of these 
chapters. Using Lipper’s data on portfolio holdings for the years 2006 and 2007, this 
chapter explores whether the level of CSR positively influences the equity holdings 
decision by SRI funds more than in the case of non-SRI ones.  
 
Although considerable research has been devoted to proving that socially responsible 
investments
24
 (SRIs) are superior to their conventional counterparts, rather less 
attention has been paid to the difference in ownership holdings by SRI funds and their 
counterparts, regarding the level of CSR. Moreover, the few investigations that have 
been undertaken on the impact of institutional ownership holdings on CSR have 
produced contradictory results (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). Further, one shortcoming of most of these previous 
studies is their failure to distinguish ownership holdings by SRI and non-SRI funds. In 
this respect, Benson et al. (2006) probed whether the portfolio allocation across 
industry sectors by SRI funds are really different from those by conventional funds 
and further whether the stock-picking ability of SRI fund managers is different in the 
two cases. These authors reported that they found that there is a weak difference in the 
portfolio composition across industries and little difference in the stock-picking skill 
of the fund managers. However, the study overlooked how the level of CSR impacts 
on the ownership holdings decisions by SRI funds and non-SRI ones. In sum, there is 
no clear evidence of there being a relationship between the level of CSR in terms of a 
distinction in the ownership decisions by SRI and non-SRI fund holders. 
Consequently, the key purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the level of a 
                                                 
24
 The term socially responsible investment (SRI) is used interchangeably with ethical or sustainable 
investment in this chapter.  
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firm’s CSR leads to a difference in the percentage of ownership holdings of SRI funds 
and non-SRI ones. 
 
A key theme that underpins all SRI funds is that they have a higher standard in 
relation to ethical issues (i.e. screened by ethical, social, or other preferences) than 
their conventional counterparts. However, the reasons why companies are listed in the 
portfolio of SRI funds are not available to the public in any great detail, as this is 
invariably decided by fund managers through an undisclosed screening process, which 
they report upon only in general terms. In this regard, Sandberg et al. (2009) criticized 
the lack of standardizing of SRI practical approaches used by these investors. 
Furthermore, Dillenburg et al. (2003) called for a new social scheme ratings 
methodology, which would provide robust quantitative outcomes for a wide range of 
audiences. Given the absence of such a mechanism, in this part of the empirical 
research four CSR representative ratings are used to investigate the aforementioned 
goal, each of which and the associated variables are discussed in detail prior to the 
computations.    
 
Section 6.2 contains the research design, provides hypothesis development, data 
selection and empirical model. Subsequently, section 6.3 contains the results of the 
analysis of the correlations between the independent variables and the overall findings 
from the empirical model. Next, in section 6.4 there is a discussion of the findings and 
finally, section 6.5 contains the chapter summary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
6.2 Research Design 
 
6.2.1 Hypothesis development 
 
Socially responsible investment (SRI) 
The phenomenon of socially responsible investing is not new, for its roots can be 
traced back to ancient religious traditions (Renneboog et al., 2008), where sets of 
values and beliefs were formulated to teach how money should be used and invested 
ethically. Understandably, this shows why the term “ethical investing” has often been 
used interchangeably with the term “socially responsible investing”. From the 
beginning of the 18th century religious groups practiced SRI by avoiding sinful 
companies involved in the: alcohol, tobacco, abortion, pornography and gambling 
industries. During the Vietnam War, these groups and the anti-war movement also 
divested all stocks in weapons-related companies to protest against US involvement. 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s anti-war, anti-racist, and civil-right movements 
made investors aware that their investments could generate negative externalities on 
society (Renneboog et al., 2008). With growing public awareness of investment 
consequences and with activity being dominated by institutional investors rather than 
individual on, its concept has broadened into the combination of social and 
environmental as well as financial objectives (Sparkes, 2001). For example, Sparkes 
(2001) clearly emphasized that SRI should be considered as a combination of 
financial and social returns, stating that “the key distinguishing feature of socially 
responsible investment lies in its combination of social and environmental goals with 
the financial objective of achieving a return on invested capital approaching that of 
the market” (p.201).  Furthermore, recently the Social Investment Forum (SIF) 
defined it as “an investment process that considers the social and environmental 
consequences of investments, both positive and negative, within the context of 
rigorous financial analysis” (2006, p.2).  
 
From the early 1970s onwards these concerns led to the introduction of SRI funds and 
services designed for those investors who wished to take account of the issues entailed 
when making investment choices, mainly in the UK and US (Sparkes, 2001; 
Renneboog et al., 2008). Since that time, socially responsible investments have 
experienced a continuous strong surge in popularity among mainstream investors 
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(Sparkes and Cowton, 2004). In fact, studies by the SIF (2007) and the European 
Social Investment Forum (Eurosif) (2008) reported that the total assets managed 
under SRI had reached around $2.71 trillion in the US and around €2.67 trillion in 
Europe as of December 2007. With the growing awareness of SRI, the SRI market has 
become noticeably dominated and driven by institutional investors, for Eurosif (2008) 
stated that 94% of market share is run by them compared to retail (e.g. individual) 
investors  in Europe. In line with an increasing activism from institutional investors, 
the number of fund managers who have introduced SRI funds with: social, 
environmental or ethical criteria, has also grown. As of 2007, there were almost 100 
funds available in the SRI market in the UK (Ethical Investment Research Service 
(EIRIS)) and 260 in the US (SIF 2008).  
 
The SIF has stated that “SRI involves evaluating companies on CSR issues, analyzing 
corporate social and environmental risks, and engaging corporate social and 
environmental risks, and engaging corporations to improve their CSR policies and 
practices” (2006, p.2). This provides the positive direct link between SRI and CSR, 
with the former acting as a catalyst, which probably explains why both have been 
increasingly prominent in the last decade. SRI research is, in general, undertaken 
internally by fund managers as well as externally by ethical screening. Furthermore, 
the former usually apply their own different screening methods to exclude or include 
companies from their investment universes. However, these can be broadly classified 
into three groups: negative screens, positive ones, and engagement. Eurosif, a non-
profit organization focusing on SRI investments, has classified the screening methods 
into three overall categories (Eurosif, 2006). 
 
i. Positive screening involves the inclusion of companies that enhance or are 
committed to having a positive impact on SRI practices and only if they fulfill 
the criteria set by the SRI researchers can they be included in the fund. 
Another type of positive screening is best-in-class screening, users of which 
seek to invest in the leading companies on SRI issues within their industrial 
sector.  
ii. Negative screening generally relates to excluding companies based on their 
involvement in certain industries or practices, with the most common being: 
alcohol, tobacco, and weapons. Another type of negative screening is norm-
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based screening, which primarily excludes companies based on their 
violations of international standards and conventions, such as: the United 
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UNICEF Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, and the ILO Labor Standards.  
iii. Engagement (or Shareholder advocacy) is a method for fund managers to 
educate and influence investors and the rights of ownership, which is usually 
undertaken through a direct dialogue with the company or by using their 
shareholder votes. 
 
The relationship between SRI and CSR  
With a growing SRI market, researchers have become increasingly interested in the 
different performance of SRI funds and their counterparts, but the evidence, to date, 
has indicated that there does not appear to be any major variation (e.g. Kreander et al., 
2005; Statman, 2006). However, whilst the comparative level of performance between 
these two has been investigated, there have been few empirical studies focussing on 
the relationship between the institutional ownership holdings decision and the level of 
CSR and these have produced inconsistent results. For instance, in hypothesis testing 
whether a higher level of CSR leads to an increase in institutional ownership, Graves 
and Waddock (1994) found that the number of institutions owning shares is positively 
and significantly related to CSR measured by KLD and financial performance, such as 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), and negatively related to the debt 
to asset ratio.  However, they also reported that the percentage of shares owned by 
institutions is not significantly related to CSR and financial performance, except for 
the debt to asset ratio, which had a negative relationship with institutional ownership. 
In a more recent study, Mahoney and Roberts (2007) obtained results that supported 
the findings of Graves and Waddock. Moreover, these findings are consistent with 
earlier research by Fombrun and Shanley (1990), who elicited that a good corporate 
reputation, as shown in the Fortune survey, is significantly related to higher 
institutional ownership. Unfortunately, this study did not address the relationship 
between institutional ownership and a firm’s financial performance. Furthermore, 
Coffey and Feyxell (1991) disclosed findings that there is a statistically positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and the number of women on the board 
of directors, but elicited no significant relationship with charitable contributions. 
Recently, Neubaum and Zahra (2006) stated that long-term institutional owners’ 
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holdings (i.e. pension funds) is positively and significantly associated with CSR, as 
defined by the KLD, but that short-term institutional owners’ holdings (i.e. mutual 
funds and investment banks) have a significantly negative relationship with CSR.    
 
In general, these findings indicate that it is unclear as to what CSR issues institutional 
investors actually focus on when making investment decisions, but it should be noted 
that these studies did not distinguish SRI funds and non-SRI ones when conducting 
their investigations. Previous research into the link between CSR and financial 
performance has provided evidence of the presence of a positive, albeit sometimes 
weak, relationship (Orlitzky et al., 2003) and also for the view that the higher a firm’s 
CSR the lower its financial risk (Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001). With respect to this, 
professional investors, in general, will prefer to invest in companies that have higher 
CSR so as to reduce the investment risk, which they expect will bring higher returns, 
which corresponds to the utility maximisation in conventional theory. However, it 
cannot be deduced from these results whether or not SRI fund investors put more 
consideration into CSR for their investment decision-making than their counterparts, 
as this, as explained above, has received scant attention.  Therefore, whether 
ownership holdings of SRI funds are really different from those of non-SRI ones 
regarding the level of CSR or whether the former are just brand names for attracting 
investors who are interested in responsible investment, is the key focus of this chapter, 
 
Hence, this leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: the ownership holdings decisions by SRI fund managers are more affected by 
the level of CSR than those with non-SRI funds. 
 
The summarized hypothesis development is presented in figure 12 below. 
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Figure 12. Summary of hypotheses develpoments for the influence on investment 
decisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2 Selected data measures and the empirical model 
 
The mutual fund holdings data for this part of the research were provided by the 
Lipper Analytic Service (henceforth Lipper), a Reuters Company, and contained 
information on the monthly company’s percentage ownership holdings, static one-off 
reports, of 30 SRI funds and 30 non-SRI funds. These funds were matched as pairs on 
the basis of their geographical investment focus, as well as their coming under the 
same management company, over the period 2006 to 2007. The reason they were not 
matched by fund size and age, the criteria employed by Mallin et al. (1995) and 
Kreander et al. (2005), is that the interest here is whether non-financial environmental 
performance (i.e. CSR reputation ratings) is perceived to be important in investment 
decision-making by SRI fund managers. Further, prior research has not yet provided 
clear guidelines on the correct length of the lagged effect of institutional ownership on 
CSR activities (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006). The time lag chosen for this study so as 
to examine the current trends in institutional ownership in response to the level of 
CSR performance is 1-year lags, during 2006 and 2007. Lipper also provided 
information on: the names of the fund and the management company, Lipper ID, 
portfolio ID, the reporting date, security holdings, portfolio holding ranks with 
percentages, portfolio holding shares with their market value, and holding market 
value currency. As monthly portfolios were not held for all funds, in some cases 
Lipper was not able to provide data all of the 24 months of the focal period. 
  
Research  
questions 
 (refer to figure 3) 
Alternative 
EP measures 
Hypothesis Analytical 
methods 
Q3: Are there 
differences 
between SRI-
styled and other 
funds in terms of 
the environmental 
performance of 
companies 
represented in 
their portfolios? 
 
 
CSR ratings 
H 6: the ownership holdings 
decisions by SRI funds are more 
affected by the level of CSR than 
those of non-SRI funds. 
 
Cross-sectional 
regression 
analysis 
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Before the fund databases were obtained from Lipper, the ethical mutual funds were 
preselected from the green & ethical funds directory complied by EIRIS, the 
independent research company specializing in the assessment of the: social, 
environmental, and ethical performance of companies. This process of choosing SRI 
funds meant that possible problems associated with self-classification were avoided. 
As a market leader in the UK, with over 60% of SRI funds subscribing to its data, 
EIRIS launched this directory in 2008 to guide financial advisers and consumers. It 
includes detailed information on 78 UK ethical funds, but in eight cases only the 
website links were provided and on visiting these it emerged that, for various reasons, 
there was insufficient information and so they were excluded. Subsequently, after 
filtering the remaining 70 funds, by identifying the equity mutual funds that could be 
matched, as described above, 35 funds qualified. However, based on the data 
available from Lipper, only 30 ethical funds could be matched with non-ethical funds, 
according to their geographic focus and similar investment types (i.e. equity, cash, or 
equity and bond). Table 14 reports the name and investment universe for each fund, 
with there being a total of 60 for the years 2007, but only 58 in 2006, because the 
portfolio holding data on two funds was missing. As some of the funds emerged to be 
invested in bonds, or money market instruments, the final observation of the equities 
held by funds was reduced to 457 for the non-SRI funds and 354 in the case of the 
SRI ones. The size of observation for the empirical analyses was constrained by the 
number of companies listed in the CSR reputation ratings and the availability of the 
firms’ financial data. 
 
CSR reputations 
To explore for the relationship between the level of CSR representational measures 
and institutional ownership holdings, four different CSR representational ratings, 
which comprise two global reputations listings and two UK based ones, were adopted 
as an exogenous variable: Fortune’s WMAC environmental reputation; the 
Accountability Rating; the Environment Index (EI) issued by Business in the 
Community (BITC); and the Corporate Responsibility (CR) Index issued by BITC. 
Even though UK domicile mutual funds were selected, the investment universe was 
not restricted in the sample selection, so as to be able to investigate whether SRI and 
non-SRI fund managers react differently according to the scope of the reputation 
scales. Further, the CSR reputation ratings can be broadly categorized into two groups, 
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one measuring corporate environmental performance (i.e. Fortune’s WMAC 
environmental reputation and the EI) and the other measured multidimensional CSR 
(i.e. the Accountability Rating and the CR Index). Fortune’s WMAC environmental 
reputation scores have already been covered in detail in chapter 4 and so it they are 
only discussed briefly, whilst the Accountability Rating and the second two reputation 
scores in the UK based companies receive greater attention in this section.  
 
Fortune’s WMAC Environmental Reputation: Since 1997, Fortune published the 
companies rankings measured by nine factors: the ability to attract and retain talented 
people; the quality of management; social responsibility to the community and the 
environment; innovativeness; the quality of products or services; the wise use of 
corporate assets; financial soundness; long-term investment value; and the 
effectiveness in doing business globally.  The last factor, social responsibility to the 
community and the environment, is used as a measure of a firm’s environmental 
reputation. 
 
Accountability Rating: Since 2004, the Accountability Rating, which was developed 
as a joint venture by both CSR consultancy csrnetwork and Accountability, has rated 
the world’s largest companies as defined in the Fortune Global listing by how they 
integrate responsible business practices into their core processes. 100 companies’ 
rating scores have been issued every year, except for 2006, which only had 64 
company ratings, comprising 50 Fortune Global companies and 14 other companies. 
Until 2006, companies were evaluated on six key areas: accountability, non-financial 
performance: stakeholder engagement; governance; strategy; performance 
management; assurance; and public disclosure. The key rating criteria were 
subsequently changed to include four areas: strategy; governance, which was a 
combination of governance and performance management; engagement, which was 
pooled stakeholder engagement; public disclosure and assurance; and impact. The 
new domains focus on social and environmental issues, with each having a different 
maximum score that are then added together to become a company’s overall score, 
with a maximum of 100. This analysis is based on a company’s main reports and its 
sustainability reports, with natural logarithms being applied to the accountability 
scores so as to reduce the extreme impact of the values. 
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Table 14. Summary information of the sample funds 
 
SRI funds Non-SRI funds Investment Universe 
Aberdeen ethical engagement UK  Aberdeen UK growth fund  UK 
Aberdeen ethical world  Aberdeen world equity  Global 
Aegon ethical equity  Aegon UK equity  UK 
Allchurches amity fund  Allchurches UK equity growth  UK 
AXA ethical fund I  AXA UK opportunities fund UK 
CIS sustainable leaders trust  CIS UK growth  trust UK 
CS fellowship fund  CS UK mid 250 fund  UK 
F&C stewardship income  F&C growth & income fund UK 
F&C stewardship growth  F&C FTSE all-share tracker UK 
F&C stewardship international  F&C global growth fund  Global 
FS Asia pacific sustainability FS Asia pacific fund Asia pacific excl. Japan 
Halifax ethical  Halifax international growth  Global 
Henderson global care growth Henderson international fund  Global 
Henderson industries of the future Henderson global technology fund  Global 
Henderson global care managed  Henderson emerging markets  Global 
Henderson global care UK income Henderson UK equity income UK 
Insight European ethical  Insight European small cap fund  UK 
Insight evergreen  Insight global alpha  Global 
Jupiter ecology Inc Jupiter global managed fund  Global 
Jupiter environmental income  Jupiter growth & income fund  UK 
Marlborough ethical  Marlborough UK equity growth UK 
NU sustainable future UK growth NU UK focus  UK 
Old mutual ethical  Old mutual UK select equity  UK 
Prudential ethical  Prudential higher income UK 
SW ethical   SW UK select growth  UK 
SW environmental investor  SW UK tracker UK 
SWIP pan-European SRI equity SWIP pan-European equity Europe incl. UK 
SWIP global SRI SWIP global fund  Global 
Standard life UK ethical  Standard UK equity growth  UK 
SJP ethical  SJP international Global 
Notes: this table provides a summary of information about each fund in the sample, including: the 
name, the code and the investment universe, from 2006 to 2007. The 30 SRI funds were matched 
according to investment universe and similar investment objectives. 
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Corporate Responsibility Index and Environmental Index Ratings: Business in the 
Community (BITC) developed the voluntary benchmark for responsible business 
practice to help build a sustainable future. It provides benchmarking assessments for 
UK companies and it launched its Corporate Responsibility (CR) Index in 2002, 
having already established its Environment Index (EI) in 1996. The CR Index 
evaluates the responsible business performance of companies, which covers: 
responsible business strategy; integration of this strategy into the business and the 
management of corporate responsibility within the organisation. The top 100 
companies’ CR rankings are published on the BITC website and/or in the Sunday 
Times every year, with the 2005 and 2006 CR indices being published in May 2006 
and 2007. Consequently, these scores are utilized in this study as reputation scores for 
the 2006 and 2007 fund portfolio holdings, respectively. From 2006 the rating system 
was changed to four performance bands rather than rankings: platinum indicated a 
score of 95% and above; gold, 90% to 94.5%; silver, 80% to 89.5%; and bronze, 70% 
to 79.5%. Thus, index scores used for each company are the median score for each 
band. That is, the companies listed in the platinum band obtained a 97% index score, 
those in the gold band, 93%, those in the silver band, 85%, and those in the bronze 
band, 75%. As another self assessed benchmarking tool, the Environment Index was 
used to evaluate: environmental management, environmental performance and impact, 
and corporate assurance and disclosure up until 2005, when two more sections were 
added, these being corporate strategy and the integration of environmental issues into 
the business. The results of the EI are published through the BITC website every year 
and as with the CR Index, the median scores of each band are used in this enquiry.  
 
Control variables 
Drawing on existing studies of the relationship between CSR and a firm’s financial 
performance and the work by Graves and Waddock (1994 and 1997) and Falkenstein 
(1996), this researcher employed the six characteristics of a firm: profitability, debt 
level, size, risk, BV/MV, and dividend yield and extracted the figures for these from 
DataStream.  
 
Profitability: A firm’s profitability was measured by return on equity (ROE). 
Regarding this, although extant studies have shown a mixed relationship between 
CSR and ROE (see Appendix I for more details), a positive relationship between 
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institutional ownership and ROE is expected (Graves and Waddock, 1994; Johnson 
and Greening, 1999). 
 
Debt level: Debt level was measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets and this 
could indicate whether the institutional holdings affect the level of debt ratio (Grier 
and Zychowicz, 1994). A low ratio will lead to institutional investors placing a higher 
value on a stock, because of the perceived lower investment risk (Graves and 
Waddock 1994) and hence, debt ratio is expected to be negatively related with both 
ownership holdings and CSR (Falkenstein, 1996: Graves and Waddock, 1994).  
 
Size: Size was measured by market capitalization and to reduce the impact of extreme 
values as well as to linearise the variables, natural logarithms were applied to the 
market value, after Gompers and Metrick (2001). A positive relationship between a 
firm’s size and ownership is expected (Cox et al., 2004; Graves and Waddock, 1994; 
Neubaum and Zahra, 2006).  
 
Risk: Risk was obtained by running a time series regression over the sixty months 
prior to the test period, using the market model, which is commonly undertaken in this 
context and the FTSE All-World index was utilized to measure the monthly market 
factor. In general, the higher the observed variation, the higher the risk involved in 
holding the equity. It is expected to be negatively related with ownership (Falkenstein 
1996; Graves and Waddock, 1994). 
 
BV/MV and DY: the book value to market value (BV/MV) and dividend yield (DY), as 
the growth potential, were used to find the preferred portfolio holdings. In general, 
growth stocks have a low book to market ratio and value stocks have a high ratio. 
There is a negative relationship between the dividend yield (DY) and ownership 
(Gompers and Metrick, 2001) and the book to market ratio is expected to be positive, 
as with Gompers and Metrick’s (2001) work.  
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 Empirical model 
The empirical analysis is in two parts, with the first comprising an investigation to 
explore the CSR impacts, if any, on the relationship between the ownership holdings 
of SRI funds and those of non-SRI ones, for the sample period and two yearly 
subsamples. For the second part, the same procedure using only the overall sample 
period is performed to elicit whether or not the investment universe of the fund 
influences the scope of the CSR reputation focussed on by both types of fund 
managers. That is, for example, are fund holders with global operations more 
interested in global than UK reputation. The CSR reputation is separately investigated 
and is reported in the descriptive and regression analyses in the next section. The 
dependent variable is defined as the institutional ownership holdings by SRI and non-
SRI funds and is measured by the sum of the weighted average of a company’s 
holdings owned by each institutional investor. 
 
The following multiple regression equation is constructed with all variables measured 
at the corporate level. 
 
                                                            
   
  
      
                              
 
where IOi,t is the level of mutual fund ownership holdings stock i in the period t by 
SRI funds or non-SRI ones. The average institutional ownership holdings (IO) of the 
equity stock are measured as the sum of each fund’s weighted average of its holdings 
during a year divided by the total holding months for that year.  CSRi,t is the CSR 
reputation of firm i in the period t and except for Fortune’s global reputation scores, 
the reputation variables are measured by the natural logarithm of their scores in order 
to minimize the impact of extreme values. ROEi,t is the return on equity of a firm i in 
the period t. Betai,t  is obtained by running a time series regression over the 60 months 
prior to the test period, using the market model. DYi,t  is the dividend yield of a firm i 
for the period t. Debt leveli,t is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets.  
BV/MVi,t is the ratio of the book value to market value. Sizei,t  is the natural logarithm 
of the  market capitalization of a firm i for the period t. Note that ROE and debt level 
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are not used in the percentage form available on DataStream so as to minimize the 
impact of extreme values.  
 
6.3. Empirical analysis and results 
 
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis      
Table 15 separately presents the descriptive analysis for the non-SRI and SRI funds, 
including the: means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations among the variables. 
Moreover, it reports these statistics in relation to the four CSR reputation tools over 
the sample period 2006-2007; with Fortune’s WMAC environmental reputation scores 
being in panel A, those for the Accountability Rating in panel B, whilst the Corporate 
Responsibility (CR) Index outcomes are in panel C, and the Environmental Index 
results in panel D. The sample sizes for which all variables were available after the 
elimination of outliers vary in each panel. Further, the table includes the results from 
the tests, i.e. the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank test, in relation to the difference in 
variable scores between non-SRI funds and SRI ones.  
 
The data in panel A, the Fortune’s WMAC environmental reputation scores, indicate 
that there is no statistically significant relationship between ownership holdings and 
the level of CSR for both groups. When comparing ownership holdings with other 
variables between fund groups, this would appear to show that institutional investors, 
on aggregate, prefer to have greater holdings with companies with higher dividend 
yield and larger company size, which is consistent with previous studies (e.g. 
Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Graves and Waddock, 1994).  The debt level (i.e. the 
ratio of total debt to total assets) is significantly and negatively correlated with the 
ownership holdings by non-SRI funds at the 5% level (-0.1009), but insignificantly 
and positively related to those by SRI funds. Further, when considering the 
relationship between CSR reputation and the other variables, beta, BV/MV and size 
are significantly different from zero at the 5% level or better, with same direction 
movements in the two different fund groups except for the ROE in non-SRI funds (i.e. 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level). In general, these results are 
consistent with previous studies on the link between CSR and financial performance 
(McGuire et al., 1988 and 1990; Robert and Dowling, 2002; Waddock and Graves, 
1997).     
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Panel B, reporting the results from the descriptive analysis of the Accountability 
Rating, as with panel A, shows that there is not much difference in the means and 
standard deviations between the two fund holding types. However, unlike in panel A, 
a higher level of CSR is significantly associated with higher ownership holdings by 
both non-SRI and SRI funds, at the 1% level (0.4329) and 5% level (0.2658), 
respectively. Further, the correlation outcomes of holdings with the other control 
variables report that the dividend yield and the debt level are significantly different 
from zero at the 10% level or better for both groups. In addition, the ROE and size in 
the non-SRI funds are statistically significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. 
Moreover, regarding the relationship between CSR and financial performance, a 
firm’s risk is only significantly related at the 5% level in the case of SRI funds, whilst 
the DY and size are related at the 10% level or better in case of the non-SRI funds.   
 
The data in panel C for the Corporate Responsibility Index illustrates that, as with the 
two previous panels, the means and standard deviations for the SRI and non-SRI 
funds are similar and further, the ownership holdings variable is statistically 
significant at the 1% level (0.3557 for the non-SRI funds and 0.3182 for the SRI ones). 
Moreover, the ownership holdings are significantly related to the other variables (e.g. 
ROE, BV/MV, and size), at the 5% level or better, for both fund groups. When 
considering the relationship between CSR and the other variables, the results show 
that they are statistically different from zero at the 10% level or better, except for 
ROE and BV/MV in the case of SRI funds. Panel D, the Environmental Index ratings 
which are measured by the same organization, BTIC, as the CR Index ratings, 
provides the same evidence to those in panel C regarding the relationship between 
ownership holdings and CSR. That is, these are significantly greater than zero at the 1% 
level for both non-SRI funds (0.2743) and SRI ones (0.2952). Further, the results in 
relation to the link between the CSR and the financial performance variables, report 
that they are significantly correlated at the 10% level or better, except in the case the 
beta for both fund types. 
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Table 15. Means, Standard Deviations, and correlations among the variables according to CSR ratings scales over the period 2006-2007 
Panel A. Fortune’s WMAC environmental reputation (N=527) 
Non-SRI funds (N=303) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 6.2261 11.8655 1 0.0189 0.2217*** 0.07 0.3389*** -0.1686*** -0.2378*** 0.4794*** 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 5.9691 0.9474 0.0506 1 -0.0434 -0.2330*** 0.1776*** -0.0902 -0.2141*** 0.2997*** 
3. DY 2.2944 1.4857 0.2589*** -0.0514 1 0.0997* 0.0315 0.1570*** 0.1847*** 0.2556*** 
4. Beta 1.1198 0.7029 -0.0446 -0.2129*** 0.0907 1 -0.0227 -0.1347** 0.1643*** -0.0403 
5. ROE 0.2061 0.1294 0.1838*** 0.1289** -0.0302 -0.0848 1 -0.0657 -0.5715*** 0.2664*** 
6. Debt level 0.2186 0.1462 -0.1009* -0.0586 0.1559*** -0.1317** 0.0127 1 0.059 -0.0686 
7. BV/MV 0.4821 0.2499 -0.1024* -0.1885*** 0.1548*** 0.1225** -0.4993*** 0.0828 1 -0.1924*** 
8. Size 17.6503 1.0601 0.2989*** 0.2792*** 0.2355*** -0.0544 0.2054*** -0.0366 -0.1924*** 1 
SRI funds (N=224) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 5.3276 9.0485 1 -0.0286 0.2525*** 0.084 0.2499*** -0.0244 -0.1112* 0.3318*** 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 6.0329 0.9514 -0.0668 1 -0.048 -0.3094*** 0.1216* -0.0195 -0.2209*** 0.3047*** 
3. DY 2.4571 1.5385 0.2932*** -0.0689 1 0.0845 0.0316 0.1677** 0.2951*** 0.2232*** 
4. Beta 1.1402 0.71 -0.0094 -0.2968*** 0.0806 1 -0.041 -0.1774*** 0.2122*** -0.118* 
5. ROE 0.2175 0.1363 0.1079 0.073 -0.0395 -0.1086 1 -0.0928 -0.5806*** 0.2299*** 
6. Debt level 0.2047 0.1459 -0.0419 -0.0092 0.1252* -0.1857*** 0.0269 1 0.0818 0.0032 
7. BV/MV 0.4465 0.2286 -0.0059 -0.1693** 0.2555*** 0.1448** -0.5339*** 0.0505 1 -0.1455** 
8. Size 17.7468 0.9795 0.1980*** 0.2934*** 0.1686** -0.0988 0.1423** -0.0235 -0.1016 1 
Tests for difference:  Non-SRI vs.  SRI         
 Variables t-Test  (p-value) Wilcoxon  Rank test (z-value)         
1. Ownerships (IO) 0.3437 0.8456         
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 0.4447 0.5261         
3. DY 0.2213 0.1693         
4. Beta 0.7422 0.73         
5. ROE 0.3266 0.3179         
6. Debt level 0.2784 0.2266         
7. BV/MV 0.0949* 0.1587         
8. Size 0.2864 0.3584         
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Table15. (continued) 
 Panel B. The Accountability Rating (N=162) 
Non-SRI funds (N=94) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 9.3735 17.3852 1 0.3023*** 0.2330** 0.022 0.3602*** -0.3616*** -0.3103*** 0.4006*** 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 3.6629 0.3384 0.4329*** 1 0.2295** -0.1945* 0.1962* -0.1164 -0.1396 0.2242** 
3. DY 2.9537 1.5817 0.2573** 0.2546** 1 0.1884* 0.1005 0.0207 0.1851* 0.0493 
4. Beta 1.1786 0.5882 -0.1036 -0.1651 0.2024* 1 -0.1738* 0.0806 0.1736* -0.4414*** 
5. ROE 0.1786 0.0824 0.1828* 0.1469 0.0571 -0.1232 1 -0.2901*** -0.5612*** 0.3081*** 
6. Debt level 0.2554 0.14 -0.2978*** -0.0944 0.0493 0.0291 -0.3057*** 1 0.1499 -0.2563*** 
7. BV/MV 0.5482 0.2328 -0.1104 -0.0465 0.1067 0.1355 -0.5020*** 0.2285** 1 -0.2977*** 
8. Size 18.3239 0.7517 0.2730*** 0.1780* 0.0357 -0.3948*** 0.3463*** -0.2210** -0.4141*** 1 
SRI funds (N=68) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 7.2748 11.6676 1 0.2859** 0.2186* 0.0751 0.2222* -0.204* -0.0804 0.0623 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 3.702 0.3347 0.2658** 1 0.1561 -0.3596*** 0.2046* -0.0404 -0.2472** 0.1819 
3. DY 3.131 1.4941 0.3357*** 0.1969 1 0.1825 0.0809 -0.0927 0.2573** 0.0995 
4. Beta 1.2018 0.5992 0.0592 -0.2927** 0.1877 1 -0.2454** 0.0765 0.2304* -0.4643*** 
5. ROE 0.1792 0.0823 0.0262 0.129 0.0555 -0.1413 1 -0.2434** -0.4972*** 0.2696** 
6. Debt level 0.2504 0.1464 -0.2190* -0.0166 -0.0335 -0.0088 -0.2875** 1 -0.0094 -0.1045 
7. BV/MV 0.5349 0.2125 0.0378 -0.1369 0.1896 0.1478 -0.4347*** 0.0956 1 -0.2428** 
8. Size 18.35 0.7316 0.0113 0.1005 0.0594 -0.3782*** 0.3226*** -0.0681 -0.3836*** 1 
Tests for difference:  Non-SRI vs.  SRI         
Variables t-Test(p-value) Wilcoxon  Rank (z-value)         
1. Ownerships (IO) 0.3888 0.5686         
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 0.4657 0.4511         
3. DY 0.4722 0.3803         
4. Beta 0.8066 0.8479         
5. ROE 0.9606 0.7458         
6. Debt level 0.8258 0.7203         
7. BV/MV 0.7101 0.7497         
8. Size 0.8257 0.8373         
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Table 15. (continued) 
Panel C. The Corporate Responsibility Index ratings (N=205) 
Non-SRI funds (N=106) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 9.0934 9.0803 1 0.3702*** 0.0245 0.1098 0.2654*** 0.1098 -0.2757*** 0.5994*** 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 4.4887 0.0847 0.3557*** 1 0.1777* -0.143 0.1956** 0.1839* -0.1989** 0.5343*** 
3. DY 2.9753 1.5021 0.1166 0.2248** 1 -0.0244 -0.0107 0.3246*** -0.0413 0.0259 
4. Beta 0.9382 0.6938 0.0475 -0.1901* -0.0367 1 -0.2801*** -0.2887*** 0.3222*** -0.0922 
5. ROE 0.3172 0.3017 0.3313*** 0.1742* 0.1478 -0.1272 1 0.1015 -0.5755*** 0.2998*** 
6. Debt level 0.2595 0.174 0.1296 0.2036** 0.3560*** -0.2725*** 0.2374** 1 -0.1373 -0.0614 
7. BV/MV 0.4038 0.2606 -0.3071*** -0.1931** -0.0649 0.2373** -0.4366*** -0.1225 1 -0.2221** 
8. Size 16.2715 1.4187 0.5994*** 0.4934*** 0.0253 -0.0967 0.2132** -0.072 -0.2195** 1 
SRI funds (N=99) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 7.5965 8.0385 1 0.2596*** 0.2806*** 0.0325 0.0858 0.2355** -0.2088** 0.1387 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 4.4854 0.0877 0.3182*** 1 0.2378** -0.1441 0.1138 0.2050** -0.1415 0.4839*** 
3. DY 3.0393 1.4856 0.3203*** 0.2754*** 1 0.0072 0.0509 0.3302*** -0.1089 0.0644 
4. Beta 0.9054 0.6958 -0.0554 -0.1839* -0.0205 1 -0.2830*** -0.2840*** 0.3444*** -0.0727 
5. ROE 0.3176 0.3056 0.2770*** 0.1383 0.1937* -0.1098 1 0.1228 -0.5464*** 0.2308** 
6. Debt level 0.2677 0.1759 0.1692* 0.2345** 0.3607*** -0.2614*** 0.2529** 1 -0.1571 -0.0779 
7. BV/MV 0.4054 0.2616 -0.2587*** -0.1452 -0.134 0.2505** -0.4113*** -0.1359 1 -0.2010** 
8. Size 16.2836 1.403 0.2039** 0.4430*** 0.0601 -0.0717 0.1623 -0.0791 -0.1951* 1 
Tests for difference:  Non-SRI vs. SRI         
Variables t-Test (p value) Wilcoxon  Rank (z value)         
1. Ownerships (IO) 0.2141 0.2314         
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 0.7853 0.8482         
3. DY 0.795 0.7105         
4. Beta 0.7360 0.6905         
5. ROE 0.9918 0.9587         
6. Debt level 0.7387 0.7594         
7. BV/MV 0.9654 0.9803         
8. Size 0.9513 0.9455         
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Table 15. (continued) 
Panel D. The Environmental Index ratings (N=311) 
Non-SRI funds (N=160) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 10.002 12.0542 1 0.3874*** 0.1684** 0.1026 0.1705** -0.0186 -0.1079 0.5645*** 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 4.4391 0.1268 0.3025*** 1 0.2332*** -0.1031 0.2532*** 0.1851** -0.1746** 0.4658*** 
3. DY 2.8435 1.4704 0.2776*** 0.2032*** 1 -0.12 0.0008 0.2033*** 0.0523 0.0542 
4. Beta 0.9824 0.6648 0.0077 -0.1009 -0.1093 1 -0.1885** -0.2483*** 0.1967** 0.0021 
5. ROE 0.3143 0.371 0.1198 0.1665** 0.0676 -0.0242 1 0.1103 -0.5217*** 0.1771** 
6. Debt level 0.2532 0.1727 0.0256 0.1579** 0.2303*** -0.2275*** 0.2389*** 1 -0.1441* -0.1527* 
7. BV/MV 0.404 0.273 -0.1185 -0.2019** 0.0128 0.1082 -0.3428*** -0.1328* 1 -0.1441* 
8. Size 16.2963 1.5407 0.5535*** 0.4191*** 0.0654 0.0032 0.102 -0.1396* -0.067 1 
SRI funds (N=151) 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Ownerships (IO) 8.5535 11.137 1 0.2759*** 0.2446*** 0.0913 0.0221 0.0054 0.0182 0.3047*** 
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 4.4319 0.1359 0.2566*** 1 0.2590*** -0.1424* 0.2197*** 0.1796** -0.1616** 0.4438*** 
3. DY 2.9634 1.4456 0.3218*** 0.2139*** 1 -0.0231 0.0367 0.1703** 0.0209 0.1364* 
4. Beta 0.9351 0.6403 0.0102 -0.1264 -0.029 1 -0.2187*** -0.1978** 0.2320*** -0.0458 
5. ROE 0.3123 0.379 0.057 0.1522* 0.0763 -0.0215 1 0.1403* -0.4945*** 0.1415* 
6. Debt level 0.2641 0.1751 -0.0287 0.1385* 0.2008** -0.1935** 0.2475*** 1 -0.1618** -0.1279 
7. BV/MV 0.4108 0.2767 -0.0725 -0.1816** -0.025 0.1506* -0.3333*** -0.1537* 1 -0.1618** 
8. Size 16.233 1.5087 0.4073*** 0.3785*** 0.1386* -0.0513 0.0866 -0.108 -0.0443 1 
Tests for difference:  Non-SRI vs.  SRI         
 Variables t-Test (p value) Wilcoxon  Rank (z value)         
1. Ownerships (IO) 0.2726 0.0545*         
2. CSR reputation (CSR) 0.6251 0.7225         
3. DY 0.4693 0.3951         
4. Beta 0.5236 0.5489         
5. ROE 0.9629 0.843         
6. Debt level 0.5806 0.5557         
7. BV/MV 0.8281 0.8321         
8. Size 0.7148 0.7324         
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Notes: the table reports the descriptive analysis on institutional ownership holdings by SRI funds and 
non-SRI ones, using institutional-holdings data from Lipper and financial information from DataStream 
for 2006 to 2007. Each panel presents the CSR reputations, covering: Fortune’s WMAC environmental 
reputation score in panel A, Accountability ratings in panel B, Corporate Responsibility index from 
BITC in panel C, and environmental index ratings also from BTIC in panel D. The number of 
observations in each panel is not identical, because of the variability in scope of the institutional 
holdings between the CSR scales. The dividend yield is the ratio of dividend per share to market price 
at year end (Worldscope item 09404). The risk is measured by the market model beta. The return on 
equity (ROE) used is Worldscope item 08301 in DataStream. The debt level is the total debt divided by 
the total assets (Worldscope item 08236). The variables ROE and debt level are not used as a 
percentage of the figures extracted from DataStream, so as to minimize the impact of extreme values. 
The book to market value is the common equity of a company divided by the market value of common 
equity (i.e. the inverse of the value of Worldscope item 03501 in DataStream). The size is the logarithm 
of the market capitalization (Worldscope item 08001). The top right half of the correlation matrix, 
above the main diagonal: provides the non-parametric spearman correlation estimations.  The symbols 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
The main deductions from table 15 are that, on average, institutional investors in SRI 
and non-SRI funds prefer to have higher holdings in companies with higher levels of 
CSR reputation than in their counterparts, which is consistent with Graves and 
Waddock (1994) and Mahoney and Roberts (2007), but this evidence is only weak in 
the case of the Fortune’s WMAC reputation scores. However, when considering the 
difference in the means for non-SRI funds and SRI ones, the results reveal this is 
insignificant in all cases. One explanation for this, which illustrates the weakness of 
this part of the enquiry, is that companies may well belong to the portfolios of both 
SRI funds and non-SRI ones and thus, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between 
them, in terms of the differences in their means. Next, to explore further whether CSR 
reputation has a different influence on the ownership holdings decision for non-SRI 
funds and SRI ones, comprehensive regression analysis is conducted. 
 
Regression analysis 
The dependent variable in the regression is institutional ownership holdings scaled by 
the weighted average of the percentage holdings at period t. The independent 
variables are the level of firms’ CSR reputations for the period t and firms’ financial 
performance variables (i.e. dividend yield, beta, return on equity (ROE), debt level, 
book value-to-market value, and size). Recall that the variables, ROE and debt level, 
are not used as percentage figures so as to minimize the impact of extreme values. 
Firstly, the funds are separated into two groups and defined as 1 if they were managed 
under SRI categories and 0 otherwise, with the subsequent regression being separately 
performed on each fund holding type in relation to CSR. Furthermore, to determine 
whether the problem of multicollinearity exists or not, variable inflation factors (VIFs) 
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are performed in the regression analysis and as reported in each panel are all below 3, 
thus indicating that severe collinearity is not a serious issue. To examine whether the 
results are driven by a time trend, the same regression tests are undertaken for each 
subsample period, that is, 2006 and 2007 as well as for the overall sample period  and 
these outcomes can be seen in each panel. Panels A and B in table 16 report the 
results of the OLS regression analysis. In this analysis, to avoid heteroskedastic 
uncorrelated errors, all regressions are conducted by the robust option, which gives 
standard errors. Columns 1 to 3 show the results, including the yearly subsamples, for 
the institution ownership holdings for the non-SRI funds and columns 4 to 6 those for 
the SRI funds. 
 
Panel A, in table 16, reports the results from the analysis using Fortune’s WMAC 
environmental reputation scores. The overall results from the OLS regression show 
that the ownership holdings of SRI funds are negatively and significantly greater than 
zero at the 10% level, whilst those of non-SRI funds are consistently negative and 
insignificant. For example, the CSR in SRI funds is significantly negative (-1.171) at 
the 10% level, whereas that for its counterparts is insignificantly negative (-0.505). 
However, this significant relationship between holdings by SRI funds and CSR is not 
found in the yearly subsample analysis. Further, when looking at a firm’s other 
characteristics that could affect ownership holdings decisions: dividend yield, debt 
level, and size, the results in most cases are significantly greater than zero at the 10% 
level or better. These results indicate that institutional investors, as a whole, choose to 
invest in firms: with higher dividend yield, of large size and with lower debt levels. 
Regarding the other characteristic variables, beta, ROE and BV/MV, these revealed 
no power in the estimations (i.e. insignificant).  
 
Panel A also presents that the results from the regression analysis using the 
Accountability Rating and the overall results show that CSR is statistically significant 
at the 5% level or better. For example, it is positively related to its holdings by non-
SRI funds at the 1% level (17.167) and SRI ones at the 5% level (8.261). Further, this 
significant relationship between holdings and the CSR holds in the yearly subsamples, 
in the case of non-SRI funds, whilst this is not so for SRI funds. That is, the CSR in 
the case of non-SRI is significantly different from zero at the 5% level in 2006 and the 
10% level in 2007, whilst for SRI these subsample outcomes are insignificant. 
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Moreover, regarding the other characteristics, a firm’s debt level is significant at the 5% 
level or better for both groups over the sample period, suggesting that the institutional 
investors, on aggregate, prefer companies with lower debt levels. However, dividend 
yield and firm size are only statistically and positively significant at the 10% level or 
better for the non-SRI funds for the entire sample period. The other results provide no 
evidence of the existence of a significant relationship with ownership holdings for 
either group.  
 
The results from the Corporate Responsibility (CR) Index are reported in Panel B and 
they show that CSR is significantly different from zero at the 5% level or better for 
the overall estimation as well as for 2006, in the case of SRI funds, but there is no 
evidence of a relationship between CSR and its holdings for non-SRI funds in any of 
the calculations. For the other control variables, the results of the measure of risk (i.e. 
beta and debt level) in the case of non-SRI funds would appear to indicate that there is 
an institutional preference toward corporations with more market risk. That is, they 
are significantly and positively greater than zero at the 5% level or better. Further, 
institutional investors involved in non-SRI funds prefer companies of a larger size, 
given this outcome is strongly significant at the 1% level for the overall sample and 
the yearly subsamples. Although the results from panel B present some evidence of a 
positive link between CSR and ownership holdings of managers involved to SRI 
funds, the Environmental Index (EI) results measured by BITC, which as mentioned 
above is the same organization that measures the CR Index, report that CSR is 
insignificantly different from zero in the overall and yearly subsample estimations. 
For the control variables, the results appear to indicate that institutional investors, on 
aggregate, prefer companies with higher dividend yield and ones that are large sized. 
Moreover, similar to the results in the other panels, no significance is found for the 
other control variables. 
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Table 16. Effects of CSR ratings in relation to differences in the institutional holdings of SRI funds and Non-SRI funds
25 
 
Panel A. Fortune’s WMAC environmental reputation and the Accountability Rating 
  Fortune’s WMAC environmental reputation The Accountability Rating 
  
Variables 
Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI SRI 
overall 2006 2007 Overall 2006 2007 overall 2006 2007 overall 2006 2007 
CSR -0.505 -0.026 -1.185 -1.171* -1.12 -1.361 17.167*** 25.275** 13.794* 8.261** 9.119 10.222 
 (-0.73) (-0.02) (-1.51) (-1.79) (-1.21) (-1.38)    (3.04) (2.51) (1.79) (2.37) (1.64) (1.28) 
DY 1.934*** 2.038** 1.847** 1.655*** 1.593** 1.723**  2.012* 2.901 1.968 2.133 1.671 2.962 
 (3.38) (2.53) (2.20) (3.13) (2.36) (2.17) (1.76) (1.64) (1.31) (1.50) (1.16) (1.28) 
Beta -1.157 -1.012 -1.277 -0.708 -0.477 -1.072 -0.625 0.708 -1.462 1.296 4.24 -1.498 
 (-1.61) (-1.16) (-1.02) (-1.06) (-0.54) (-0.96)    (-0.27) (0.17) (-0.49) (0.59) (1.48) (-0.36) 
ROE 12.895** 12.077 13.566* 5.918 5.032 6.856 -0.658 -25.512 0.164 -11.027 -15.356 -17.477 
 (2.42) (1.47) (1.84) (1.09) (0.55) (1.02) (-0.04) (-0.77) (0.01) (-0.67) (-0.49) (-0.63) 
Debt level -11.579*** -14.118*** -8.825 -5.336* -5.786 -4.754 -30.296*** -34.337** -29.107** -18.095** -15.206 -23.343* 
 (-3.05) (-2.65) (-1.57) (-1.94) (-1.62) (-1.11)    (-3.38) (-2.25) (-2.42) (-2.50) (-1.49) (-2.05) 
BV/MV -0.772 -1.367 -0.009 -0.869 -1.888 0.661 0.272 -2.046 -0.196 -0.077 -1.033 -3.997 
 (-0.45) (-0.63) (-0.00) (-0.42) (-0.87) (0.16) (0.05) (-0.26) (-0.02) (-0.01) (-0.21) (-0.27) 
Size 2.375*** 2.318*** 2.585*** 1.517*** 1.516** 1.598**  3.406* 6.983* 1.459 0.087 2.097 -3.000 
 (3.97) (2.88) (2.77) (2.76) (2.07) (2.06) (1.70) (1.94) (0.61) (0.04) (0.66) (-0.78) 
_cons -35.580*** -36.857** -36.074** -17.600* -17.178 -18.739 -113.425** -203.151** -65.695 -26.598 -67.557 26.947 
 (-3.29) (-2.39) (-2.27) (-1.91) (-1.52) (-1.26)    (-2.37) (-2.30) (-1.19) (-0.56) (-0.94) (0.38) 
N 303 159 144 224 126 98 94 40 54 68 35 33 
Adj. R2 0.149 0.145 0.116 0.109 0.07 0.091 0.249 0.322 0.133 0.114 0.028 0.013 
F value 6.033*** 3.068*** 2.968*** 3.193*** 1.516 1.658 2.614** 1.445 1.311 2.047*** 0.835 1.309 
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Table 16. (continued) 25 
Panel B. The Corporate Responsibility Index and the Environmental Index 
  The Corporate Responsibility Index The Environmental Index 
  
Variables 
Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI SRI 
overall 2006 2007 overall 2006 2007 overall 2006 2007 overall 2006 2007 
CSR 3.529 6.364 9.435 18.473** 18.039* 28.432 1.14 -3.329 16.039 6.233 3.838 19.316 
 (0.43) (0.72) (0.44) (2.13) (1.78) (0.92) (0.16) (-0.38) (1.04) (1.08) (0.59) (1.17) 
DY 0.095 0.369 -0.293 1.157** 1.025 1.512**  1.939*** 2.016** 1.732* 2.085*** 2.197*** 1.967**  
 (0.21) (0.60) (-0.47) (2.56) (1.55) (2.13) (3.19) (2.31) (1.96) (3.88) (2.89) (2.45) 
Beta 2.680*** 2.392** 3.788** 0.488 1.149 -0.397 0.934 0.822 1.484 0.733 1.102 0.248 
 (2.88) (2.07) (2.38) (0.45) (0.95) (-0.16)    (0.84) (0.56) (0.78) (0.60) (0.73) (0.10) 
ROE 3.788* 3.102 13.053** 3.801 3.064 8.598 0.37 -0.337 3.322 -0.229 -1.166 1.714 
 (1.73) (1.25) (2.23) (1.21) (0.91) (0.67) (0.22) (-0.20) (0.81) (-0.13) (-0.66) (0.30) 
Debt level 8.589** 0.044 18.736*** 0.204 -1.113 -1.035 2.932 1.334 6.295 -3.537 -1.276 -8.31 
 (1.99) (0.01) (3.14) (0.04) (-0.21) (-0.11)    (0.82) (0.31) (0.98) (-1.14) (-0.35) (-1.23)    
BV/MV -5.277** -4.372* -1.88 -4.323* -2.129 -6.353 -3.511* -3.095 -4.026 -2.197 -0.347 -6.184 
 (-2.54) (-1.81) (-0.44) (-1.89) (-0.74) (-1.12)    (-1.83) (-1.39) (-1.01) (-1.07) (-0.14) (-1.55)    
Size 3.548*** 2.774*** 4.034*** 0.311 0.055 0.454 4.164*** 4.426*** 3.685*** 2.476*** 2.660** 2.061*   
 (5.47) (3.81) (3.45) (0.69) (0.11) (0.53) (5.15) (3.33) (3.53) (3.32) (2.26) (1.99) 
_cons -68.576** -67.462* -109.817 -83.794** -78.354* -131.621 -68.791*** -52.685* -129.126** -64.218*** -58.138** -112.949*   
 (-2.05) (-1.82) (-1.29) (-2.29) (-1.87) (-0.94)    (-2.68) (-1.81) (-2.19) (-2.98) (-2.31) (-1.78)    
N 106 59 47 99 57 42 160 82 78 151 80 71 
Adj. R2 0.427 0.348 0.502 0.158 0.109 0.119 0.347 0.299 0.36 0.212 0.163 0.214 
F value 11.585*** 5.784*** 7.967*** 3.278*** 1.882* 2.455** 8.785*** 3.571*** 5.693*** 5.000*** 2.158** 3.014*** 
Notes: The table includes the results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. It reports the estimates of regressions of institutional holdings on CSR reputations with the control 
variables and also estimates of the separate annual regressions. Each panel presents the results of regressions for the four measures of CSR reputation: Fortune’s WMAC environmental 
reputation and the Accountability Ratings in Panel A, and the corporate responsibility index ratings and environmental index ratings in panel B. The number of observations in each panel is not 
identical, because of the variability of scope of the holdings portfolio across the reputation instruments. The dividend yield is the ratio of dividend per share to market price at year end 
(Worldscope item 09404). The risk is measured by the market model beta. For the return on equity (ROE) Worldscope item 08301 in DataStream is used. The debt level is the total debt divided 
by the total assets (Worldscope item 08236). The variables, ROE and debt level, are not used as a percentage of the figures extracted from DataStream, so as to minimize the impact of extreme 
values. The book to market value is the common equity of a company divided by the market value of common equity (i.e. inverse value of Worldscope item 03501 in DataStream). The size is 
the logarithm of the market capitalization (Worldscope item 08001).T-statistics (in Parentheses) are estimated using White’s (1980) standard error as calculated during the regression. The 
symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
                                                 
25
 The regression was rerun using a year dummy variable rather than subsample year for the period 2006 and 2007, but the outcomes show the same results as table 16 and 
that a year variable in each panel is not significant. 
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The results in table 16, in general, show that the level of CSR ratings has a different impact 
on the ownership holdings decisions when non-SRI and SRI funds are compared. In 
particular, it emerges that institutional investors are more interested in the CSR measured 
by the Accountability Rating and the Corporate Responsibility Index than that of the other 
two reputation scales, thus indicating that multidimensional CSR measures are more 
attractive to investors than a narrower one. For example, the results indicate that the 
institutional investors involved in non-SRI prefer companies with a higher level of the 
Accountability Rating than other CSR ratings and those associated with SRI tend towards 
investing in companies with higher scores on both the CR Index and the Accountability 
Rating. It should be noted that, as mentioned above, the CSR reputations selected can be 
put into two different categories: global (i.e. Fortune’s WMAC and Accountability Rating) 
verses the UK based measures of reputation (i.e. the Corporate Responsibility Index and 
the Environmental Index). Therefore, to investigate whether the scope of the CSR 
reputation is associated with the investment universe, the same regression methods are 
performed separately according to the: UK and global investment universes. 
 
Although the fund holder portfolios used in the first regression included Asian and 
European investments, when the four universes are separated, the data for these two is 
insufficient to provide meaningful results through OLS estimation and hence, have been 
dropped from the analysis. Table 17 presents the results of the ownership holdings 
decision on the level of CSR for the two investment universes: global and UK and they 
seem to indicate that there is no consistent evidence that institutional investors have a 
particular preference with regards to this aspect.  For example, the CSR measured by the 
Accountability Rating is statistically significant at the 10% level in the UK for non-SRI 
funds.  Further, weak evidence can be found of the same result for Fortune’s WMAC, i.e. 
it is negatively significant at the 10% level in the global universe for non-SRI funds. The 
CSR measured by the CR Index is significantly greater than at the 5% level in the UK 
investment universe of SRI funds, whilst the other measure of CSR, namely EI, is 
insignificant for both fund types.  
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Table 17. Results of regression analyses for the investment universe 
 
 Fortune's WMAC The Accountability Rating The Corporate Responsibility Index The Environmental Index 
Variables /  
Region 
Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI SRI Non-SRI SRI 
Global  UK Global  UK Global  UK Global  UK Global  UK Global  UK Global  UK Global  UK 
CSR -1.058* 2.943 -1.258 1.533 2.917 72.381* 1.079 -22.383 26.984 -2.808 17.549 26.413**  7.111 -3.048 33.024 1.757 
 (-1.85) (1.14) (-1.37) (0.86) (0.99) (2.40) (1.50) (-1.71)    (1.24) (-0.34) (0.46) (2.22) (0.32) (-0.58) (1.70) (0.27) 
DY 1.202* 2.465 0.623 5.048*** 1.627 6.216 -0.055 -6.206 2.869 0.015 2.368 0.739 6.192*** 0.651 7.871* 1.301**  
 (1.92) (1.55) (1.30) (3.54) (1.28) (0.58) (-0.22) (-0.92)    (1.73) (0.04) (0.87) (1.63) (3.96) (1.49) (2.07) (2.45) 
Beta -0.186 3.915 -0.069 5.906**  0.909 16.813 1.871*** -29.453**  9.853** 1.911** 7.334 0.715 1.447 1.512 -1.427 0.506 
 (-0.41) (1.06) (-0.10) (2.51) (0.75) (0.82) (3.10) (-2.64)    (2.67) (2.19) (1.25) (0.55) (0.64) (1.47) (-0.53) (0.41) 
ROE 4.250* 5.663 0.892 5.204 -5.277 168.455 2.84 -279.957*   -25.412 3.265 -12.623 3.266 -3.485 2.477 -21.25 -1.935 
 (1.81) (0.23) (0.43) (0.39) (-0.43) (1.00) (0.88) (-2.42)    (-1.27) (1.59) (-0.49) (0.78) (-1.12) (1.24) (-0.63) (-1.40)    
Debt level -3.992 -43.904* -2.361 10.199 -6.348 -12.285 0.382 -80.287 22.143 2.276 32.335 -6.669 12.215 -0.174 23.542 -7.471**  
 (-1.56) (-1.91) (-1.39) (0.66) (-1.22) (-0.18) (0.16) (-1.44)    (1.48) (0.69) (1.80) (-1.32)    (0.69) (-0.06) (1.10) (-2.45)    
BV/MV -0.545 -28.921* -0.672 2.952 2.847 -97.58 -0.429 112.518 -49.987*** -5.328*** -35.879* -5.175**  -12.919 -6.401*** -20.893 -4.304**  
 (-0.40) (-1.78) (-0.55) (0.20) (0.77) (-1.19) (-0.39) (1.67) (-3.64) (-2.79) (-2.22) (-2.16)    (-0.95) (-3.48) (-1.21) (-2.02)    
Size 1.658*** 10.835*** 1.247*** 2.342 2.961* 7.153 -0.164 -5.943 5.107** 4.611*** -0.678 0.689 2.328 5.987*** -0.087 3.890*** 
 (3.65) (3.87) (3.10) (1.24) (2.00) (0.50) (-0.37) (-1.20)    (2.17) (6.69) (-0.36) (0.94) (1.03) (6.75) (-0.09) (4.03) 
_cons -20.685*** -177.652*** -11.614*** -64.708*   -63.887* -407.992 -0.007 298.067**  -194.486* -53.105 -59.914 -121.337**  -74.462 -72.933*** -147.336 -60.849*** 
  (-2.84) (-3.83) (-2.80) (-1.85)    (-1.85) (-1.22) (-0.00) (2.69) (-1.79) (-1.64) (-0.35) (-2.55)    (-0.97) (-3.68) (-1.53) (-2.70)    
N 234 39 126 53 70 11 37 13 22 80 16 74 38 118 22 116 
Adj. R2  0.123 0.453 0.089 0.198 0.061 0.753 0.095 0.582 0.398 0.618 0.095 0.179 0.252 0.574 0.228 0.326 
F value 6.67*** 6.886*** 4.21*** 2.847** 3.179*** 10.239** 3.319** 7.333** 5.147*** 14.025*** 2.918* 2.632** 7.183*** 13.719*** 0.738 5.732*** 
Notes: The table reports the estimates of the regressions of institutional holdings on CSR reputation, with control variables by the investment universe for the four different measures of CSR reputation: Fortune’s 
WMAC environmental reputation, the Accountability Rating, the Corporate Responsibility Index and the Environmental Index. The dividend yield is the ratio of dividend per share to market price at year end 
(Worldscope item 09404). The risk is measured by the market model beta. For the return on equity (ROE) Worldscope item 08301 in DataStream is used. The debt level is the total debt divided by the total assets 
(Worldscope item 08236). The variables ROE and debt level, which are obtained from DataStream, are not used as a percentage of the figures so as to minimize the impact of extreme values. The book value to 
market value is the common equity of a company divided by the market value of common equity (i.e. inverse value of Worldscope item 03501 in DataStream). The size is the logarithm of the market capitalization 
(Worldscope item 08001). T-statistics (in parentheses) are estimated using White’s (1980) standard error as calculated during the regression. Sample size varies in each panel because of the different CSR ratings 
employed and each model has been checked for outliers. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 17-1. Results of regression analyses for the investment universes when substituted as a dummy variable  
 
 
Fortune's WMAC 
 
The Accountability Rating 
 
The Corporate Responsibility 
Rating 
 
The Environmental Rating 
Variables Non-SRI SRI      Non-SRI SRI      Non-SRI SRI      Non-SRI SRI    
CSR  -0.272 -1.07 
 
9.963** -1.238 
 
3.403 24.571**  
 
-1.88 3.795 
 
(-0.37) (-1.46)    
 
(2.33) (-0.45)    
 
(0.44) (2.32) 
 
(-0.27) (0.66) 
DY 1.448** 1.607*** 
 
1.407 1.779*   
 
0.108 0.786*   
 
1.805*** 1.639*** 
 
(2.50) (2.85) 
 
(1.13) (1.81) 
 
(0.24) (1.81) 
 
(2.88) (3.05) 
Beta -0.659 0.353 
 
-1.244 0.185 
 
2.658*** 0.863 
 
1.418 0.87 
 
(-1.05) (0.48) 
 
(-0.59) (0.11) 
 
(2.88) (0.74) 
 
(1.36) (0.74) 
ROE 9.423** -0.011 
 
-2.086 -17.99 
 
2.44 2.025 
 
0.301 -2.156 
 
(2.19) (-0.00)    
 
(-0.13) (-1.32)    
 
(1.22) (0.49) 
 
(0.26) (-1.61)    
Debt level -7.892** -3.922 
 
-7.743 6.263 
 
4.456 -1.201 
 
-0.295 -4.735 
 
(-2.33) (-1.38)    
 
(-0.92) (0.93) 
 
(1.03) (-0.24)    
 
(-0.08) (-1.52)    
BV/MV -0.45 0.012 
 
5.069 0.035 
 
-7.077*** -5.543**  
 
-5.710*** -3.473*   
 
(-0.21) (0.01) 
 
(0.93) (0.01) 
 
(-3.37) (-2.41)    
 
(-2.89) (-1.73)    
Size 2.845*** 1.515**  
 
4.966*** -2.353 
 
4.277*** 0.534 
 
5.381*** 3.304*** 
 
(4.06) (2.51) 
 
(2.70) (-1.28)    
 
(7.09) (0.80) 
 
(6.49) (3.89) 
Invest- universe 14.694*** 6.451*** 
 
30.157*** 23.191*** 
 
4.623** 0.891 
 
7.440*** 4.694 
 
(4.46) (3.58) 
 
(3.74) (5.01) 
 
(2.1) (0.31) 
 
(2.84) (1.61) 
_cons -46.635*** -19.845*   
 
-124.609*** 46.824 
 
-80.870** -112.861**  
 
-78.875*** -67.667*** 
  (-3.51) (-1.92)      (-3.01) (1.24)   (-2.55) (-2.55)      (-3.13) (-3.34)    
N 273 179 
 
81 50 
 
102 90 
 
156 138 
Adj. R2 0.32 0.234 
 
0.508 0.584 
 
0.5 0.132 
 
0.417 0.264 
F value 7.479*** 3.937***   5.347*** 9.965***   13.092*** 2.712**   10.613*** 5.292*** 
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The weak evidence from table 17 might be because the sample size of the CSR rating group is 
small for each subgroup (i.e. Global and UK). Thus, further analysis was conducted using a 
dummy variable, defined 0 for Global and 1 for the UK and the results are presented in table 17-
1.  It can be seen that the results are similar to those in table 17, although the investment universe 
dummy variable is significant at the 5% level or better, except for the corporate responsibility 
rating and the environmental rating in the SRI cases. That is, the evidence also indicates that 
non-SRI fund managers are not particularly concerned with the CSR ratings regarding their 
investment universe.  Overall, the results from tables 16, 17 and 17-1 would appear to 
demonstrate that there is weak evidence of a relationship between institutional ownership 
holdings by SRI funds and the level of CSR.  
 
6.4. Discussion 
 
In the investigation into whether or not information concerning CSR ratings is appreciated by 
fund managers, either for sustainability or financial reasons, the results suggest that there is weak 
evidence that this is the case for both SRI and non-SRI fund holders. Considering these findings, 
one clear explanation for this relates to the lack of a standard procedure for assessing SRI 
(Sandberg et al., 2009), as discussed above. Moreover, according to previous studies (e.g. Shane 
and Spicer, 1983; Spicer, 1978, see Appendix I for more details), improving the level of CSR can 
reduce the investment risk and increase financial performance. Therefore, from the view of the 
rational investor, institutional investors involved in non-SRI may well have a preference towards 
companies with higher CSR as long as expected returns are met.  This would explain why some 
companies are in the portfolios of both SRI and non-SRI funds and hence, why previous studies 
have provided only weak evidence of any difference in performance (Kreander et al., 2005) or 
stock-picking ability (Benson et al., 2006) between SRI funds and their counterparts.  Moreover, 
it  has not yet emerged that institutional investors who manage SRI funds prefer to take CSR 
representative measures into account more when investment decision-making than their 
counterparts.   
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Further, the results for the weak relationship might relate to the use of percentage-of-shares 
holdings for the institutional investors (Graves and Waddock, 1994). With regards to this, Graves 
and Waddock (1994) and Mahoney and Robert (2007), using the KLD measures of CSR for a 
sample of US firms, showed that there is no significant relation between the percentage of 
ownership holdings by institutional investors and CSR and yet at the same time eliciting that 
there is a significant relationship between the number of institutions and CSR. Graves and 
Waddock (1994) explained this contrast in these findings as being because decision-making 
regarding the percentage-of-shares holdings may be more complicated than simply a binary one 
(i.e. buy or not buy), owing to other factors (e.g. regulations, financial performance, or customer 
preference) needing to be considered.  In addition, a number of researchers have identified a 
range of different motivations for SRI preference among individual investors on the customer 
side apart from the desire for a reasonable return for their investments (Lewis, 2001; Lewis and 
Webley, 1994; Mackenzie and Lewis, 1999). Hence, SRI fund managers have to consider the 
covariance in returns between firms as well as a firm’s financial health, if two firms have similar 
levels of CSR, if they are to satisfy their customers. 
 
The findings from this analysis also most likely indicate that there is the co-existence of value-
driven and profit-seeking investors in the SRI market, as claimed in a study by Derwall et al. 
(2011). That is, the former are willing to trade-off financial return for non-pecuniary utility and 
use a negative screening approach to avoid sin industries, whereas the latter pursue a stronger 
financial motive using a positive screening (i.e. best-in-class) approach. However, because the 
results indicate that this type of fund manager is not sensitive to CSR ratings, this suggests that 
this market is dominated by profit-seeking investors and hence, the decisions of the minority of 
value-driven ones are unable to affect the share price (Derwall et al., 2011; Heinkel et al., 2001).  
Regarding this, in a theoretical paper, Heinkel et al. (2001) argued that at least 10% of the 
financial market being represented by value-driven investors is required for CSR ratings to have 
an impact on share price. Moreover, the lack of a distinction regarding the ratings between SRI 
and non-SRI funds is consistent with findings reported in chapter 2, where some scholars could 
not provide robust evidence of there being a significant difference in performance between SRI 
and non-SRI funds (e.g. Kreander et al., 2005; Mallin et al., 1995). Further, the data analysis of 
the mean difference portfolio holding ownerships between the two types of funds also reveals 
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that there is no significant difference between them. It should be noted that given the nature of 
this particular investigation it was not possible to distinguish value-driven from profit-seeking 
SRI fund holders and hence, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the value relevance of 
ratings information to the former type.  
 
In addition, if the CSR is related to risk, as suggested in some studies (Boutin-Dufresne and 
Savaria, 2004; Derwall et al., 2005; Heinkel et al., 2001; Lee and Faff, 2009; Manescu, 2011), 
including this one, then managers of non-SRI funds will choose to spread their portfolio 
ownership holdings to include SRI industries with high levels of CSR ratings so as to reduce the 
investment risk.  Indeed, the data in this study indicated that companies are often owned by both 
funds and this fund mixing provides further explanation for why no distinction was found 
between the types of funds as well as why the reaction to the CSR ratings proved to be 
insignificant. Further, following the line of comparison of the investment strategies of non-SRI 
and SRI fund holders, some scholars (e.g. Renneboog et al, 2008; Rudd, 1981) have claimed that 
the latter may be less adequately diversified than their counterparts, because of the integration of 
ESG criteria in the investment process. However, Bello (2005) has argued against this assertion, 
empirically showing that SRI funds do not suffer the disadvantage of greater restrictions imposed 
by ESG criteria, in terms of the degree of portfolio diversification or  investment performance, 
when compared to non-SRI ones. Regarding this matter, it has yet to emerge conclusively 
whether a diversification strategy in SRI may affect ownership holdings decisions when fund 
managers are taking into account the level of CSR ratings. However, since it has been elicited by 
some scholars that the higher the CSR ratings the lower the investment risk (e.g. Boutin-
Dufresne and Savaria, 2004; Lee and Faff, 2009), it might be the case that non-SRI fund 
managers will more broadly diversify their investment universe than SRI ones. Regarding this, 
table 15 shows that there is a significant relationship between ownership holdings and CSR 
rating in non-SRI and this is a little higher than those for SRI, although the correlation analysis 
between the two for the latter is less than 50% (i.e. not perfectly diversified). On the other hand, 
since SRI fund managers’ investment decision conditions are imposed by ESG criteria, they may 
be less volatile to the level of CSR ratings regarding their ownership holding decision. Overall, 
following this last line of reasoning, it is concluded that the findings provide no strong evidence 
of there being an impact on the investment decision by the level of CSR ratings. 
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6.5 Chapter summary 
 
In this chapter the results have been reported of an investigation into how CSR ratings affect 
institutional ownership holdings decisions by SRI and non-SRI funds. These ratings were 
measured by using the following data: the Fortune’s WMAC environmental reputation, the 
Accountability Rating, the Corporate Responsibility Index, and the Environmental Index, for the 
years 2006 and 2007. Further, results have been presented regarding whether institutional 
investors involved in SRI or non-SRI funds are influenced by the different investment universe 
of the CSR in relation to their ownership holding decisions. 
 
The sixth tested hypothesis aimed at establishing whether institutional investors involved in SRI 
funds have a greater preference towards companies with higher levels of CSR than those 
engaging in non-SRI ones. The correlation table 15 shows a strong relationship between the 
ownership holdings decision and the level of CSR, except in the case of Fortune’s WMAC 
environmental reputation. However, the regression results in tables 16 and 17 are inconsistent 
with these correlation findings, in that in most cases only weak evidence of the level of CSR on 
this decision emerged. Further, the different CSR measures only revealed a weak relationship 
between the ownership holdings decision by SRI and non-SRI funds and the investment universe. 
In general, the results have shown that the institution ownership holdings decision relating to SRI 
funds is associated with higher levels of CSR, as measured by the CR Index and further, that 
both SRI and non-SRI fund managers are also attracted to higher levels according to the 
Accountability Rating, a multi-dimensional CSR type. 
 
In sum, the evidence in this chapter has shown that the results weakly support for the sixth 
hypothesis. Consequently, it can be concluded that it is beneficial to a company, in terms of its 
attractiveness to institutional investors, for both SRI and non-SRI fund managers, to pursue 
higher levels of CSR rating. 
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Chapter 7. Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter has two main aims as follows: 
 
 To summarize the empirical findings in chapters 4 to 6, thus fleshing out the overall 
picture that has emerged within the prescribed thesis boundaries;  
 To discuss the findings from the empirical studies.  
 
To begin with, in section 7.2, by focusing on the outcomes of the hypotheses put forward in each 
empirical chapter, a general picture of the focal issues in this research endeavour is elicited. 
Following this, section 7.3 concentrates on the outcomes in relation to market incorporation of 
corporate environmental performance information and section 7.4 contains the chapter summary. 
 
7.2 Summary of the empirical findings 
 
At the outset of this thesis it was contended that there is still limited knowledge regarding the 
influence of environmental performance on stock market performance, in particular, because of 
the lack of a robust conceptual framework distinguishing the quality of corporate 
environmental/CSR reporting from other representations of performance, such as reputation and 
SRI index membership. Moreover, this lack of a framework means there is little understanding of 
the relation, if any, between investors’ decision making and environmental performance. Further, 
when applying such a framework a comprehensive set of measures to establish the nature of any 
relations between these variables is essential, but to date this has been missing. That is, despite 
the substantial body of research into the relationship between CSR/environmental performance 
and firm performance, financial performance and equity performance, up until now little is 
known about investors’ decision making regarding environmental performance. This thesis has 
had the aim of shedding light on these deficiencies. Next, the outcomes relating to the 
hypotheses put forward in chapters 4 to 6 are summarized, with the first hypothesis to be 
addressed being:  
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Hypothesis 1: The informativeness of accounting earnings as an explanatory variable for returns 
is systematically related to a firm’s environmental reputation, its environmental disclosures, 
and/or its physical performance. 
 
The results from chapter 4 have indicated that the level of environmental reputation does not 
monotonically increase with the level of accounting earnings, whereas the other proxies, 
environmental disclosure (DJSI) and physical (i.e. pollution) performance (revenue/GHG 
emissions) have been found do so in the case of DJSI listing. Further, the evidence appears to 
show that extensive environmental disclosures (DJSI) lead to a higher correlation between 
earnings and returns, but it is not the case for the other variables. This evidence at the global 
level does not support the findings of a previous US study conducted by Belkaoui (2004), who 
elicited that the level of the environmental reputation is systematically and significantly related 
to the level of earnings as well as the level of the returns, but he did not use multiple measures of 
environmental performance. In sum, the finding here is that the first hypothesis does not hold for 
all the proxies of environmental performance.  
 
Hypothesis 2: there is a positive association between company market value and                             
corporate environmental reputation, environmental disclosures and/or physical performance.  
 
Environmental reputation and physical performance were found to be negatively and 
significantly related to stock returns, inconsistent with the earlier studies which found a positive 
relationship between them (e.g. Freedman and Patten, 2004; Freedman and Stagliano, 1991; 
Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Herrmans et al., 1993; Orlitzky et al., 2003), but in line with 
Brammer et al. (2006). Further, the results regarding different industry are somewhat 
counterintuitive, in that firms with high levels CSR have low stock performance, also consistent 
with Brammer et al. (2006). However, the environmental disclosure emerged to be positively, 
but insignificantly, related to stock returns for the OLS method, thus suggesting that investors do 
not seem to give more credit to companies that have extensive environmental disclosure than to 
their counterparts, which is in contrast with the findings in several works on CSR disclosures  
(e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Belkaoui, 1797; Ingram, 1979; Toms, 2002).   
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Hypothesis 3: representational non-financial information (i.e. corporate environmental 
reputation, environmental disclosures, or/and physical performance) is relevant to firm value. 
 
In contrast to the two previous outcomes, environmental reputation, physical environmental 
performance and environmental disclosures (GRI Guidelines) emerged as being highly value 
relevant to investors. That is, it has been revealed that investors do rely on non-financial 
information when making investment decisions, which is consistent with several previous studies 
on value relevance (Black et al., 2000; Cormier et al., 1993; King and Lenox, 2002; Hughes II, 
2000; Smith et al., 2010). In addition, the three variables, earnings, book value, and industry 
effects, were also found to be positively associated with firm value. 
 
Hypothesis 4a (4b): Announcements of firms being included in (deleted from) an SRI index are 
associated with their experiencing significant and positive (negative) share price changes.  
 
The findings have provided asymmetrical evidence regarding whether event announcements in 
relation to DJSI and FTSE4Good index status have a significant impact on stock returns. That is, 
companies subject to inclusion in (exclusion from) the DJSI experience a significant 
(insignificant) but temporary decrease in stock return on the announcement day. Subsequent to 
this it emerged that there is a temporary increase following positive news, but there is no effect 
for negative news. By contrast, companies being added to (removed from) the FTSE4Good index 
in the March announcement results in a temporary decrease in stock return, but only the 
inclusion effects are significant and further, the findings show that there is a increase in stock 
return on the day after exclusions, thus indicating that companies are not penalized for being 
deleted from this particular index. Further, in contrast to the outcomes for March announcements, 
those for September show logically expected MARs behaviours  for both good news (i.e. 
inclusion in the index) and bad news (i.e. exclusion from the index), but these effects are only 
temporary. Hence, in general, the evidence from the results does not strongly support the fourth 
hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 5:  Membership of an SRI index is relevant information in that it has an impact on 
the market value of firms 
 
It was elicited that membership of SRI index has no value relevance for both the DJSI and 
FTSE4Good index, which concurs with the revelations in some studies (Curran and Moran, 2007; 
Moneva and Ortas, 2008), although some weak significant evidence was found in the 
relationship between DJSI status and firm value when it came to the yearly subsamples. 
 
Hypothesis 6: the ownership holdings decisions by SRI funds are more affected by the level of 
CSR than those of non-SRI funds. 
 
Regarding this hypothesis, the findings indicate that the level of CSR has a weak influence on 
the ownership holdings decisions taken by SRI fund managers and further, they show that, on 
aggregate, they prefer to take into account multidimensional CSR measurements when making 
investment choices.   
 
Figure 13 shows an overall view of the research design, which outlines the: main research 
questions, key issues, hypotheses, analytical methods and the results. In the following three 
sections the research questions and propositions pertaining to the findings for each empirical 
study are addressed in some detail.  
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Figure 13. Overview of research design  
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7.3 Do market securities incorporate the value of corporate environmental performance? 
 
Financial markets have been increasingly responding to corporate environmental performance, as 
one of the ESG factors. Nevertheless, this aspect and its impact on stock markets remains the 
subject of ongoing debate in academic studies, because the effect of CSR policies on traditional 
economic theory in relation to returns on investment remains unresolved. In particular, previous 
studies have provided inconclusive evidence regarding the relationship between environmental 
performance and firm performance, although the results of these studies would appear to indicate 
that the relationship between the two is positive. If so, this would open up new horizons for 
financial decision-makers, because information on corporate environmental performance could 
be incorporated into their investment options as a means of increasing shareholder value. 
However, even if it is value relevant to financial decision-makers and incorporated into the 
market, it may be the case that when balancing returns and risk in the market, possession of 
environmental performance information does not lead to higher shareholder value. 
 
The evidence from the results in this study suggest that corporate environmental reputation and 
physical performance are value relevant (i.e. investors positively expect future cash flows from 
them) and further, they shows that they are negatively significantly related to returns. That is, 
companies with high environmental performance experience lower returns than those with low 
performance. In this respect, recently some scholars have attempted to find plausible explanation 
for this link between the two by considering firm risk (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria, 2004; 
Derwall et al., 2005; Heinkel et al., 2001; Lee and Faff, 2009; Manescu, 2011). More specifically, 
whereas some earlier research activities probed indirectly the implication of firm-specific risk on 
CSR (Herremans et al., 1993; McGuire et al., 1988; Spicer, 1978 and 1978a), these more recent 
ones have focused on explicitly eliciting the relationship between environmental performance 
and firm risk, in terms of systematic risk and/or idiosyncratic risk in order to understand better 
the firm performance implications of CSR and they elicited that high returns for low level CSR 
companies reflects high idiosyncratic risk and vice versa.  Furthermore, in Lee and Faff’s (2009) 
work a positive relationship was found between firm-specific risk and stock returns and thus 
these authors concluded that leading CSR firms by their nature are reducing risk and hence, 
lowering the cost of equity. 
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As a slightly different view of the market’s incorporation of ESG factors, Edmans (2011) 
asserted that the market may not incorporate these factors fully into stock valuation, but rather 
they will affect stock price when they are incorporated into tangible outcomes (e.g. earnings 
announcements) and empirically showed that the stock market does not fully value employee 
satisfaction, even though it is highly related to the shareholder returns. This line of argument has 
been supported by Manescu (2011), who found that certain ESG factors, as measured by the 
KLD, are not efficiently incorporated into stock price. Further, Edmans contended that even 
though investors are aware of a firm’s CSR performance they may be unaware of the benefits of 
CSR, because the extant theory provides ambiguous predictions on its worth. The findings from 
the membership of SRI indices in this research could provide support for these perspectives. That 
is, financial decision-makers are probably aware of the SRI index and the announcements of 
their constitutions changing, but the findings from chapters 4 and 5 suggest that investors do not 
see these as value relevant and hence, do not appreciate company efforts to maintain up to date 
environmental performance reporting. Moreover, although investors do not appear to value the 
badge of index membership in this study, this cannot be entirely discounted as other studies have 
revealed the opposite result. In sum, it is too early to conclude whether the market is insensitive 
to SRI index membership, as clearly further investigation needs to be conducted on this matter.  
 
Overall, there is robust evidence as to whether the securities markets incorporate corporate 
environmental performance into share price.  However, there is some indication from the results 
of this study in relation to two of the three measures of environmental performance information 
employed (i.e. the corporate environmental reputation and physical performance). In addition, in 
chapter 1 it was the issue of whether there is a link between environmental reputation and actual 
environmental performance was raised and what was its direction. The evidence from the results 
in table 6 indicates that environmental reputation is negatively significantly related to physical 
performance until industry effects are included. That is, without industry effects companies with 
higher environmental reputation have lower physical performance, regardless of whether this 
refers to the DJSI or use of the GRI Guidelines. Further, the significant positive link between 
environmental reputation and its disclosure for the cases of the DJSI and the GRI fades way 
when other control variables are included. Moreover, the results indicate that physical 
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performance is significantly positively correlated with environmental disclosure for both the 
DJSI membership and the GRI Guidelines usage. These outcomes are not consistent with the 
findings of Cho et al. (2012), who elicited that voluntary environmental disclosure mitigates the 
effects of poor corporate environmental performance on environmental reputation, but rather 
suggest that these factors have varying impacts depending on the industry concerned. 
 
 
7.4 Chapter summary 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to set the background to the conclusions presented in 
chapter 8 as well as shaping the proposals for future policies and practices. More specifically, 
after a summary of the empirical findings from chapter 4, 5, and 6, which also contained the 
hypothesis outcomes, there was a detailed discussion on these. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter pulls together the main findings and contributions of the thesis. More specifically, 
the research avenues identified in the literature review, chapter 2, are linked with the conceptual 
development in chapter 3 and the subsequent empirical research presented in chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
To start with, there is a summary of the findings based on the propositions developed in chapter 
3 and this is followed by consideration of the implications for policy makers and practitioners. In 
addition, the limitations of the research are discussed and subsequently, there suggestions put 
forward for future potentially fruitful research avenues.  
 
8.2 Summary of findings  
 
The literature review in chapter 2 and the conceptual framework devised in chapter 3 helped to 
shape this enquiry into the nature of the influence of environmental performance on stock market 
performance and the effect of corporate environmental performance on investors’ decision 
making. It was reported that prior studies have presented mixed results covering all the possible 
outcomes regarding the relationship between corporate environmental performance and stock 
market performance, that is, positive (e.g. Belkaoui, 2004; Freedman and Patten, 2004), neutral 
(e.g. Lorraine et al., 2004; Murray et al., 2006), and negative (e.g. Brammer et al., 2006). Further, 
regarding conceptual development, scholars have faced difficulty in constructing robust models, 
in particular, because of the lack of consensus on how ethical/sustainable preferences modify 
conventional economic rationale and the lack of standardised measures of non-financial 
performance aspects of business activity (Ullman, 1985). In spite of this, it is generally accepted 
amongst researchers that there exists a relationship between environmental performance and 
stock market performance (e.g. Orlitzky et al., 2003), but its sign is still disputed in the empirical 
outcomes. Investigation into this relation is particularly crucial for profit-seeking investors, 
because if it is irrefutably found that corporate environmental performance is value relevant to 
investors, then having access to high quality disclosure would increase their utility. However, it 
is hard to establish which information is value relevant to investment decision making, because  
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corporate environmental performance is difficult to measure owing to its complexity and the lack 
of financial equivalence for non-financial performance. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 2, a 
standardised measure of this performance remains elusive and the various proxy measures used 
by scholars have been insufficient, which perhaps explains the variance in the outcomes (see 
Appendix I for examples). However, investors are heterogeneous and so they are expected to 
value the available information differently. In this respect, the evidence from the results in 
chapter 4 suggests that environmental reputation and physical environment performance are 
highly relevant information sources for investors in their decision making process. That is, they 
(i.e. profit-seeking investors) believe that such information has value relevance as it can affect 
expected future earnings and also stock market returns, leading to utility maximization. 
Regarding this, whilst some of the outcomes of this research on stock market performance have 
concurred with this perspective, others have not. More specifically, investors with holdings in 
firms with high levels of CSR (i.e. environmental reputation and physical performance) appear to 
experience low stock market returns, although such firms may generate high firm value, when 
compared with their counterparts. However, the outcomes for value relevance are consistent with 
what was expected.  
 
Moreover, in the capital market, financial reports and disclosures are premier sources of a 
company’s performance information and it can use the latter performance information, including 
environmental performance to minimize information asymmetry between it and outside investors, 
thereby increasing market value (Healy et al., 1999; Healy and Palepu, 2001). Therefore, 
managers have the responsibility of deciding whether to report and if so, what content to disclose. 
Further, as there are no commonly accepted guidelines for reporting, corporate managers often 
disclose their environmental performance according to a variety of voluntarily adopted 
procedures, including, set guidance on formats, (e.g. DEFRA and the GRI guidelines), 
environment management systems (e.g. International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
14001), and/or they can apply to join an SRI index, which requires achieving certain standards 
on ESG issues and economic performance. Being proactive towards these goals, implies that a 
company manager believes that environmental performance disclosure is value relevant 
information.  However, because of the voluntary basis of these procedures, each manager 
chooses which form to employ depending on their strategic positions. In this respect, the results 
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in chapter 4 suggest that the GRI Guidelines are value relevant to investment decisions even 
though they are not incorporated into share prices. However, the evidence from chapters 4 and 5 
indicates that membership of an SRI index (e.g. the DJSI or the FTSE4Good index), as one of 
the possible corporate environmental performance measures that could influence investors’ 
decision making, has no value relevance. In other words, it would appear that index membership 
information does not capture information that helps to determine firm value (Francis and 
Schipper, 1999) and hence, is of little use to investors when making investment decisions. These 
results are inconsistent with those of Al-Najjar and Anfimiadou (2011), who found the converse, 
i.e. membership does lead to an increase in the market value of a firm. Further, the event study 
carried out in chapter 5, which involved testing market reaction to the announcement of SRI 
index membership or exclusion, did not provide strong evidence of any impact. In sum, the 
research findings here do not strongly corroborate the view that the badge of index membership 
affects investors’ decision making.  
 
In addition, with the strengthening link between social and environmental issues and the 
investment process, an SRI approach incorporating both financial and social value is increasingly 
being adopted by investors, including individuals and institutions (e.g. NGOs or institutional 
investors), with the latter providing the lead in the SRI market (Louche, 2009; Sparkers and 
Cowton, 2004). Various forms of SRI initiatives has been promulgated by some in the investor 
community as potentially offering a more straightforward means of understanding and 
incorporating ESG issues into investment decision making.  Regarding this, Waddock (2008) has 
noted that such initiatives have grown in number owing to there being no standardized normative 
framework for SRI investors, regarding ESG issues, so as to keep up with changing public 
expectations and also because companies are seeking positive feedback from outside investors.  
However, despite these initiatives aimed at facilitating SRI and possibly because of their 
proliferation, it is unclear as to which of their aspects have value relevance in the decision 
making process. In chapter 6 it emerged that the CSR ratings used in this study weakly affected 
the portfolio ownership holdings decisions of SRI fund managers. More specifically, the tests to 
see if SRI fund managers are more sensitive to the CSR ratings than non-SRI ones, regarding 
their portfolio of ownership holdings, reveal only weak evidence for this to be the case. This was 
put down to SRI funds being owned by both value driven and profit-seeking investors, with the 
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latter spreading their portfolios to include SRI companies with low firm-specific risk. Further, it 
emerged that both SRI and non-SRI fund managers are attracted to multidimensional CSR type 
ratings (i.e. Accountability Rating), which provides support for their enhancement. 
 
8.3 Contributions of this study 
 
This thesis has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways. First, it has enhanced the current 
financial theory regarding investor decision making by employing multiple measures of non-
financial environmental information, including: environmental reputation, environmental 
disclosure, and physical performance, at the global level. Second, there has been an investigation 
into market reaction on announcements of addition to or deletion from SRI indices, namely, the 
DJSI or the FTSE4Good index, for a longer sample period than that employed previously. Third, 
there has been comprehensive elicitation of which environmental performance information is 
more value relevant to investors when making investment decisions. Fourth, as far as it has been 
possible to ascertain, this is the first study in which SRI and non-SRI funds have been 
distinguished by using a matched–pairs approach to investigate whether CSR ratings are more 
closely related to the former’s managers’ investment decisions regarding portfolio ownership 
holdings than the latter’s. 
 
Several scholars have contended that extensive disclosure will reduce information asymmetry 
and agency conflict between corporate managers and outside investors and thereby, enhance firm 
value and stock market performance (e.g. Gelb and Zarowin, 2002; Healy and Palepu, 2001; 
Healy et al., 1999). However, in reality, the onus is on corporate managers to decide how much 
to report on environmental policy, but given the lack of any robust disclosure framework that 
indicates the value relevance of different types of information and the fact that investors are 
heterogeneous, they have imperfect knowledge of how what they provide will be interpreted by 
investors or how it could affect future earnings. The results from the studies carried out in this 
thesis have indicated that the badge of SRI index membership brings no immediate economic 
benefit to a company, but the use of GRI Guidelines can do (i.e. value relevant to investors). 
That is, these outcomes imply that these current procedures on a voluntary basis are effectual in 
their current form for distinguishing environmental performance that increases firm value from 
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that which does not, if they are to be of use to managers whilst pursuing profitability. 
Furthermore, the results from the studies have indicated that environmental reputation and 
physical performance are value relevant to investors when making investment decisions. Hence, 
by taking a more proactive role with regards to building a good environmental reputation and 
providing extensive environmental disclosures, managers may be able to communicate a firm’s 
environmental performance more efficiently to outside investors.  
  
In addition, the outcomes from this study are informative to policymakers in relation to whether 
or not to legislate on the disclosure of communication of corporate social and environmental 
information. That is, the research findings in this study indicate that voluntary disclosures (i.e. 
GRI Guidelines) on ESG issues are value relevant to investors but have no influence on stock 
market performance.  However, in the case of the DJSI, it has emerged that investors do not 
value corporate environmental disclosures as well as their having no influence on stock market 
performance, which may be because they feel that the information required by the DJSI is not 
enough to have an impact on their decision making, it is not comprehensively understood by 
investors, or information disclosure by itself says nothing about environmental performance. 
Hence, this result draws attention to the need to encourage managers to adopt voluntary 
disclosures and, meanwhile, press for the development of clear standards or guidelines for 
environmental disclosures that can have an influence on stock market performance as well as 
firm value. Further, the results have revealed that SRI fund managers are not much more 
sensitive to the level of CSR rating than non-SRI ones, regarding the investment decision on 
portfolio ownership holdings.  This implies that there is no clear distinction between the two 
types of funds. It may be argued that there should be action taken to ensure that those with 
holdings in sin industries are not able to hold both types, which appears to be the case at present.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
227 
 
8.3 Limitations 
 
A number of limitations can be identified in this research that could have impacted on the 
outcomes and acknowledgement of them could provide the basis for future research, as discussed 
in the section. More specifically, each empirical study contained several shortcomings which are 
considered next. 
 
Sampling and data collection issues 
For the proxy for the reputational aspect of environmental performance data was substantially 
obtained from Fortune and although this is a premier source of corporate reputation, using it 
alone restricted the accuracy of this measure.  For example, even though the environmental 
reputation score is less related to a firm’s financial performance than other attributes (Brown and 
Perry, 1995; Wood, 1995), consideration of firm size has been neglected here, because the 
Fortune and Hay Group pre-selected the largest companies with the greatest revenues. Further, 
because reputation taken from this source is based on the evaluators’ perception, it is not possible 
to conclude that it is unbiased.   
 
Further, as a measure of a firm’s disclosure, membership of the DJSI, defined as 1 if a company 
is a member and 0 otherwise, was used rather than the content analysis of a firm’s 
CSR/environmental performance disclosures, which has mostly been utilized in the extant 
studies. Consequently, even though this researcher has attempted to avoid subjectivity by 
employing multi-dimensional aspects measured by a third party, the DJSI and SAM, this 
potential problem has not been entirely eradicated, because the contents of the questionnaires 
that firms have to complete when applying for membership are provided and reviewed by their 
respective committees, i.e. they determine the qualification criteria. Moreover, as with Fortune, 
the large company size bias of the DJSI, whereby it includes the 2,500 largest companies within 
the Dow Jones Global Total Stock Market Index
26
, probably distorted the overall outcomes in 
terms of the levels of CSR reporting, because these firms have greater inclination to use 
resources for environmental activities owing to their higher level of public exposure and their 
consequent need to gain or maintain their legitimacy. 
                                                 
26
 See more detail: http://www.sustainability-index.com/07_htmle/assessment/startinguniverse.html 
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Another limitation is with regard to the duration of the analysis period used in chapter 6. That is, 
the data for measuring fund managers’ portfolio holdings was provided by Lipper from 2006 to 
2007 and whilst they are global leaders in supplying mutual fund information, this was probably 
too short a period to capture fully how the CSR ratings affect fund ownership holdings decisions 
by SRI and non-SRI fund managers. 
 
Methodological issues   
Regarding the methodology employed in this research, firstly, the use of multiple regression 
analysis did not allow for consideration of the causal relationships between the dependent and 
independent variables. In particular, it was not possible to identify the nature of the vector 
between environmental performance and firm performance. Secondly, the decision to use an 
event study in order to measure whether the market responds to CSR information did not allow 
for control for the possible impact of other events that could have been having an impact on 
stock market returns. That is, even though the addition and deletion of samples was benchmarked 
against two SRI indices (i.e. DJSI and FTSE4Good index), it was not possible to completely rule 
out other explanations for what was observed. Further, even though the SRI indices were treated 
separately, no control was made for companies gaining membership the second of these indices 
having already been a member of the first, for such occurrences most likely would have 
dampened overall market response. Finally, in chapter 6 even though the research design issues 
and tests considered thoroughly whether heteroscedasticity and/or multicollinearity existed in the 
data or not, it was not able to control completely for such matters, because a company often 
holds both SRI and non-SRI funds. 
 
8.4 Directions for future research 
 
The findings of the study, as well as the limitations considered in section 8.3, provide the bases 
for a number of future research avenues. First, the most recent Lipper database of fund portfolio 
ownership holdings could be used to extend scholarship in SRI. In particular, triangulation of the 
results obtained in this study could be undertaken considering other perspectives, such as: using 
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other countries’ funds, including bond investment, and/or applying different criteria for a 
matched-pairs approach.  
 
Second, the number of variables employed in this research could be extended to include such as: 
the KLD ratings, the DSI (another sustainability index), and CDP (Carbon Disclosure Project), 
which would provide more robust outcomes regarding the relationship between corporate 
environmental performance and stock market performance. Further, incorporating another 
environmental performance measure, such as that of a quality of disclosure rating by an 
information intermediary, would provide a different perspective on the relation between 
environmental performance and stock market performance.  
 
Finally, future research could examine the impact of idiosyncratic risk on corporate 
environmental performance, using the data employed in this study or expanding upon it. Little 
attention has been paid to research of this type, with the exceptions being a recent few studies 
that have probed the relationship between CSR, using the KLD, and risk (see for example Lee 
and Faff, 2009; Manescu, 2011). By considering this risk factor, scholars and practitioners could 
gain useful insights into how and why environmental performance impacts differently at the 
firm-level. 
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Appendix I. Summary of literature on the environmental performance and firm performance 
 
Study 
 
sample  
test 
years 
Event study 
(event day) Method  
Theoretical/ 
Hypothesis 
frameworks  
proxies of environmental performance (CSR) Firm performance measures 
objectives /3rd 
parties 
reputation  
(Rep) 
Disclosures 
(Dis.) 
SRI 
Indices 
Market 
perform 
measures 
Accounting 
performance 
measure  
Control/ Others 
variables 
1 
 
Vance,  
1975 
45 1974   Replicating 
Moskowitz 
 
Trade-off 
theory 
Ratings by corporate 
staff members and 
business students  
      Share per 
price 
change 
    
2 
 
Belkaoui, 
1976 
100 (match 
paired, 50 
firms with & 
without 
disclosure )/ 
S&P 500 
1970 24 months 
(t-12, t+12) 
event day: 
annual 
report 
announce 
month 
Event study Efficient 
market view. 
(semi-
strong) 
Ethical 
investor 
hypothesis 
    Whether 
pollution 
expenditures 
were 
disclosure in 
annual report 
  Risk-
adjusted 
stock 
return 
(market 
model),  
Beta 
period: 24 
months 
    
3 
 
Ingram,  
1978 
287 / 
Fortune 500 
annual report 
01/05/ 
1970- 
30/04/ 
1976 
  Event study Capital 
market 
(Information 
content) 
    Monetary  vs. 
non-
monetary in 5 
categories  
  Monthly 
returns: 9 
mo. Prior 
and 3 mo.  
After fiscal 
year end, 
Beta 
period: 60 
months 
  Excess earnings , 
Year, 
Industry 
4 
 
Spicer,  
1978a 
18/ 
pulp & paper 
industry 
1968 -  
1973 
  Spearman 
correlation 
analysis, 
Stepwise 
regression 
 
 
 
  1970 pollution index 
report released 
by CEP (product 
capacity) 
      Monthly 
return  
(market 
model), 
Beta 
period:196
8-1973,  
Total risk 
Earning 
variability, 
ROE, 
Size (log TA), 
Leverage, 
Payout 
Current ratio 
  
5 
 
Spicer,  
1978b 
18/  
pulp & paper 
industry 
1968-
1973 
   Spearman 
rank order 
correlation,  
Mann-
whitney U 
test 
 Capital 
market 
(ethical 
investor 
hypothesis) 
1970 and 1972 
pollution indices 
by CEP (product 
capacity, mills) 
      Monthly 
return 
(market 
model), 
Beta 
period: 
1968-1973, 
Total risk 
Size (log TA,) 
ROE, 
P/E ratio 
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6 
 
Alexander 
& 
 Buchholz, 
1978 
40 / 
survey 
ranking by 
students & 
businessmen 
(studied by 
Vance(1975)) 
1970 - 
1974 
1971 - 
1973 
(CSR : 
1971, 
1972) 
  Replicating 
Vance 
study 
Capital 
market 
Ratings by corporate 
staff members in year 
1971 year and 
business students in 
1972 
      Risk-
adjusted 
return  
(CAPM), 
Beta 
period: 
1970 -74  & 
1971 -73 
    
7 
 
Anderson  
& 
Frankle,  
1980 
314/ 
Fortune 500 
campiness 
listed on the 
NYSE for the 
calendar 
year-end 
July 
1972 - 
June 
1973 
   Matched 
portfolios  
Capital 
market  
    Based on 
Beresford 
social 
involvement 
disclosures 
scales 
1.Dis. vs. 
nondis. 
2. Financial 
vs. non 
finance 
3. continuous 
vs. new 
disclosure 
  Monthly  
return 
(CAPM) 
Beta: from 
Merrill 
Lynch 
Securities 
research 
EPS, 
DPS 
  
8 
 
Chen  
& 
Metcalf,  
1980 
18/ 
Pulp & paper 
industry 
 
1968-
1973 
    Re-working 
of Spicer 
1978b data 
 
Pollution index  
by CEP in 1970 & 
1972 (product 
capacity, mills) 
      Monthly 
return 
(market 
model) 
Beta 
period: 
1968-1973 
ROE, 
P/E ratio 
Size 
9 Jaggi 
 &  
Freedman,  
1982 
105/  
chemical, 
paper & pulp, 
oil refining, & 
steel 
industries 
1973-
1974 
21 months 
(t-10, t+10) 
event day: 
10-K report 
filing month 
Event study Ethical 
investor 
hypothesis 
Rational 
investor 
hypothesis 
     Disclosed (84 
firms) vs. 
Non-
disclosed (21 
firms) 
  Monthly 
returns 
(market 
model) 
Beta 
period: 120 
months 
    
10 Bowen et 
al.,  
1983 
28 / 
electric utility 
firms which 
have at least 
20% of 
capacity of 
unclear 
1978-
1979 
28/03/1979 
accident day 
Event study Capital 
market 
Environ. accident 
(Three Miles Island) 
      Daily 
abnormal 
return  
(Market 
model) 
beta 
period: 
01/06/1977
-
27/03/1979  
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11 Shane  
&  
Spicer, 
1983 
58/ 
paper, 
power, steel, 
& oil 
industries 
1970-
1977 
6days 
(t-4 to t+1) 
Event study Efficient 
capital 
market  
Pollution index  
by CEP 
      Mean-
adjusted 
returns, 
Beta 
period: 100 
days 
    
12 Cochran & 
Wood, 
1984 
39 or 36/ 
US industry 
firms 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
  OLS 
regression 
of CFP on 
CSR, 
Logit 
regression 
of  CSR on 
CFP 
  Moskowitz  
ratings 
        Earnings/assets, 
Earnings/sales, 
Sales/assets, 
Net fixed 
assets/gross 
fixed assets, 
Excess market 
valuation 
Industry 
13 Stevens, 
1984 
58/ 
pulp& paper, 
petroleum, 
steel, & 
electrical 
utilities 
industries 
1972-
1977 
t-11 to t+6 
around 
CEP 
reporting 
issuing 
month 
Event study Capital 
market,  
Ethical 
investor 
hypothesis 
Pollution control 
costs by CEP  
      Monthly 18 
month (t-
11 to t+6), 
Beta 
period:60 
months 
excluding 
12 months 
Prior to 
portfolio 
formation 
date 
    
14 Mahapatra, 
1984 
67 / 
chemical, 
iron & steel, 
paper, 
petroleum 
refining, 
primary non-
ferrous 
metals, and 
textile firms 
listed on 
NYSE 
1967-
1978 
  Spearman 
rank 
Correlation  
analysis 
Ethical 
investors 
hypothesis 
Pollution control  
expenditure 
      Average 
monthly 
returns 
(market 
model) 
Beta 
period: 
1967-1978  
    
15 Freedman 
&  
Jaggi,  
1986 
88/ 
chemical, 
paper & pulp, 
oil refining, & 
steel firms 
1973 - 
1974 
t-8 to t+8  
around 
disclosing 
month 
 Event 
study 
Efficient 
market 
hypothesis. 
    Extensive vs. 
minimal 
pollution 
disclosures 
   Returns 
(market 
model) 
Beta 
period:120 
periods 
before the 
disclosure 
date 
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16 Freedman  
& 
Jaggi, 
1988 
108/  
Chemical & 
electrical 
utilities, 
paper and 
pulp, oil 
refining, steel 
firms 
1973- 
1974 
 Correlation    The amount 
of pollution 
emission & 
capital 
expenditures 
for pollution 
abatement 
disclosures in 
10K and 
annual 
reports, 
weighted 
schemes 
  ROA, 
ROE, 
Cash basis ROA: 
((NI+Depr.)/TA), 
Cash basis ROE: 
((NI+Depr.)/ 
Equity), 
(NI+taxes+IE) 
/TA, 
(NI+taxes+IE)/ 
equity 
 
17 McGuire  
et al.,  
1988 
98 or 131/ 
firms listed 
on Fortune 
ratings 
1977 -
1981 
1982 -
1984   
  Regression  
(CSR on 
Acct & 
Market 
perform.) 
Stakeholder 
theory 
  Fortune's 
Rep ratings 
of 
community 
and 
environ.  
Rep. from 
1983 to 
1985 
    Standard 
deviation of 
total 
return, 
Alpha 
Beta: from 
COMPUSTA
T database 
ROA, 
Operating 
leverage, 
Asset growth, 
sales growth,  
operating 
income growth, 
debt/asset, 
Standard 
deviation of 
operating 
income 
  
18 Belkaoui 
 & 
Karpik, 
1989 
23/ 
Leading 
corporations 
surveyed 
both by 
Business and 
Society 
Review's 
1972 
"Industry 
Rates Itself" 
and Ernst and 
Ernst 1973 
survey of 
social 
responsibility 
disclosure 
1973   Regression  
(social 
disclosure 
on 
perform.) 
Agency 
theory  
  Business & 
society 
(1972) 
Scale by Ernst 
& Ernst 
(1973) 
  Stock price 
change,197
0 -1974 
Beta 
period: 
1970 -1974 
(market 
model)  
Size (log TA), 
ROA, 
Debt/asset, 
Dividends/ 
unrestricted 
retained 
earnings, 
Capital intensity 
(gross fixed 
assets/sales), 
Net 
Incomes/total 
assets 
  
19 McGuire  
et al., 
 1990 
131/ 
 Fortune 
survey for 
1983 
1982 - 
1984 
(post- 
survey) 
1977 - 
1982 
(pre-
survey) 
  Regression  
(Rep. on 
perform.) 
Attribution 
theory 
  Fortune's 
Rep  
ratings  
    Monthly 
return 
(market 
model) 
Alpha, 
beta: from 
COMPUSTA
T and CRSP 
databases 
ROA, 
Leverage, 
Sales, operating 
income, & asset 
growth 
Debt/asset, 
Average assets 
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20 Freedman  
&  
Stagliano, 
1991 
27 /  
firms in 
Cotton textile 
Mill & 
Knitting mill 
industries 
4-day 
period 
(t+0 to 
t+3) 
t+0 to t+3 Event study Efficient 
capital 
market  
    10-K report 
1. 
Insignificant 
or immaterial 
disclosures 
 2. Non-
quantitative 
& material 
disclosures 
3. 
Quantitative 
& material 
disclosures 
4. no 
disclosures 
  Daily return 
(market 
model) 
Beta 
period: 
200-day 
trading 
period 
preceding 
the date of 
the court 
decision  
    
21 Jaggi  
& 
Freedman, 
1992 
13/ firms in 
pulp & paper 
industry 
1975-
1980 
  Pearson 
correlation 
Efficient 
capital 
market  
emissions (water 
pollutants) 
      PE 
ratiobeta 
period: 60 
months 
(market 
model) 
Net income, 
ROA, ROE, 
Cash flow 
/equity, 
Cash flow 
/assets 
  
22 Patten, 
1992 
21 / 
firms (exc. 
Exxon) in the 
petroleum 
segment of 
the 1989 
Fortune 500 
1988-
1989 
  t-test 
Regression 
Legitimacy 
theory 
    The amount 
of pages on 
Environ. 
disclosure, 
classified by 
Wiseman 
(1982) study  
      Size (log of 
revenues), 
Dummy variable, 
1 a firm is a part-
owner  Alyeska, 0 
otherwise 
23 Cormier et 
al.,  
1993 
74/ 
Canadian 
firms in pulp 
and paper, 
Steel, metals 
and mines, 
and 
chemicals 
and oil 
industries 
1986-
1988 
   Value 
relevance  
 Emission ratio  
(actual pollution 
level/pollution 
standard set by 
Environ. ministries 
        Net monetary 
working capital, 
Book value of 
inventories, 
PE ratio, 
Book value 
Debt, 
Book value of 
preferred stock 
  
24 Herremans 
et al., 
1993 
96/ 76 
US 
manufacturin
g firms rated 
by Fortune; 
matched 
pairs good 
and bad 
reputation in 
same 
industry 
1982 -
1987 
  Analysis of 
difference, 
Correlation 
Agency 
theory 
  Community 
and 
environ. 
ratings by 
Fortune 
    Abnormal 
return 
(CAPM) 
Beta 
period: 60 
months 
(market 
model) 
ROA, 
ROE, 
Operating 
margin 
(operating 
profit before 
depreciation, 
as % of sales), 
 Net margin 
(after-tax profit 
as % of sales) 
Industry, 
Size 
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25 Blacconiere 
& 
Patten, 
1994 
47 / 
Chemical 
firms similar 
to Union 
Carbide 
(NYSE/ASE 
firms and at 
least 10% of 
their 
revenues in 
chemical and 
industrial 
gases) 
3/12-
1984-
7/12/ 
1984 
event day: 
03/12/1984 
5-day 
windows 
(t+0, t+4) 
Event study Legitimacy 
theory 
    5 aspects of 
environment
al disclosures 
in 10-K prior 
to chemical 
leak 
  Daily 
abnormal 
return 
(market 
model) 
  Ratio of chemical 
segment 
revenues to total 
revenues, 
Size (log 
revenues) 
26 Brown  
&  
perry,  
1994 
234 / 
firms rated 
by Fortune 
1988 - 
1991 
  Regression   KLD Fortune       ROA, 
Debt/equity, 
Market to book 
value, 
Sale growth 
log(sales) 
  
27 Hamilton, 
1995 
436 / 
Firms in EPA's 
first Toxic 
Release 
Inventory 
(TRI) data 
release of 
June 19, 1989  
6-day 
periods 
around 
the 
event 
day 
(19/06/
1989) 
6 days 
(-1 to +5) 
logit 
regression, 
OLS 
regression 
Efficient 
capital 
market 
TRI       Abnormal 
return 
(Market 
model), 
Beta 
period: 
1/3/1989 -
5/24/1989 
    
28 Klassen  
& 
Mclaughlin, 
1996 
96 for 
positive 
events; 16  
for negative 
events/ NYSE 
or AMEX 
firms 
1985 - 
1991 
for +ve 
events; 
1989 - 
1990 
for –ve 
events 
3 days 
 (t-1 to t+1) 
Event study Stakeholder 
theory 
(operation 
strategy) & 
Efficient 
market  
Environ. events from 
NEXIS database 
      Abnormal 
return 
(Market 
model), 
Beta 
period: 200 
days (t-209, 
t-10) 
    
29 Hammond 
& 
Slocum, 
1996 
149/ 
firms by 
Fortune lists 
in 1993 
1981, 
1986  
  
  correlation  
regression 
Stakeholder 
theory, 
Slack 
resource 
  4 attributes 
of Fortune 
    Beta: 
dividing the 
sum of the 
covariance 
of the 
market and 
the 
covariance 
of the firm 
by the 
squared 
variance of 
the market  
ROE, 
ROS, 
Leverage 
(assets/equity), 
Asset turnover 
(sales/assets), 
Retention rate 
(1-
(dividends/NI)) 
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30 Cormier 
 & 
 Magnan, 
1997 
154 firm-year 
observations 
from three 
major 
Canadian 
industries 
(Pulp &paper, 
Chemicals 
&oil refining, 
and steel, 
metals and 
mines) 
1986-
1991 
    Value 
relevance 
 Water  
pollution level 
        Book value , 
Market value, 
Net monetary 
working capital, 
Inventories, 
Fixed assets, 
Other assets 
/liabilities, 
Debt, 
Preferred 
stocks, 
Minority 
interests, 
EPS 
Industry 
31 Waddock  
&  
Graves, 
1997 
469 / 
S&P 500 
firms high vs. 
low in KLD 
screens 
1990 
for  
KLD, 
and 
1989 & 
1991 
for 
Acct. 
data 
  Correlation  
regression 
Slack 
resource,  
Good mgt.  
KLD rating         ROA, 
ROE, 
ROS 
Size (TA, total 
sales), 
Risk (LT debt/ TA), 
Industry 
32 Russo  
&  
Fouts,  
1997 
243/ 
Large US 
firms rated 
by the 
Franklin 
Research and 
Development 
Corporation 
(FRDC)  
1991- 
1992 
    Resource-
based 
perspective 
Environ. rating by 
FRDC 
        ROA Size (log sales), 
Industry growth 
rate, 
Industry 
concentration, 
Capital intensity, 
Firm growth rate, 
Advertising 
intensity 
33 Konar  
&  
Cohen, 
1997 
130/firms 
from NYSE & 
AMEX subject 
to reporting 
requirements 
of toxic 
emissions 
1988 -
1990 
1991 -
1992 
event day 
19/07/1989,
6 days   
(-1 to +5) 
  Efficient 
capital 
market  
TRI       Abnormal 
return 
(Market 
model) 
Beta 
period: 240 
day period 
(t-250 to t-
10)  
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34 Neu et al., 
1998 
33/ 
Canadian 
firms 
operating in 
polluted 
industries 
1982-
1991 
  Regression Stakeholder 
theory, 
Legitimacy 
theory, 
Political 
economy 
    Number of 
words 
included in 
annual report 
    NI after tax, 
log (total 
debt/total 
equity), 
log (revenues) 
Number of fines, 
Number of 
articles of 
Environ. criticisms 
in CBGA 
electronic 
database, 
Number of words 
on other CSR 
topics, 
Number of 
articles in 
Canadian 
newspaper and 
periodicals 
35 Patten  
&  
Nance, 
1998 
25 / 
firms listed in 
1989 Fortune 
500 
petroleum 
segment & 
S&P  
15 days 
periods
: 
27/03/ 
1989-
10/04/ 
1989 
27/03/1989 
(on event 
day 
24/03/1989, 
stock 
exchange 
with closed 
for Good 
Friday) 
Event study Capital 
market, 
Legitimacy 
theory 
    12 aspects of 
environment
al disclosures 
in 1988 
annual report 
and 10-K  
  Daily 
abnormal 
return 
(market 
model) 
Beta period 
200 days 
trading 
period (-
210 to -11) 
  Size (log 
revenues), 
whether firms 
disclosed the 
operation in 
Alaskan 1988 and 
1989 financial 
reports 
36 Stanwick  
& 
Stanwick, 
1998b 
111 in 1987 
102 in 1988;  
120 in 1989;  
125 in1990;  
118 in 1991; 
121 in 1992/ 
top 500 firms 
listed in 
fortune 
1987- 
1992 
  Correlation  Social 
responsible 
principles  
Emission from EPS's 
TRI reports 
Fortune       Earning (annual 
profits/ annual 
sales) 
Size (Sales) 
37 Hughes II, 
2000 
44 US electric 
utilities firms 
targeted by 
Phase One of 
1990 Clean 
Air Act & 46 
non-Phase 
One US firms  
1986-
1993 
     Value 
relevance 
 Sulfur dioxide 
emission 
# of superfund sites 
% of power 
generated by nuclear 
unit to total power 
generated by the firm 
Value line of 
assessment of the 
regulatory climate 
        Book value, 
Market value 
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38 McWilliams 
& 
Siegel,  
2000 
524 / 
firms listed in 
KLD  
1991-
1996 
  Correlation  
Regression 
        DSI 400   Accounting 
profit, 
R&D intensity 
(R&D /Sales) 
Industry, 
Risk 
(Debt/assets), 
Adverting 
intensity, 
Size (total sales, 
TA) 
39 Konar  
&  
Cohen, 
2001 
233/ 
S&P 500 
firms in 
polluting 
industries 
1988-
1989 
  Regression Efficient 
capital 
market 
Investor 
Responsibility 
Research Center: the 
pounds of toxic 
chemicals emitted 
per dollar revenue of 
firm (TRI data) and 
number of 
environmental 
lawsuits pending in 
1989 
      Tobin Q R&D 
expenditures, 
Advertising 
expenditures, 
Sales growth 
Import-
consumption 
ratio 
Size (log assets), 
Market share, 
Capital 
expenditures 
/depreciation 
differential 
40 Ruf et al., 
 2001 
488/ 
firms in KLD 
database 
1990-
1995 
  Regression Stakeholder 
theory 
KLD ratings        Change in ROE, 
Change in ROS, 
Growth in sales 
Industry, 
Size (log sales), 
Prior year's 
financial 
performance 
41 Toms,  
2002 
215/ 
FTSE 100 UK 
firms 
1996 - 
1997 
  Regression Resource-
based view, 
Positive 
accounting 
theory  
  Community 
and 
environme
ntal ratings 
by Mgt. 
Today 
Survey for 
quality of 
environ. 
disclosure to 
fund 
managers  
  Risk: 
company's 
beta factor 
Average ROE 
for previous 3 
years 
Size (log sales 
turnover), 
Industry, 
Environ. Audit, 
Ownership, 
Quality environ. 
Obtained a 
Environ. quality 
kitemark or not,  
whether Environ. 
Reporting 
published 
separately or not 
42 Roberts  
&  
Dowling,  
2002 
300/firms 
listed in 
Fortune 
1984 -
1998 
  Regression Resource-
based view   
  Fortune       ROA, 
Market to Book  
Size (total sales) 
239 
 
43 Belkaoui, 
2004 
404 / 
US firms 
listed in 
Fortune  
1994 - 
1998 
  Correlation 
OLS 
regression  
Information 
of earnings 
  Community 
and 
environ. 
rating by 
Fortune 
    Annual 
returns (9 
months 
prior and 3 
months 
after fiscal 
year end) 
Beta 
period: 60 
months 
(Market 
model) 
Market to Book, 
TD/ TA, 
EPS 
Size (log MV), 
Earning variability 
(STDV of 
earnings), 
Earning 
persistence (first-
order 
autocorrelation in 
earnings) 
44 Clarkson et 
al.,  
2004 
29 US pulp 
and paper 
mill firms 
1989-
2000 
    Value 
relevance 
 Environmental 
capital expenditure 
        Book value, 
Market value, 
Abnormal 
earnings 
high-low polluting 
firms: divided the 
sample at the 
mean of emission 
data from TRI and 
BOD (Biological 
Oxygen Demand), 
LT debt / Equity, 
Cash flow from 
operations to 
sales, 
Net capital 
equipment to 
gross capital 
equipment 
45 Freedman  
&  
Patten, 
2004 
112/ 
top 500 firms 
listed on the 
EPA in 1987 
and available 
10-K report in 
1988 
12/06/
1989 
(Clean 
Air Act) 
  Regression Capital 
market 
(quasi-
regulatory 
mechanism),  
Legitimacy 
theory 
TRI    10-K report 
(content 
analysis) 
  Abnormal 
return  
(3 days 
cumulative 
AR: Market 
model) 
  Size (log sales), 
Industry 
46 Lorraine  
et al.,  
2004 
32 / 
firms 
exposed any 
environment
al issues by 
Financial 
Times, The 
Times, & 
Environ. 
agency from 
04/1995 to 
08/2005 
12/ 
1993 - 
08/ 
2000 
21 days  
(t-10 to t+10) 
Event study Efficient 
capital 
market  
Environmental news 
by Financial Times, 
The Times & Environ. 
Agency 
      Abnormal 
returns(t-
10 to t+10)  
Beta 
period: day 
t-310 to 
day t-11 
(Market 
model) 
  Industry, 
Fine, 
News 
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47 Al-Tuwaijri 
et al.,  
2004 
198 /S&P 500 
firms listed in 
the IRRC's 
1994 environ. 
profiles 
directory; 
had annual 
reports; and 
appeared in 
the Wall 
Street Journal 
Index 
1994   Regression Stakeholder 
theory 
Recycling ratio by 
IRRC 
  10-K report 
(disclosure-
scoring based 
on 4 environ. 
Indicators) 
  Industry-
adjusted 
annual 
return 
  Unexpected 
earnings,   
Pre disclosure 
environment , 
Growth 
opportunity, 
Profit margin,  
Environ. 
exposure, 
Environ. concern, 
Pubic visibility 
Size (MV) 
48 filbeck  
& 
Gorman, 
2004 
300/ 
 S&P 500 
firms related 
to environ. in 
the IRRC data 
base 
1999 - 
2001 
21 days  
(t-10 to t+10) 
Event study Efficient 
capital 
market 
IRRC database       Abnormal  
return 
(Market 
model) 
    
49 Elsayed   
&  
Paton, 
2005 
227 UK firms 1994-
2000 
  OLS 
regression 
 panel data 
analysis: 
dynamic 
estimation 
theory of the 
firm:  
win-win 
perspective 
  Community 
and 
environ. 
rating by 
Mgt. Today  
      ROA,  
ROS, 
LN (TA), 
TD/TA 
R&D/total sales, 
Net fixed 
Assets/total 
Assets, 
Industry 
50 Hassel et 
al.,  
2005 
71 Swedish 
firms  
30/06/
1998- 
30/09/
2000 
    Value 
relevance 
 Ratings from Caring 
Company (CC) 
Research 
        Book value, 
Dividend, 
Market value, 
Net income 
Industry, 
Year 
51 Hasseldine 
et al.,  
2005 
139/ 
UK firms 
listed in 
Management 
Today 2000 
2000   Content 
analysis, 
Regression 
Adopted 
Toms(2002) 
study 
 Positive 
accounting 
theory, 
Signaling 
theory 
 
  Community 
and 
environ. 
rating by 
Mgt. Today 
2000 
Environ. 
disclosures by 
sentences: 
quantity and 
quality 
measure 
  Beta:  from 
London 
Business 
school Risk 
mgt. 
services 
3 year average 
ROE (1998-
2000), 
Size (log sales), 
R&D 
Industry, 
Diversification, 
Ownerships 
52 Brammer  
&  
Pavelin, 
2006 
210 / 
UK firms 
listed in 
Management 
Today in 
2002 
1998 - 
2002 
  Regression Social 
responsible 
principles 
EIRIS database Community 
and 
environ. 
rating by 
Mgt. Today 
    Beta 
period: 
1998-2002 
(Market 
model) 
ROA, 
Total debt/TA 
Size (log TA), 
Industry, 
Advertising 
intensity, 
Visibility, 
R&D intensity 
(R&D costs/ TA), 
Institutional 
ownership 
53 Brammer et 
al., 
 2006 
451/ 
UK firm listed 
in FTSE All 
Share index 
07/ 
2002-
12/ 
2005 
  Regression Capital 
Market 
EIRIS database on 
07/2002 
      Monthly  
return 
beta, CAPM 
Size (Market 
Capitalization), 
Price to book 
value 
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54 Murray et 
al., 
2006 
100 / 
Top 100 firms 
from The 
Times 1000 
from 1988 to 
1997 
1988 - 
1997 
  Correlation 
Regression 
Ethical 
investors 
hypothesis 
    CSEAR 
database 
(page 
numbers) 
  Annual 
return 
  Year, 
Size (Sales) 
55 Inglis et al., 
2006 
77 / 
firms listed 
on Australian 
stock 
exchange and 
rated by 
RepuTax 
2003- 
2004 
  Regression     Ratings 
from 
RepuTax 
      ROA, 
ROE, 
Market value - 
Book value 
Return on 
invested capital 
  
56 Cormier 
 & 
Magnan, 
2007 
580 Canadian  
237 French 
308 German  
firm-year 
observations 
1992 
/1993  
-1998 
     Value 
relevance 
Environ.  
reporting 
  Ratings by 13 
items of 
environment
al disclosures 
    MV/BV Ln (total assets), 
Age of fixed 
assets, 
Industries, 
Public media 
exposure 
57 Curran  
& 
Moran, 
2007 
Firms added 
to or deleted 
from 
FTSE4Good 
UK 50 index 
2001-
2002 
Announce 
day of index 
membership  
Kolmogorov
-Smirnov 
one sample 
test 
Capital 
market 
      FTSE4Good 
UK50 
Daily 
abnormal 
return  
(Market 
model) 
    
58 Lopez et al., 
2007 
55 European 
firms of 
similar size & 
capital 
structure 
from DJSI and 
DJGI (total 
110) 
1998-
2004 
  Regression 
Hypothesis 
test(Mann-
Whitney U) 
Economic 
theory & 
sustainable 
develop. 
 :value 
creation 
      DJSI    Profit/Loss 
before taxes 
Revenue 
Size, 
Debt/TA, 
Industry 
59 Moneva  
&  
Ortas, 
 2008 
142/ 
European 
quoted firms  
2003-
2005 
  Correlation 
Regression 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Social & 
environmental 
ratings from SIRI 
group 
  GRI DJSI Annual 
returns 
    
60 Sinkin et 
al.,  
2008 
431 firms 
listed in 2003 
Fortune 500 
2003      Value 
relevance 
 Eco-efficiency : ISO 
14001 & issued CER 
reports 
        BVPS, 
EPS 
LT debt/equity, 
R&D expense/TA, 
Advertising 
expense/TA 
242 
 
61 Chatterji et 
al.,  
2009 
350 / 
firms listed 
by KLD 
1991-
2003 
  Poisson 
regression, 
Probit 
regression 
  Environmental rating 
by KLD 
Emission as pounds 
toxic chemicals 
reported by TRI 
Number and values 
of penalties by TRI 
Annual number of 
spill, permit denials, 
and shut-ins by CEDP 
        Net income, 
Total net sales 
Industry, 
Size (log revenue, 
log assets), 
Total common 
equity 
62 Collison et 
al,  
2009 
7 (interview) 
440 (survey) / 
Firms listed in 
FTSE4Good 
index 
12/ 
2003-
07/ 
2004 
  Interviews, 
Survey 
Legitimacy 
theory 
      FTSE4Good        
63 Consolandi 
et al.,  
 2009 
16-30/ 
firms being 
included to 
and excluded 
from DJSSI 
2001-
2006 
Announce 
day of index 
membership 
& effective of 
index 
revision 
Event 
study:  
t-test 
sign-test 
Capital 
market  
      DJSSI Daily 
abnormal 
return  
(Market 
model) 
    
64 Doh et al., 
2010 
65 deleted 
from & 56 
added to 
index 
  announce 
day of index 
Regression    KLD ratings     Calvert 
social  
index 
Daily 
abnormal 
return  
  Size (ln (MV)), 
Sales growth (% 
change in 
revenue between 
year -5 and year -
1) 
65 Guidry  
&  
Patten, 
2010 
474/ 
500 firms 
listed in the 
Newsweek 
ratings in 
2009 
2006-
2008 
  Correlation 
Regression 
    Environ. 
reputation 
by 
Newsweek 
      ROA, 
Market to Book 
value, 
Growth (3 years 
average % 
change in 
sales), 
Debt to equity 
Industry 
66 Hussainey 
&  
Salama, 
2010 
129/ 
non-financial 
firms listed in 
MAC survey 
from 1996 to 
2002  
1996-
2001 
  Regression  
Panel-data 
analysis 
Signaling 
theory 
  Community 
and 
environ. 
Rep. ratings 
by Mgt. 
Today 
    Annual 
returns 
EPS, 
Growth rate of 
book value of 
total assets 
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67 Cheung, 
2011 
40-61/ 
US firms 
added to or 
deleted from 
DJSI World 
2002-
2008 
Announce 
day of index 
membership 
& effective of 
index 
revision 
Event 
study:  
t-test 
Sign-test 
        DJSI World Daily 
abnormal 
return 
(Market 
model) 
    
68 Clacher  
& 
Hagendorff, 
2011 
356 firms/ 
included in 
FTSE4Good 
UK index 
07/ 
2001-
03 
/2008 
Announce 
day of index 
membership  
Event 
study :  
t-test 
Sign-test 
Regression 
       FTSE4Good 
UK  index 
Daily 
abnormal 
retune 
(Market 
model) 
Ln(TA), 
total debt/TA, 
ROE 
EBIT/# of 
employees, 
Firm visibility in 
FT Liquidity  
(average daily 
ratio of absolute 
stock return to 
trading volume), 
Sales/ TA, 
CF/TA, 
Growth(%) in TA 
over 3yrs before 
inclusion 
# of employees / 
TA, 
(MV+LT debt)/TA, 
GDP (inflation-
adjusted GDP 
growth before 
inclusion), 
Industry & Year 
69 Lackmann 
et al.,  
2011 
359/ 
European 
firms added 
to DJSI STOXX 
from 2001 to 
2008 
2001-
2008 
Announce 
day of index 
membership  
Multiple 
regression 
(CARs for 5, 
11, 21 
days ) 
Capital 
market 
      DJSI STOXX Daily 
abnormal 
return 
(Market 
model) 
Beta: CAPM 
Leverage (total 
debt/total 
asset) 
Country, 
Industry, 
Other market 
variables  
70 Robinson et 
al.,  
2011 
43 or 48/ 
North 
America firms 
added to or 
deleted from 
DJSI World 
2003-
2007 
Announce 
day of index 
membership 
& effective of 
index 
revision 
Event study         DJSI World Daily 
abnormal 
retune 
(Market 
model) 
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71 Salama et 
al.,  
2011 
1625 
observations/
UK firms 
1944-
2006 
  Regression     Community 
and 
environ. 
ratings by  
Mgt. Today 
    Market 
model 
beta 
period:  24 
months 
  log(# of 
employees), 
Dividend payout, 
Current ratio, 
log (equity 
gearing), 
log( asset 
growth), 
Return on capital 
employed 
Industry 
72 Cho et al., 
2012 
92 US firms 
the basic 
materials, oil 
and gas, and 
utility 
industries 
listed in 
Newsweek 
rating 2009 
2009   Path 
analysis 
  Ratings by Newsweek   Scoring of 
environ. 
disclosure 
(GRI) in 
repotting 
DJSI     Media exposure 
 
Data definitions: 
CEP: Council on Economic Priorities 
CSR: Corporate social responsibility 
DJSI: Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
DJSSI: Dow Jones Sustainability Stoxx Index 
EIRIS: The Ethical Investment Research Services 
FTSE4Goood: Financial Times Stock Exchange for Good 
GRI: Global Reporting Initiative 
KLD: Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co Ltd 
TRI: Toxics Release Inventory  
TA: Total assets 
EBIT: Earnings before interest and tax 
TD: Total debt 
ROS: Return of sales 
ROE: Return on equity 
ROA: Return on assets 
IE: Interest expense 
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Appendix II. Summary of literature on SRI performance and the effect of CSR on institutional ownership  
  Study  Purpose Test period Country N/ sample 
1 Teoh &  Shiu, 
1990 
Attitudes towards CSR   Australia 38 investment companies 
2 Coffey & Fryxell, 
1991 
Institutional ownership and CSR 1984 US 110 firms from Fortune 500  
3 Luther et al.,  
1992 
The performance of ethical units trust 1984-1990 UK 15 SRI funds 
4 Hamilton et al., 
1993 
The performance difference in SRI and non-SRI funds 1981 - 1985 & 
1986 - 1990 
US 32 SRI & 320 non-SRI funds, randomly selected 
5 Graves & 
Waddock,  
1994 
Institutional ownership and CSR 1990 US 430 firms from S&P 500 
6 Mallin et al.,  
1995 
The performance difference in SRI and non-SRI funds 1986 - 1993 UK 29 SRI funds & 29 non-SRI funds  matched by 
size and age 
7 Gregory et al., 
1997 
To re-evaluate the Mallin et al. (1995) study by controlling size and 
risk adjusted benchmark 
1986-1994 UK 18 SRI funds & 18 non-SRI funds, matched by 
funds size, age, investing area, and fund type 
8 Johnson & 
Greening,  
1999 
The institutional investor ownership types and CSR (KLD database) 1993 US 252 companies  
9 Statman,  
2000 
The performance of SRI funds 1990-1998 US 31 SRI & 62 non-SRI funds, matched by fund 
size 
10 Cox et al.,  
2004 
The Patten of institutional ownership and its relationship with CSR 
behaviour 
2001 - 2002 UK 678 companies  
11 Bauer et al., 
2005 
The performance difference  in SRI and non-SRI funds 1990-2001 German, UK and US 103 SRI funds & 4384 non-SRI funds, including 
dead funds 
12 Kreander et al., 
2005 
The performance difference  in SRI and non-SRI funds 1995 - 2001 European countries 
(UK, Sweden, 
German, Dutch) 
30 SRI & 30 non-SRI funds, matched by  age, 
size, country, and investment university 
13 Neubaum  & 
 Zahra,  
2006 
The relationship between institutional owners' holdings and CSR 
(KLD) 
1990 - 1992/             
1995 - 1997/  
1993 - 1995/             
1998 - 2000 
US Fortune 500 (357 in 1995 & 383 in 2000) 
14 Benson et al.,  
2006 
Managers' stock picking ability between SRI and non-SRI fund 
managers 
1994 - 2003 US different number of SRI and non-SRI funds, the 
data extracted from Morningstar database 
15 Bauer et al.,  
2007 
The performance difference  in Canadian SRI and non-SRI funds 1994-2003 Canada 8 SRI funds & 267 non-SRI funds 
16 Henningsson,  
2008 
To explore how fund managers are influenced by the CSR 
information when making investment decision 
2005-2007 Sweden 14 Swedish fund managers 
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